How can a comparison between the educational systems of Norway and Spain give a better understanding of welfare models and national cultures? The author aims at contributing to a discussion on how changes that largely are designed to meet present and future challenges in educational and welfare systems, are historically rooted in cultural, religious, economic and political power relations. The comparative analyses focus on complex and interwoven processes of change that are inherent to European standardisation forces – and that are assumed to be responses to impact of globalisation forces on education and work.

Basic cultural dimensions that are part of any social formation serve as magnifying glasses to what is particular and what is universal across cultural borders. By means of initial and closing questions the reader is challenged to critically reflect on hidden and open power mechanisms in own and foreign cultures.

Researchers, students and others who are visiting foreign countries – and foreigners coming to Norway – may gain some analytical tools that may encourage new orientation in intercultural communication.

Anne Smehaugen is Ph.D in Comparative and International Education and Associate Professor at Akershus University College.
Education, Culture and Welfare in Spain and Norway

Equalities and Inequalities

A main topic of the book is how development and reformation of education as formal schooling is related to cultural, religious and economic/political dimensions in society. The education histories and present educational systems in two extremely different European countries – Spain and Norway – are compared and analysed as parts of welfare states and national cultures.

One conclusion of the comparative study is that the Spanish and Norwegian educational systems have developed historically due to different organisation of welfare and work. The restructuring of cultural institutions as ‘social investment’ in education of the 1990s, imply a rapid narrowing of the former gap that is supposed to be influenced by accelerated internationalisation and globalisation.

The primary aim here is to contribute to critical reflection on patterns that may be taken for granted in own and alien cultures. More specifically, it is an objective to add to awareness about values – *for better and for worse* – that are part of ‘Norwegianness’ and ‘Europeanism’ for participants in internationalisation projects within Europe, and in globalisation processes in a wider sense.

By applying Gregory Batesons’ metaphors, it is an ideal to combine ‘loose’ and ‘strict’ thinking in reading this book, and also when moving in and out of cultures. This combination implies: open-mindedness and imagination, but also logical, analytical reflection on power regimes that may be concealed or hidden.

It is challenging to present ideas on complex social phenomena in a foreign language. I hope the reader will have broad-mindedness with my handling of the English language in this text.

A warm gratitude to Associate Professor, Else Askerøi, for her flexibility and availability as editor of the publication series, and for her critical and stimulating comments to the initial draft of this manuscript.

*Kjeller 2004*
## Contents

**Introduction**  
Cultural Patterns and Social Structures: Two Sides of the Coin?  
Social Class Differences: Myths or Realities?  
Modernisation of Welfare – Distribution of Risk  
Education as Standardised Learning Environments  
Why a Comparative Approach – and why Spain and Norway?  

**European Identity: Continental – National – Local?**  
Cultural Unification and a North-South Split  
European Democracy in a Centre – Periphery Perspective  
The Nation-state as Political Entity  
Nationalism: who are “we” and who are “the others”?  
'Europeanism’  
Citizenship that Includes and Excludes People  
Norwegian Identity  
Spanish Identity  
Final Remarks on European Identity  
Nationalism: Myth or Reality?  
Spain and Norway: Still Valid as Extreme Cases?  

**Cultural Dimensions in Spain and Norway**  
Family Structures and Functions  
Norwegian Family Patterns  
Spanish Family Patterns  
Transition from Family Traditionalism to Modernism  
Power Distance at Institutional and Personal Levels  
Dependence – Independence  
Individualism – Collectivism  
Femininity – Masculinity in Socialisation Practices  
Anxiety versus Tolerance towards Conflicts and Uncertainty  
Final Remarks on Cultural Patterns  

**Spain and Norway as Welfare States**  
Spain and Norway as Economic/Political Peripheries  
Economy and Central Institution Building  
Solidarity and Welfare in Local Communities  
Social Structure  
Centres and Peripheries within the Nations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUP:</td>
<td>Bachillerato Unificado y Polivalente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC:</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC:</td>
<td>European Economic Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGB:</td>
<td>Educación General Básica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU:</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVS:</td>
<td>European Value Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVSS:</td>
<td>European Value System Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVSSG:</td>
<td>European Value System Study Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDE:</td>
<td>Centro de Investigación y Documentación Educativa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COU:</td>
<td>Curso de Orientación Universitaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP:</td>
<td>Formación Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHI:</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI:</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDR:</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED 3A:</td>
<td>OECD definition of upper secondary programmes giving direct access to tertiary programmes which provide students with qualifications to enter highly-skilled professions or advanced research programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED 3B:</td>
<td>OECD definition of programmes providing direct access to tertiary programmes focused on specific occupation skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILE:</td>
<td>Institución Libre de Enseñanza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO:</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGE:</td>
<td>Ley General de Educación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LISM:</td>
<td>Ley de Integración Social de Minusválidos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCE:</td>
<td>Ley Orgánica de Calidad de Educación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LODE:</td>
<td>Ley Orgánica del Derecho de Educación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGSE:</td>
<td>Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema Educativo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOPEG:</td>
<td>Ley Orgánica de Participación, Evaluación y Gobierno de los Centros Docentes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD:</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCE:</td>
<td>Ministry of Church and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCSA:</td>
<td>Ministry of Cultural and Scientific Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC:</td>
<td>Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia – Ministry of Education and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MESC:</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Church Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MES:</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCES:</td>
<td>Ministry of Church, Education and Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE:</td>
<td>Partida Socialista de Obreros Españoles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCE:</td>
<td>Ministry of Church and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO:</td>
<td>United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP:</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVS:</td>
<td>World Value Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WE:</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices
Appendix 1: Map of core areas and peripheries in Europe.
Appendix 2: Areas of educational decision-making.

List of Tables
Table 1 Nationalism and collective identity in Norway and Spain.
Table 2 Institutional and interpersonal trust in Spain and Norway (percentage of total respondents).
Table 3 Individualism and collectivism in Norway and Spain.
Table 4 Aspects of authority and socialisation in the different cultural and religious contexts.
Table 5 Main characteristics of Spanish and Norwegian welfare states.
Table 6 Ideological pillars and developmental phases of the two-welfare states.
Table 7 Women and political participation.
Table 8 Percentage of students in primary schools in which differentiation practices are used.
Table 9 Learning environment and organisation of schools.
Table 10 Percentage of the population that has completed upper secondary education.
Table 11 Enrolment rates by age in Norway and Spain.
Table 12 Upper secondary graduation rates at typical graduation age in Spain and Norway. (Ratio of upper secondary graduates to total population (multiplied by 100) by programme and gender).
Table 13 Upper secondary education enrolment patterns by type of programme and type of programme destination.
Table 14 Percentage of 20 to 24 year-olds not in education, by level of educational attainment, gender and work status. Total 20-24 year-olds: 100.
Table 15 Average annual earnings of women as a percentage of men by level of educational attainment of 30 to 34 year-olds.
Table 16 Educational enrolment rates and estimated income from future work.
Table 17 Share of income (%).
Table 18 Four indicators of gender (in-)equality (percentage of total).
Table 19 Historical profiles of Spain and Norway.
Table 20 Relative autonomy of restructured basic education in Spain and Norway.
The idea that all citizens should have equal educational- and career opportunities irrespective of social and cultural background is a deep-rooted principle in democratic societies. However, it is also a great challenge for welfare states to fulfil this goal. The working life in Western Europe has undergone considerable changes related to de-industrialisation. These changes imply increased demands of highly specialised and technical qualifications. Education in the sense of formal schooling has become virtually the only gate through which young people may enter society as citizens with adult status. Even when this position is obtained, it is not guaranteed to be lasting throughout the whole working life. Social inclusion is increasingly dependent on a broad, general knowledge basis to form the capability of being flexible and adaptive to readjustments throughout the entire working career.

Extended, compulsory education has taken over essential dimensions of the acculturation of individuals that previously was the domain of primary socialisation within the family, and is also mandated to form a general basis for further training in employment and higher education. In this way, extended, formal education for all has been licensed to:

• cover longer time periods of young people in transition to adult status
• prepare for formalised life-long learning in rapidly changing economic and technical life
• form and evaluate wider areas of self-understanding and personal identities in a ‘life-wide’ learning perspective

Exchange of ideas, knowledge and information as well as trading commodities between peoples and nations has historically inspired to political and cultural new orientation. Such exchange has influenced on the way education and work have been organised. However, we are now witnessing accelerated internationalisation and globalisation trends of restructuring and switch-over within institutions that provide welfare. New media of information technology and transport have made it economically profitable to move industrial production – which requires low levels of formalised skills – to low-cost regions. This implies that regions with high
levels of labour costs and welfare securities – like Western Europe – are loosing labour intensive work places. In this way, division of work has become global. This globalisation of production places a heavy burden on European youth of being a highly educated and specialised work force in order to be included in society.

During times of industrialisation, workers moved from rural to urban areas in order to be secured jobs. As an extension of this previous mobility of work force within the industrialised nations, a mobility across national borders has become a major political goal in the European Union. As a consequence, harmonisation and standardisation of education and training between nations has become a necessary condition for the securing of certain standards of quality and equality. This intended mobility is conditioned upon people’s ability to identify with greater units; and upon their capabilities to relate to people with different languages, value systems and communicative codes. According to Benner and Lenzien (1996) these unification processes have largely been introduced according to indirect – rather than direct policies and control mechanisms. Wanted changes of people’s identification have largely been left to cultural institutions – particularly to education – which in turn respond to new incentives linked to economy and reputation. How cultural institutions are organised and how they change is based on deep-rooted value patterns which may vary in expression from one national context to another. Expressions of for instance authority may awoke feelings of trust and care in one cultural and social context, and mistrust and resistance in another.

Taking the current European harmonisation as point of departure, some factors may accelerate or obstruct the integration process:

- How shared or different were cultural values and patterns of welfare distribution before the globalisation forces gained momentum before the turn of the 20th century?
- What historical roots of family systems and socialisation practices are shared or diverse?
- How is the role of education in the ongoing cultural integration project within Europe?
- Which factors may indicate that the cultural rapprochement is driven by ‘natural’ cultural processes of exchange that grow out of people’s enlarged range of cultural identification?
- How is the integration project driven by political and systemic forms of control that reinforce institutional restructuring according to economic and other incentives to change?

The scope of these questions is Western Europe, and the main conceptual framework of culture and societies that are discussed are primarily related to this context. However, the dimensions of culture and welfare societies that are treated, are assumed not only to be relevant for self-reflection on
own culture, but also for new-comers who intend to understand alien cultures. Even if cultural expressions and communicative forms may vary from one context to another, they may belong to deeper cultural dimensions that are universal and part of all social formation. The main theme deals with the interrelationship between society, culture and education in an attempt to get closer to an understanding of interwoven processes of change that are assumed to be active whether countries are modernising or restructuring their welfare institutions.

Further questions to be treated in the text:
• How are cultural dimensions varying in different national contexts within the European civilisation?
• How are social forms of organising and distributing welfare to people connected to these varying cultural dimensions?
• How are two extremely different European nations – Spain and Norway – approaching equality of opportunities in education and society?

Main purposes of this book are to contribute to awareness of universal cultural dimensions that are basic in all societies, and to add to reflection on how they may be expressed and experienced differently from one particular context to another. It is an intention that researchers, students and others who are visiting foreign countries – and foreigners coming to Norway – may gain some analytical tools that may encourage new orientation and prevent flawed inter-cultural communication due to different experiential backgrounds. Finally, the motivation is to contribute to a discussion on how present changes – that largely are designed to meet future challenges in educational and welfare systems – are historically rooted in cultural, religious, economic and political interrelated power regimes.

Cultural Patterns and Social Structures: Two Sides of the Coin?

The concept of culture may be addressed from a variety of approaches. It may be applied to describe human activity and experience that are assumed to be part of the social structure, or it may be viewed as less fixed patterns. Moreover, cultural activity may be studied as ideas and symbols that express intentions and meaning, or it may be studied as observable, human behaviour. In this text culture will not be studied from a behavioural approach – but as value patterns, intentions and norms that form conditions for behaviour.

Cultural patterns may be both implicit and explicit. Implicit value patterns indicate unspoken, unconscious driving forces that are regulating people’s ways of action and how they experience these actions. When being
explicit, they are openly communicated and known as rules and norms. People may adapt to these norms, or they may resist. If people resist to follow certain collective norms of conduct, they may be exposed to collective penalty. This may take the form of social exclusion, which for instance is experienced by heavy drug addicts living at street level in European cities. Social exclusion is a shady side of civilisations that will be addressed from various angles throughout the book.

It is assumed that cultural phenomena are related to the structural characteristics of a society. People who become socially excluded are pushed to the margin of society’s organised cultural and social activity, and deprived of for instance education, work and secure life conditions such as: nourishing food, safe place of residence and meaningful participation in political, social and cultural life. It is a basic assumption that society consists of hierarchical social divisions based on various forms of power domination and subordination. The form and structure of such divisions will in the continuation be labelled as social formation, which may be applied as synonymous to social system and social structure. It is also assumed that cultural, communicative patterns regulate and express such hierarchical power constellations (Bernstein 1967, 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1994).

These basic assumptions on culture derive mainly from interpretative and analytical anthropology, in which cultural patterns are seen as mediator between personality and social structure. This is a perspective that does not invite to causal explanations, but which rather seeks understanding of historical, slowly changing, collective patterns. In this approach, culture and social structure are viewed as interwoven elements that mutually influence on each other. However, where a social system may be changed by ‘revolutionary’ political decisions, cultural patterns tend to remain due to ‘cultural inertia’, and thus uphold embodied social practices despite of the structural changes.

Social Class Differences: Myths or Realities?
Research on social inequalities in western societies confirms the class theory of Max Weber (1864–1920), which implies that social class positions are maintained by the mechanisms of exchange in capitalist market economies (Beck 1992). According to Nilsen and Østerberg (1998), class inequalities are upheld, even if social formations are changing. They have analysed the changes in the ‘wage labour class’ and its relation to the state in the ‘egalitarian’ Norwegian context of the 1980s and ‘90s. These two decades were marked by neo-liberal economic de-regulation. The

---

1 For a more thorough description of the view of culture underlying this text, see Smehaugen 2001, Ch. Four.
authors argue against what is conceived as a reduction of the working class in this period. They stress that all the sub-classes of skilled and unskilled workers, and higher, medium and lower levels of functionaries, are united by virtue of the fact that they are all wage labourers who sell their own working power. They are subordinated labourers with limited power to influence their production; and, there are increasingly more female employees in middle- and lower positions in the public sector. The authors also reject the idea of a growing middle class, since by the time the working class obtains goods and benefits formerly associated with the middle class the items have been devalued since they no longer grant the same access to social positions and power influence.

The middle classes will in this text be defined by their domination in symbolic control of communicative processes in education; both at theoretical and practical levels. The middle classes have greatest direct influence on and benefit from education. The ruling class is composed of those who decide the means, contents and possibilities of production, and is used as synonymous to elite groups. The activities of this upper class have a direct impact on labour and production, and education has an indirect or instrumental relevance as producer of skilled working force according to changing modes of production. ‘Social group’ is primarily applied to sub-categories of social classes (for instance powerful elite groups). However, ‘social group’ may also refer to socio-psychological processes in groups of students, peers etc., which only indirectly relate to the social formation (Based on Bernstein 1967, 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1994).

Modernisation of Welfare – Distribution of Risk

The term ‘modern’ has been applied since the Middle Ages to describe social and cultural processes which have been evaluated as worthy of being emulated (mainly in the field of theology and politics). The concept was expanded to arts, literature, music etc. in the Renaissance. The idea of modernity which has been predominant in the Western cultures since the mid-eighteenth century, has been based on the three sub-concepts listed below:

- individualism: the legally free man with individual rights
- reason, as opposed to mysticism, religion, emotional irrationality
- progress of liberation and liberty (Nilsen and Østerberg 1998).

According to the previous, modernisation of society is not a terminated project. With reference to contemporary European and global trends, modernisation here refers to the whole of social and collective life where standardising politics are diffused and emulated. The following categories of modernisation are based on Rust (1977), and some additional remarks are put in parenthesis.
Political modernisation
Growing emphasis on rational, scientific, and secular techniques of political decision-making. Increasing centralisation in governmental control functions. (In particular measuring ‘output’ of social investment as control of standardised contents).

Social modernisation
A shifting composition between the rural and urban populations, combined with a decline in the importance of traditional groups based on kinship. A wider range of individual ‘choice’ in alternative ‘options’. Increasing specialisation of roles in the economic, political and intellectual spheres. (Increasing influence by impersonal ‘social relations’ combined with the ‘pure relationship’\(^2\), which can easily be dissolved).

Economic modernisation
Increased application of scientific technology. Growing specialisation of labour. Increasing connection between human skills and economic efficiency. Increased emphasis on economic opportunities and goals (expressed by economic rationality and managerial terminology in educational leadership).

Intellectual modernisation
Weakened cultural traditions and religious dogma combined with increased value placed on the individual. Growing demands of vocational, social and intellectual training of the individual. Growing material attitudes (and short-term instrumentality in knowledge production).

Risk as social insecurity is taken to be a modernisation phenomenon. The late modern society\(^3\) is characterised by increased individualised competition and inequality, and it is a widespread opinion that responsibility for failure should be taken by individuals, mainly due to conviction that they lack necessary motivation and effort. Based on the previously described dimensions of modernisation, these signs of risk are viewed as inherent symptoms of the political, social and economic modernisation project of society, and not indicators of a post-modern society. To conclude, the further presentation builds on the assumption that risk
\begin{itemize}
  \item is a sign of social insecurity typical of reflexive, high modernity
  \item is unevenly distributed in the social structure
\end{itemize}

\(^2\) This concept refers to a ‘transformation of intimacy’ from relationships in which solidarity and trust was anchored outside the relationship itself – such as criteria of kinship, social, traditional duty and obligation – to ‘free-floating’ relationships of pure interpersonal trust and commitment (Giddens 1991:6,7 and pp. 88–98).

\(^3\) The concept ‘late’ or ‘high modernity’ derives from Giddens (1991); ‘reflexive modernity’ from Beck (1992), and the denomination of ‘self-referential, technological societies’ is introduced by Luhman (1995).
• relates unevenly to different cultural contexts
• is only partly related to individual responsibility for failure

Education as Standardised Learning Environments
This text is based on a conviction that people learn and develop throughout their entire life courses as ‘real-life-long learning’, due to universal human drives to seek meaningful existence through self-expression and development (based on Rogers 1961, 1974; Freire 1970, 1985). It is believed that formal education has no monopoly of learning processes. When such cultural and social learning and knowledge-generating activity in general is in focus in the text, the term social agents will be applied. Social agents are assumed to be reasonable: they act on the basis of strategies to seek well-being and happiness. However, since conscious and non-conscious elements may be mixed – and besides – the information they gain may be false; they may often act in ways that may clash with their real interests (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1993).

Youth, adolescents and young people may be used as synonyms when no exact age or educational level is referred to. Pupil will refer to a child within primary and lower secondary education only, while student is used as a general term for a person who is enrolled in any level of education. What makes conditions for learning within educational systems different from learning in general, is primarily the standardisation, homogenisation and individualisation of these systematised teaching/learning environments.

Why a Comparative Approach – and why Spain and Norway?
This study compares some differences and equalities within Western Europe related to education, culture and welfare, according to the overall questions:

How have national educational systems developed and changed?
How does education relate to culture and welfare in a broader societal perspective?

The two nation-states Norway and Spain in the peripheries of the north-south axis of Europe have been strategically chosen for the purpose of shedding light on maximal cultural and social variance within the Western European context. It is a principle within comparative research that if common patterns are found between extremely different cases, they are supposed to have great significance and validity. However, for two cases to be comparable, some similarities concerning important characteristics are also required (Archer 1979; Patton 1987; Daun 1998). In the present
comparison, three criteria on variation *and* shared qualities were complied
with:
• educational histories and present restructured systems
• cultural dimensions and religious value patterns
• social organisation of welfare

Spain – besides being an interesting culture and society – mainly serves
the purpose to form an extremely different back-drop to self-reflection on
what is Norwegian, in order to reveal what eventually is taken for granted
or artificially created as myths. The identification of the historical Norwe-
gian-Spanish gap, and its rapid narrowing during the last decade, may
serve as an interesting joint background to discuss restructuring of social
welfare systems on the basis of world systems and globalisation.

*Chapter Two* discusses questions on how the two extreme cases share
some common inheritance from the European civilisation, and how
nation-building and peoples’ identification have been varying in the Span-
ish and Norwegian nation-states.

*Chapter Three* identifies and describes differences and similarities in
Spain and Norway concerning the cultural dimensions of:
• power dispersion related to dependence/independence
• individualism versus collectivism, implying family structures
• femininity versus masculinity in socialisation practices
• anxiety or tolerance to conflict – uncertainty – ambiguity

*Chapter Four* addresses questions concerning social organisation and dis-
btribution of welfare in Spain and Norway.

*Chapters Five* and *Six* treat the historical development of the national
education systems and the present restructured models, and the outcome
of ‘educational investment’ at national and personal levels.

Finally, *Chapter Seven* relates the findings to a world-system perspective
by discussing how national cases may differ widely in cultural, religious
and economic/political values systems – and yet share some common
reorganisation patterns that are acting as standardising forces in a glob-
alised world.

The topics and questions raised in this book demand knowledge across
disciplinary borders. This broad perspective may limit the depth of the
discussion due to the following factors. Selections from a whole universe
of possibly relevant knowledge have been guided by subjective search of
understanding and meaning of the writer, whose pre-understanding
mainly derives from the field of education.
An integration process aiming at a freer movement of people and labour force is currently going on within the European Union. The multi-cultur-alism that is a result, constitutes challenges to nations and local democracies. Tensions may be provoked by recognition of cultural variation and corresponding resistance to cultural mainstreaming by some groups – and claims of cultural adaptation or assimilation from others. Such problems specifically related to immigrants/migrants, refugees, and persons applying for political asylum in Western Europe will be not be treated. Also excluded are questions particularly related to minority groups such as the Sami people in Norway and the Romany-speaking people in Spain. Questions addressing cultural unity and variation will in this text be treated in connection with standardisation forces and their assumed impact on democratic participation in general, and with a specific focus on the role of education as including institution in society.

**Questions which Urge the Reader to Make Own Reflections**

- Make some initial reflections on your own pre-assumptions about the meaning and significance of main cultural dimensions introduced in Chapter One.

- How valid do you find the idea that “everybody is the architect of his/her own fortune” (voluntarism) versus belief in cultural/social fate and destiny (determinism) when having European youth in mind?

- What are your basic assumptions about culture and society when it comes to equality versus inequality of power to influence on changing processes in Western Europe in general?

- What are your main hypothesis on differences to be found between Norway and Spain?

- What is your view of the role of education as entrance gate to adult status in late modernity?

- What are your pre-assumptions about negative and positive outcomes of globalisation of economy, production and information?
European Identity: Continental – National – Local?

As society divides up experience, so experience divides up society.
D. Hamilton

An overall aim of this chapter is to present a brief historical retrospective glance to the building up of the European civilisation, and how it has been split into a north-south division. The first objective is to trace some features of Europe as one symbolic, cultural unity. From this approach, European identity is based on some ideas that are shared within the European civilisation, and distinctive from non-European cultures. Secondly, Europe will be analysed as a multiplicity of cultural contexts that are being constructed by peoples in their constantly shaping and reshaping of identities, norms, values and patterns of belief. According to this second perspective, Europe is split into two main divisions. Within these, diversity is being manifested by the formation of national cultural systems and only loosely kept together by a common circle around the universal key dimensions of culture that were introduced in chapter one (authority, individual and collective identity formation, masculine versus feminine values and patterns of how to deal with conflicts). Finally, some comments on the contemporary social and economic process of change are added: does the restructuring reinforce the unity or the diversity?

Cultural Unification and a North-South Split

The first perspective to be discussed focuses on a unique form of European rationality that has been formed by a common legacy from three main ingredients:
• Judeo-Christian tradition
• Greek philosophy
• Roman law

When Spain and Norway are referred to as extremely different cases, the comparison is primarily based on the religious dimension. Judeo-Christianity is not only regarded as the first and dominant unifying force, but also as the first divider of the European civilisation. The split between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation resulted in a socio-politically dividing of North from South (Eisenstadt 1987; Zoja 1995; Webster 1995). The Northern Protestant churches, particularly the Evangelical
Lutheran State Church of Norway, became linked to the state and to political power, thus merging the clerical bureaucracies with the secular territorial establishments (Therborn 1995: 33). These Northern state churches became major agencies of the standardisation of national languages and for the socialisation of the masses, by means of early mass schooling, and unification of national cultures (Rokkan and Urwin 1983).

Norway is generally conceived to hold a stronger and more extreme status of Protestant orientation than the other Nordic countries. Similarly, it is held that Spain has occupied a traditional Catholic position in value orientation, even if the position of the Church has been weakened during the last decades also here. Spain was marked by a strong Counter-Reformist movement which consolidated privileges and authority of the church, and this was later reinforced under the dictatorship of General Franco. The Roman Catholic Church continued to be supra-nationally oriented after nation-building had become a fact. Unlike in Norway, it linked itself closer to trans-national intellectual and scholarship currents than to national state politics. In Spain it was only during the Civil War (1936–1939), that the Church took an active stance to support nationalism. Essential to understanding the role of the Catholic Church in Spain is also, according to the recognition of the religious frontier that it constituted towards the Islamic world (Therborn 1995).

**European Democracy in a Centre – Periphery Perspective**

Together with India, Europe belongs to the so-called axial age civilisations. This concept describes those civilisations which developed a basic tension between the transcendental and the mundane authorities. In Europe, unlike in India, the boundaries of different collectives, units and frameworks were continuously changing – and this instability and pluralism promoted the democratic system, which was unique to Europe (Weber 1958; Eisenstadt 1977b, 1987).

The borders between Protestant and Catholic Europe are almost identical with the territorial expansion of the Roman Empire. The hierarchical structures that the Roman “top-centred” empire left behind in the south are in sharp contrast with the multiplicity of centres that developed in the Germanic tribal structure. On the other hand, the trade networks of the former Roman Empire forwarded communication and expansion of religious and cultural currents, and thus they countered the cultural dominance from the top. The religious split caused by the Reformation and Counter-reformation is regarded as one of the two European revolutions (besides the Industrial Revolution), having the effect of splitting Europe into two main entities: the Northern Protestant and the southern Catholic ones (Rokkan and Urwin 1983).

Europe has developed a democratic system, which is unique word-wide
due to some specific social and cultural features connected to the elite and assertive groups that developed in Europe. There has been a continuous restructuring of class, ethnic, political and religious entities in combination with a high degree of autonomy of these groups and of their access to power. This has been interrelated to a high level of status, class consciousness and political activity. The variety of cultural and professional elite groups has been great. The legal system has had relative autonomy versus other interpretative systems of religious and political modes. There has been a remarkable autonomy of the city centres as to social and cultural creativity and identity formation (Eisenstadt 1977a, 1987). It may be concluded that Europe as a whole has been characterised by its variety of territorial centre-periphery formations with autonomous elite groups within each centre.

The modern European civilisation builds on tensions between a multiplicity of centres, and of tensions caused by a high degree of influence of the peripheries on these centres. This network or chain of plural power and resource holders has been basic to democratic development. The core area of Europe has, at the end of the 20th century, become markedly more concentrated and compact: France, Germany and the Netherlands constitute the most influential nations (Therborn 1995: 181 ff. See also Appendix 1).

The Nation-state as Political Entity

A nation may be defined as “(...) a named human population, sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”. A nation is a social construct and a political contract (Smith in Ester 1997:167).

The nation-state combines both the nation and the state: it describes a political entity with representation in the international community, consisting of people who share similar language, culture, ethnicity and history. It is asserted that only a minor part of the world’s approximately two hundred individual states are nation-states according to this definition. Norway is regarded as one of the most homogenous nations in the world. In spite of the relatively strong peripheries, the state has been capable of implementing standardisation and consolidation. According to this definition, Spain is a nation-state to a lesser extent than Norway. With Spain’s multi-linguistic structure and strong autonomous communities, the territory is less conducive to centralised power and institutional standardisation.

A less exclusive definition covers both the Norwegian and Spanish
nation-states portrays the nation-state as a body that at the very least has an international right to rule over a certain territory and its inhabitants; and which in most industrialised countries has developed from within, but based on ideas that were framed at European level (Daun 1992:11).

**Nationalism: who are “we” – and who are “the others?”**

In order for the idea of nationalism to be implemented, a certain legitimacy was claimed and to be perceived and recognised by ordinary people in their everyday lives. A conceptual frame is of importance in order to discuss the dialectical processes from macro to micro levels. *Micro-nationalism* is often used to cover nationalism at state and at local-regional levels, and building on imagination that people make in terms of the ‘we’ against the ‘them’ within their own country. *Macro-nationalism* is used to cover the historical European idea and politics of building distinct nation-states. It may also be used to cover contemporary European unification and standardisation processes in political, economic and cultural institutions (Galtung 1972 in Rokkan and Urwin 1983:17).

The imagined national communities of Europe are a rather new cultural product, as states before and long after the French Revolution were multicultural entities. The process of nation-building led to cultural standardisation within a given territory. The legitimacy of the social contract of the nation has been based on imagination of nationhood by large parts of the territory’s population. National identification has been promoted through shared symbols that more or less have been created by them through a process of imagination (Andersen 1983). What is shared and expressed as the dominant imagination may thus vary in accordance with a cultural centre-periphery perspective. The building of national identification was a unification process functioning to bridge the gap between past and present, and between centre and periphery. Symbols that at one point in time had only a local meaning, were subsequently objectified and imbued with a new, national meaning.

People’s historical interests and cultural creative and re-creative activities, which are essential for daily life, thus were instrumental as a means for territorial unification. This was thought necessary for territorial economic and political control mechanisms. The transition from multi-cultural pluralism to national identification thus inevitably bore inherent standardising mechanisms, which defined for individuals what constituted valid experiences, and who were qualified members of the in-group (‘we’) versus the foreign out-group (‘they’). Such unification built on myths of a shared cultural unity.

Transformations of identification and cultural values change very slowly and with great institutional inertia. National identity is made up by three essential components: symbolic, institutional, and historical aspects. It is
primarily people’s cultural status, which is the primary source of peoples’ national self-awareness and identity. Economic and material class criteria are found to be of less importance: rich and poor may join in a common national pride, for instance. The nationalism that has existed in Europe since the nineteenth century may be regarded as a myth and a civil religion. Language is commonly held as the most obvious sign of national distinctiveness and identification (Rokkan and Urwin 1983).

The 1980s marked the end of the era of intense internal migration from agriculture to industry. Since then, about two thirds of Europeans have been living in towns and cities, and they have become part of a structural process of European integration and standardisation across national cultures. Diverse European studies on peoples’ values have shown that there has been a general decline in nationalism within the nation-states of Europe. According to the European value studies, this decline in national identity seems to be transferred to a strengthened identification with local culture in local communities. However, small and peripheral nations (like Norway), seem to have greater resistance to European and global standardisation. Here, national identity has rather been strengthened during the 1990s, combined with a general feature that people increasingly tend to dig their local roots in a globalised world. The national dimension still constitutes the strongest variable of the European diversity. The strengthening of local frames of references for sense of belonging may be interpreted as a resistance or reaction against the trend of increased emphasis on a European dimension in education, in the media and common cultural symbols, and against globalisation (EVSS reported in Ashford and Timms 1992; EVSSG reported in Ester 1997).

‘Europeanism’

The current European integration process towards a common identity was started after the fall of the empire states, and in order to facilitate internal European co-operation. This co-operation started as a pure economic supra-national organisations, but has later incorporated the need of a cultural integration process and the closing of external borders against immigration (Fernandés-Armesto 1996:560).

Is there a common European, trans-national identity for the majority of the European inhabitants, or only an ‘Europeanism’ for the economic, political and bureaucratic elite, supported by political steering from the core? As the substitution of the name ‘European Economic Market’ (EEC) with ‘European Community’ (EC) and more recently, ‘European Union’ (EU) indicates, there has been a shift from an economic rationale to one aspiring to reach beyond the creation of a common marketplace. To what extent have people supported European integration?
The aims of the Maastricht summit in December 1991 contained elements of clear significance in the building of a European identity, as the participants were not only interested in a monetary union and a common currency, but also common foreign and defence policies, as well as extended rights of the European Parliament.

The Norwegian population has proven hostile towards European unification, as evidenced by their rejection of membership in the EC in 1972, manifested again in the 1994 referendum. Spain, on the other hand, joined the European Community as early as 1986. In the EC countries as a whole, the idea of European unity was supported by more than 40 per cent of the inhabitants.

Who are positive and who are negative towards the unification of Europe? According to research conducted in 1993 and 1994, it is people in positions of political, economic and spatial centrality who tend to support the European Union. In contrast, people in the spatial periphery and in economically and politically marginal groups tend to be sceptical about the terms of the union (Therborn 1995). This was visible in the Norwegian referendum: the resistance was greatest in the peripheries, and among the working class and women. The same pattern was found in the national mobilisation process: groups in the margins were more strongly against state centralism and standardisation.

Apart from the Norwegian case, do Europeans in general identify themselves more supra-nationally and continentally than people on other continents? Data from surveys having measured values world-wide, illustrate that as a whole Europeans identify more with the local dimension: “(...) there is not more of a European than of a Latin American or an African identity” (Therborn 1995:249). There is weaker support for a unified European identity than for economic and political unity. Travelling student exchange programs, are more important indicators of European citizenship than is a shared identity. However, exchange programs do quite obviously add fuel to the cultural integration process that otherwise would have been more slow; for better and for worse.

**Citizenship that Includes and Excludes People**

In order to describe excluding forces that have been inherent in European political nationalism, it is necessary to move beyond open ideologies. Sluga (1998) builds her analyses on French and German philosophers, when she identifies strong elements of inclusive and exclusive forces related to demands for universal rights and popular sovereignty that were made in the course of the French Revolution. She states that there were severe hidden obstacles and excluding principles inherent in the national sovereignty rhetoric which were directly associated with peoples’ identity formation.
The definition of the territorial borders included individuals and groups in citizenship (and excluded others from the same) due to their geographical residence, and questions on cultural unity and diversity were neglected. They were then also excluded from other citizenship. The notion of popular sovereignty was exclusively defined in terms of a masculine citizenship where the female population was excluded from participation in the public sphere. Females were not socially accepted in any role except for a mere supportive function in relation to the masculine citizenship (fathers, husbands and sons). Their social functions became limited to a private sphere distinct from the public sphere. In relation to the preceding, patriotism as ideology was built on masculine values where the individual was integrated into the state and nation through the patriarchal and bourgeois family. The paternal authority related to the ideas of ‘the father king’ came under pressure, and fraternity or brotherhood continued to exclude the female population. The brotherhood contract society of modernity substituted the earlier (and lost) legitimacy of paternal authority.

As long as the patriarchal ideology had legitimacy it was openly expressed. The German philosopher Fichte (1762–1814), who developed theories on transcendental idealism and nationalism, claimed that “(...) moral education would build the child’s instinctive identification with the father” (Fichte 1968:148 in Sluga 1998. Italics added). The patriarchal family became the image of a natural unit to support the fraternal nation-state; and, thus only formally included all – meanwhile the practice was to exclude women and ethnic minorities. The family as institution for the formation of male citizens was consigned to the feminine sphere, which was actively used to legitimate exclusion from female citizens’ rights. This social distribution of labour comprised the most oppressive practice of making the female population actively contribute to the exclusion and marginalisation of themselves. Females were defined – and defined themselves only indirectly – by applying feminine values and knowledge in support of masculine spheres and values.

When the masculine, patriarchal state and citizenship are juxtaposed with the distinction between civil rights that derive from rights earlier granted to male citizens, the following assertion becomes valid; masculine values have been extended to the female population, who in turn have supported the masculine values. It has been observed as a world-wide phenomenon that civil rights that are attached to men are more easily institutionalised than rights uniquely fitting women (Ramirez and McEneaney 1997). This may be supported by the fact that in Norway female suffrage was introduced in 1913, only shortly after male general suffrage in 1898. After its independence in 1814, Norway was the first country in Scandinavia to institutionalise broad manhood suffrage. However, it was limited to officials, landholders and businessmen. The voting rights were extended to grant universal male suffrage in 1898. In 1907, women were given lim-
ited suffrage and in 1913, universal suffrage. In Spain, the female population won the general right of suffrage together with the male population after the end of the dictatorship in 1978. Distinct feminine rights, as for instance, the right for women to control own reproduction and the liberalisation of the abortion law, have been strongly opposed in both countries, particularly in Spain.

Norwegian Identity

During the nation-building period in nineteenth century Europe, Spain and Norway were regarded as economically backward peripheries. Berend and Ranki (1982) have analysed the role of the state in this nationalisation process, and concluded that the Scandinavian countries (except Finland) became nation-states early in the century. Systematisation of networks into national institutions (state intervention) was important, but state activity in itself cannot normally be exerted without a high level of legitimacy. This in turn implies that a majority of people have to identify with an imagined, unified community.

A great proportion of the Norwegian elite who wanted to create a national, unifying identity were first-, second- or third generation immigrants (from Denmark, Germany, France and Britain) who themselves had to establish a national identity. The Scandinavian countries have, largely, shared and interrelated histories. Perhaps as a result, there are some similarities in identity and value patterns that set Scandinavians apart from the rest of Europe. Likewise, the Latin countries in many respects constitute a Mediterranean entity.

The nationalist ideology was growing in Norway during the nineteenth century, largely inspired by the revolutionary ideology of popular sovereignty; of freedom, equality and fraternity of the French revolution. Norway as nation-state was created, not due to any cultural spirit of community, but according to a myth about what is typically Norwegian. This was substantially defined by an intellectual nation-building group rooted in liberal patriotism. The construction of Norwegian national identity is influenced by strong cultural tensions between the centre and the peripheries. Norwegian nationalism took forms other than those on the continent. The chosen symbols derived not from urban elite groups, but were largely rooted in the popular culture of the rather unsophisticated, practically minded, free peasantry. Nevertheless, the national entrepreneurs

---

were largely made up of an urban, well-educated cultural elite greatly inspired by German idealism and romanticism. Selections from the peasant traditional costumes, habits and folk arts were combined with ancient Viking and old Norse heroism in new combinations, which constituted the main ingredients of the ‘bricolage’ of the Norwegian national movement.⁵

Apart from the Sami people in Northern Norway, and other more recent signs of multi-culturalism caused by a wave of immigrants from non-European and central-European countries, the Norwegian nation-state is a very homogenous nation. However, these minority groups consisting of immigrants, refugees and the Sami people all demand equal rights and an acknowledged minority status. The Sami people have lived in what is now Norway longer than ethnic Norwegians have. They were until the 1950s highly stigmatised in the Norwegian systematisation process, and many chose to assimilate. From the 60s, and particularly during the 80s, there has been a Sami ethnic revitalisation movement. According to many patriots holding fast to the “idea of ‘Norwegianness’”, the presence of Muslim and other religious minorities are viewed as a threat to the Norwegian identity. In other words, the Norwegian identity that is proclaimed in the public discourse, seems incompatible with Islam, as well as other religions (Hylland Eriksen 1993).

What was presented in nation building as ‘traditional’ tastes and habits were largely inspired by continental culture. Despite of the internal gap accounted for above, the Norwegian-constructed national identity is based on Norwegian distinctiveness and particularism, deriving from the notion that Norwegians are one single and homogenous people, distinct from all other peoples. Apart from the educated cultural elite (as mentioned before, largely with foreign backgrounds), and a growing trading group, there was in Norway in the peripheries great resistance towards foreign influence. In general, there would not have been grounds for linking national symbols more closely with upper class values and tastes. Thus, the strong influence of folk culture in national identity formation makes Norway not only unique in Europe, but also in Scandinavia. Due to the relative absence of a strong cultural elite and a Norwegian nobility to be influential in rural and regional areas – as was normally the case in Europe – the imagined Norwegian community of ordinary people probably became more important for the legitimisation of the national state. The Norwegian nationalism

---

⁵ The concept of *bricolage* was introduced to anthropology by the French social anthropologist Claude Lévi Strauss in 1962 (Johansson and Miegel 1996: 115–119), and has been applied by Thomas Hylland Eriksen (1993) in his analysis of Norwegian nationalism. It may be said to signify a process of selecting old, well-known symbols from a historical context, and merging the selected symbols into new and artificially created patterns serving the national ideology of unification.
thus may be said to have included popular symbols and excluded what was considered foreign, exotic and alien. This is what is classified as introvert and defensive nationalism based on particularistic ideas and resistance to hierarchical normative and central urban values defined by the magistrate culture and entrepreneurial middle classes.

Despite the homogeneity measured by ethnographic criteria, the Norwegian identity is contradiction-ridden and vulnerable, a fact also indicated by the language issue, which may reflect cultural division (Hylland Eriksen 1993). According to analyses of participation in democratic processes, there are in Norway strong local, peripheral attachment as a basis for social identity and political opinions. In spite of this tension between strong local identification and central political steering, the degree of political stability has been unique. In addition, participatory democracy has been strong. Key components of political effort have been the enhancement of individual welfare as a collective responsibility, which should be enhanced through political decisions, not through market mechanisms.

It may also be pointed to great inequalities in the Norwegian participatory democracy due to unequal distribution of resources (cultural, political, social and material) necessary for influencing political decisions. These differences were identified before the last centralisation process started in the 1980s. The increased economic delegation combined with centralisation of educational contents and systemic control of outcome represent a paradigm shift in the Norwegian democratic tradition which tends to disfavour the cultural aspect of participation of the peripheries.

From analyses of the Norwegian post-war society it has been concluded that during the process of modernisation and industrialisation after the Second World War, and under the dominance of the Labour Party, consumer ideals were peculiar expressions of Norwegian culture. Intellectually, the stakeholders accepted broad streams of knowledge, technology and trends of decision, which were based on positivist research. There was a strong belief that political decisions were value-neutral when based on scientific (particularly experimental) research. This had a strong impact on educational research and development (Hylland Eriksen 1993).

Centralisation and standardisation may have caused fragmentation at local levels. Traditions of strong local participation and pluralism have been exposed to control from the centre. Increased economic delegation combined with centralised control of educational contents and outcome, may be said to represent a shift in the Norwegian democratic tradition, which tends to disfavour the cultural aspect of participation of the peripheries. This causes a fragmentation of the life-world of people, which devaluates their experiential background.
Spanish Identity

Spain is a heterogeneous nation with three different forms of nationalism within the nation-state:
- *racial* (the Basque case)
- *cultural* (the Catalan and Galician case)
- *political* (the Andalucian case)

The modernising project of Spain (and Southern Europe in general) had developed differently from that of the Nordic region. In the south, alternatives to an objectionable, western individualist capitalism were sought. Collectivism and solidarity among groups were values that were strongly adhered to across the social and economic class hierarchy. Nationalism was primarily promoted as a basis for economic and industrial development, less to promote the direct (modern) link between individuals and the state. Also, cultural integration and shared identification were less emphasised than in Northern peripheries. This form of nationalism was conceived as complementary to *corporatism* (to be treated later) and the Catholic principle of *subsidiarity*. Subsidiarity refers to a political principle that a central authority should control only those activities that cannot be satisfactorily and voluntarily undertaken in the local community. The Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity in educational and social matters in particular refers to state transfer of responsibility to the Church, who has no national limitation such as the state church in Norway. Consequently, the role of education as nationalisation project has been weak compared to Norway and other Protestant countries (Mentzal/Senghaas framework in Mjøset 1992).

Spain had a continuous state formation beginning in the Middle Ages. Ferdinand II of Aragon (1479–1516) and Isabelle I of Castile (1474–1504) attempted to start the building of a modern bureaucratic state. There were two main reasons why the country failed to build a modern state. First, the prevailing concept of the kingdom as the monarchs’ *personal estate* – a concept that lasted until the nineteenth century – was incompatible with bureaucratic rationality and the rule of the law required by and for a modern state. Second, ambitious foreign adventures of Christofer Columbus (*Cristóbal Colón* 1451–1506) and his men weakened the social institutions, which were already subject to centrifugal forces undermining the state building.6

---

6 After Boiset 1989. What follows is based on Todd 1985; Gunther et al. 1988; Boiset 1989, and Djurfeldt 1993. For detailed references, see Smehaugen 2001: pp. 122–126. The references that are made to trends of wished self-definition are based on examinations and measurements that have been existing since the democratic elections of 1979, which represented the final step of transition to democracy.
Local cultural habits and identity and sense of belonging were linked to ‘the little motherland’ (*patria chica*). There may also have been anti-centralising forces among the strong, rural nobility having mainly local interests. The new urban middle class of entrepreneurial citizenry was also modestly developed compared to other European countries. There were cultural centres with strong elite groups in the various regions. It should be mentioned that one of the first European universities was established in Salamanca (in 1253) became a prestigious university recruiting elite students from all Europe. It should also be noted that the Roman Catholic church saw a centralised, secular state as a threat to the authority of the church as controller of the “correct belief”. Finally, there were problems in building a national independent economy.

At this point of time when Norway – and large parts of Europe – was in the midst of a successful nation-building process, Spain developed autonomous regions rather than enforcing the state. The result was a weak centre and strong regions. There were no national unification and standardising processes that could counteract the willfulness of the regions. Loss of colonies and related financial crises were issues accounting for the fact that the state administration was incapable of collecting tax revenues that were large enough to build an efficient central administration. Spain failed to build a democratic parliamentary system based on the European macro-nationalism and liberalism. A personal style of leadership survived with the exception of the rapidly economically and industrially developing urban centres of Barcelona and Bilbao, both of which were capable of consolidating their independence of the centre.

The situation outlined above remained until the second half of the 20th century. When the efforts to centralise power after the civil war (1936-39) were implemented, the power was typically not linked to institutions but to one single person, the dictator General Francisco Franco. The personal aspect of leadership has had stronger legitimacy among the population in Spain than in Norway, where trust and power are primarily attributed to institutions and organisations. The highly centralised dictatorship government was not able to systematise and unify the underlying heterogeneity of the traditional Spanish society. As reactionary power systems were reinforced and revitalised, the development process was blocked for decades.

The relation between rural and urban life patterns seems to have been dif-

---

7 The Islamic notion of ‘fatherland’ that the Arabs brought with them was that of a beautiful garden that has to be constantly cultivated in order to be maintained and developed, with the aim of citizens taking pleasure in enjoying the refreshment and beauty of it. This cultivated homeland was attached to a feminine conceptualisation which may have been carried further in the notion of the ‘motherland’.
ferent in Norway and Spain. In Norway the urban bourgeoisie (largely with foreign cultural and familiar roots) set the premises for legitimate habits and tastes. As a contrast, in Spain the weak urban bourgeoisie absorbed tastes and habits from the culturally strong landed gentry. The dominant pattern of influence has in Western Europe generally been characterised by diffusion from the urban centres to the agricultural areas; a rationality of progress as linear orientation that growth will never stop. These cultural patterns worked to undermine the former cyclical life orientation that traditionally was inherent in agricultural areas, where there was respect for the nature’s giving and taking in a cyclical rhythm. In Spain, the direction of influence was to a certain extent the opposite – from the rural areas to the urban centres – and this hampered implementation of a linear growth rationality that spread throughout Europe may have affected Spain’s slow economic progress.

Based on the previous, it is assumed that the national identification and consciousness among Spaniards is much more complex than in homogeneous Norway. First, there is a dual nationalism following the fact that a great majority of Spaniards identify themselves simultaneously with their region (in some regions conceived as nation of origin) and with the nation-state of Spain. People’s subjective attitudes are consistent with the sociological, juridical and political multi-national Spanish state. This dual identification is held by people across political ideologies, social classes, educational and professional background. The consolidation of autonomous communities within Spain has largely been stimulated in identical manners as nationalist movements in Europe. They have been built from the top by a minority intelligentsia or elite, and articulated as ideological campaigns, which finally have reached the social base and have become mass consciousness.

Despite an almost non-existent, unilateral, pure nationalistic consciousness in Spain as a whole, there are some extreme exceptions. In the Basque country, old and new nationalist parties want independence from Spain due to the claim of historical rights to their country. The Catalan nationalists are in favour of autonomy rather than independence. Pure nationalist identity with the region is expressed in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. These are the three regions with separate languages and independent historical traditions. Galicia is the least economi-

---

8 The references concern measurements during the 1990s. The findings are the results of a study by Rafael (1998) which was based on data collected and compared in 1991 and 94 for the research project Centre for investigation of Spanish social reality (CIRES) with representative sampling of people over 18 years of age. The patterns of local, regional and national identification that were found in the CIRES project seem to be supported by the EVSSG studies referred to previously in this chapter.
cally developed of the three and the least separatist one. The Basque national identity is an exclusive one since it is primarily founded on the notion of the ‘Basque race’ and origin, and secondly, on the Basque language. All other qualities are seen as a result of the two categories of origin. Immigrants thus cannot become integrated due to lack of blood bonds, and will always remain ‘guests’. The Catalan identity builds on shared language and culture, and immigrants may become integrated if they assimilate and adapt to the new culture. There is also in Andalucia a relatively strong separatist movement, which probably is more connected to the political sphere, with a widespread lack of faith in the state’s capability to serve the needs of this region. Andalucia has for long been in need of major land reforms which it has been difficult to find sufficient support for at central level. Catalonia is the most mixed of these regions as to identity. This may be due to the great migrations of labourers to this region from other parts of Spain in the post-war times. The state nationalism is most prevalent in Castille-La Mancha, which surrounds the capital, Madrid. This is not surprising since the state administration is localised there.

Within the minority movement that favours unilateral Spanish nationalism there are some political and social trends of the followers. Persons who define themselves as politically left-wing or centrists are more likely to have a dual national identity. Those on the right are more likely to identify themselves exclusively as Spanish. Those who claim a strong state (centralistas) are politically in the centre or at the right wing. The adherents of independence (interpendistas), on average place themselves considerably to the left. There have been diffuse relations between political orientation and occupational background in the Spanish democratic period. However, as to the question of national identification, there are significant relations between occupational background, political orientation and religious affiliation and nationalism.

• ‘White-collar’ workers tend to define themselves more often unilaterally as Spanish than those in ‘blue-collar’ occupations.
• The working class tends to hold more extreme separatist opinions than of centralism.
• People in higher social strata and actively practising Catholics tend to hold extreme attitudes toward centralism over than regionalism.

It is also interesting to note that rural and semi-urban residence is more closely related to Spanish national identification than urban place of residence. This means that urban citizens in Spain have stronger local attachments than do rural populations.
Final Remarks on Nationality Formation

Nationalism: Myth or Reality?
Nationalism is not nature-given, but is intentionally created by means of cultural and political ideologies that define some common qualities of a specific area and the people living there. Nationalism contains two main components:

Identification with an ‘imagined community’
Nation-building is dependent of institutions like constitutional rules, kingdom, education, state church, cultural and economic elite, historical and present heroes etc. who convey ideologies, symbols and myths that are intended to be shared by people of a specific geo-political territory and not by strangers.

Personal attachment to a social unity
This dimension is dependent of people’s psychological attachment and emotional belonging to a social collective sharing a sense of pride, validity and worth. This imagined unit is larger than those people naturally have capability to identify with as a result of direct, social contact and inter-human relations. It is dependent on the human capability to imagine what is not directly experienced.

Different cultural status within a social hierarchical structure promotes different possibilities to define what shall be conceived as valid, valuable and worthy by people’s collective self-identity. This may be viewed as a civil religion.

When nationalism is primarily political, it has as its ideal a civic formation (polity) of educated citizens united by common laws. According to this, citizens may move in and out of the designated national territories. When viewed as cultural, nationalism refers to the notion that individuals themselves embody nationality by their imagination and identification. It may be said that the former is defined by territorial power holders, while the latter is personally and collectively created by peoples’ cultural activities. It is within the concept of national cultural identity that divisions within the nation due to religious, provincial, ethnic and other factors may be acknowledged and respected (or lose respect). The Western political nation-states are based on the rationale of unity. National identity has been constructed by a variety of elite groups, imagined by many as a collective identity. The Western nation-states may be seen as territorially defined ‘in-groups’ whose members are entitled to certain rights. The rationale of universal rights is only universal within this territorial level. In a wider perspective, national rights are no longer universal, but entitling particular rights to ‘us’ but not to ‘them’. Nationalism as political means has been built on inclusion of some and exclusion of others, and
has largely been motivated by the need for effective, central control and defence of designated national territories.

This chapter has exemplified some common conditions for cultural integration related to state, individual citizenship and cultural identification. Nationalisation and modernisation in Europe was unilaterally nourished from the same sources: lost legitimacy of a feudal subordination and ownership of subjects, rationalism, and scientific advances. This split in political/economic and cultural spheres made the feminine citizenship – which was undefined – ‘bridled’ to socialise masculine citizenship. The different conditions for cultural integration along the North-South axis are manifested in the early closing of national and cultural borders that took place in northern Protestant states (and Norway), compared to the continuing supra-territoriality spread by the Roman Catholic church in the south (and in Spain). Consequently, the North-South axis marks the degree of dependency on Rome as religious centre, and the further away from Rome, the better have conditions for national mobilisation, standardisation of identities and systematisation of cultural institutions like for instance education been.

The balance between the cultural and the political spheres have been different in Spain and Norway. In Spain there has been a rich cultural and intellectual life in powerful elite institutions – combined with a relatively weak political will to co-ordinate and unify state institutions. Secondly, the Catholic Church has been apolitical in the sense that it has supported the principle of subsidiarity based on voluntary agency in the civil society. The basic cell of society – the family – has been a key institution for socialisation. In Norway, the cultural elite has been weaker, but has strengthened the capability to form society by delivering premises to a formalised state-administered socialisation project; early developed mass education. In recent times, through most of the post-war period, The Norwegian Labour Party was in power, and the modernisation process was driven by economic/material rationality. These facts may account for greater politicisation and rationalisation of the traditionally feminine functions of cultivation and education of citizens compared to Spain.

**Spain and Norway: Still Valid as Extreme Cases?**

Spanish nationalism provides at least two levels of thinking in terms of the ‘we’ against ‘them’, the region and the nation-state. Inclusion and exclusion in Norwegian nationalism is related to the level of the nation-state. This chapter has confirmed the two nations as extreme cases, but they share some patterns as European peripheries. In neither of the countries is there any cultural nationalisation, which seems strong enough to ‘embody’ the ongoing political standardisation and unification processes in the educational field at national and European trans-national levels. The ideal of political nationalisation has been a civic polity of educated
citizens who themselves ‘embody nationality.’ Standardisation and strengthened state control in curriculum definition may be seen in this perspective. Education may be instrumental means to create identification with imagined communities that culturally do not exist, and which only exist in economic/political spheres, and that may demand ‘cultural passing’ or cause resistance.

Table 1 Nationalism and collective identity in Norway and Spain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of nationalism</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation as social/political contract</td>
<td>Single contract between individual and nation</td>
<td>Dual contract: nation of origin/region and the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-state as political and cultural entity</td>
<td>Homogenous</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of nationalism</td>
<td>Predominantly cultural nationalism: strangers may be included by assimilation and adaptation (‘cultural passing’)</td>
<td>Different forms in different regions: • racial • cultural • political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relationship between:</td>
<td>Unification premises from the political sphere has been forced upon the cultural sphere via self-understanding.</td>
<td>Relative balance between political and cultural nationalisation processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political nationalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural nationalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity:</td>
<td>Dual identification: Strong national pride and strong identification with the local community.</td>
<td>Triadic identification: Strong national pride, strong identification with the region, and with the local community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the common identification with an imagined community”</td>
<td>Pan-European identity: weak</td>
<td>Pan-European identity: weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with Europe as ‘imagined community’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 1 some characteristics of the two nations are compared. The dimensions of nationalism in the left column may serve as analytical tools for reflection on nation-building and modernisation also in other territories and continents.
Cultural Dimensions in Spain and Norway

Culture consists of learned systems of meaning, communicated by means of natural language and other symbol systems, having representational, directive, and affective functions, and capable of creating cultural entities and particular senses of reality.

D’Andrade.

Based on the previous chapter it may be concluded that the North-South axis is essentially characterised by its religious and cultural division. In this chapter, a closer look at these cultural differences will be the main topic. Ways of organising family systems are basic channels through which cultural dimensions are formed and manifested in all societies. Moreover, ideological and political patterns that are dominating in a country have roots in the family structure, which is prevailing in that territory (Inkeles and Levinson 1969; Todd 1985; Hofstede 1991, 1993; Therborn 1995). Some Norwegian and Spanish family patterns will be compared and together form the back-drop of a discussion on how some cultural key dimensions have developed differently in the two countries. The main focus of this chapter is to discuss institutional differences and to provide some examples of how people subjectively conceive specific aspects of their own culture. An overall intention is to relate the different value patterns to an understanding of equality and inequality in national cultures. The presentation of data and the discussion will be grouped according to the four basic cultural dimensions:

- power distance
- individualism/collectivism
- femininity/masculinity
- conflict and uncertainty avoidance

These dimensions will be defined and treated in separate sub-sections below. Some overlapping will take place due to their inter-relatedness. Today a large proportion of both Spanish and Norwegian citizens would characterise themselves and their societies as post-religious. Irrespective of this, some references will be made to how essential Protestant and Catholic values have influenced on family- and socialising practices that change more slowly than religious affiliation.
Family Structures and Functions

The family produces and reproduces values that are shaped in society as policies and ideologies. This reproductive process is explained by the relation between primary human relations, and secondary social relations. The first term refers to the interaction between individuals and their everyday environment (in home and school for instance). Norms are learned from unconscious experiences through direct face-to-face interaction. Secondary social relations are determined by sets of values and attitudes, which govern relationships between individuals who do not know each other personally. The two spheres are related through processes whereby values and attitudes of the primary human relations are extended into consciously formulated ideologies that are expressed in public life. To exemplify: a family structure which is egalitarian and treating the members as equals, will tend to produce primary values that promote individual democratic participation in secondary, impersonal relations (in organisations, political parties etc.).

In the Norwegian agrarian society the patriarchal, authoritarian family structure has been common: the eldest son continued to live with his parents after marriage, and inheritance has been unequally distributed. In Spain there have historically been two main family structures. In the northern regions the family structure is the same as in Norway, whereas in central and southern areas the egalitarian, nuclear family form is predominant. In the latter case, inheritance is shared equally among all brothers. This has led to a splitting up of the land in these central and southern regions, resulting in new possibilities for capital investment in agriculture. Properties that were too small for subsistence became available for purchase. The in-egalitarian social structure that develop in such areas is a secondary effect of egalitarian values related to family and inheritance patterns.

As a contrast, in Norway and northern Spain, family farms have been prevented from being divided. Consequently, capitalism has not penetrated the rural areas; and the social structure is more egalitarian. At the same time attitudes held by people influenced by such family structures are directed by hierarchical authoritarianism (Todd 1985).

Norwegian Family Patterns

As regards Norwegian culture, diverse studies have furnished evidence of very high valuation and significance of the family group by people.9 In

---

what follows, some characteristics of the Norwegian family will be outlined. First, some manifestations of the legacy inherited from Protestant family ethics may be suggested. Just as the individual is alone before God, the Protestant family is a private and closed world. Some contradictory trends may be assumed to relate to the Protestant division between the *idealised self* and the *real self*; there may be a successful and polished façade, which disguises inner difficulties. This trend is connected to a paradox inherent in the public – private dimension. The family in Norway as social institution is more open to public scrutiny than in most other cultures, but actual human relations within families are defended as strictly private. The family, just like the individual, is self-sanctioning and builds hidden mechanisms of authority on individual feelings of guilt. The communicative code is indirect. Justice is often referred to openly, but since it is very closely related to guilt, the hidden function is to touch upon personal feelings of guilt (conscious and unconscious). It may be assumed that inconsistency or strict division between idealised facade and perceived internal self makes people (and social groups) vulnerable to social comparison. Sensitivity to social control may be one outcome. Conformity is an efficient defence against the threat of social evaluation, and Norwegian families largely seek to maintain conformist values and conformist practices. The open aims of Protestant socialisation processes are *independence* and internal, individual control. The unintended effect of *dependence* due to conformity to external social control mechanisms, may lead to divided selves who are extra vulnerable.

The ‘crisis of the Norwegian family’ has been discussed since the 1970s. Themes such as rising divorce rates, decline of the family, and social isolation have been recognised as problems. In addition, an increasing economic inequality over the last decade has reinforced class differences in family functions. When the rural – urban distinctions are combined with social class distinctions, three ideal family types may be indicated, and which differ in patterns of socialising practices:

**The urban middle class family**
An emphasis on independence, negotiations and exchanges among individual members characterises this family type. It is dissolved when exchange is recognised as uneven and unfair. This social formation is closest to the personalised relations of late modernity which have been characterised as ‘pure relationship’, since it may easily be dissolved when one or both parts no longer find it rewarding.10

---

10 The concept ‘pure relationship’ is used by Giddens (1992).
The urban working class family
This family is also dissolvable, but only if there is either a lack of solidarity or lack of recognition of the value of being together and supporting one another. The existence of this basic attitude is supported by the various European values studies, which agree that manual and unskilled workers and women express a collectivist value set that is in favour of familial solidarity.

The rural family structure
This structure is less defined by social class, and probably the most affected by the legacy of the Protestant split self. Here negotiations and exchange are less common, and the facade of harmony reigns. Informal sanctions and social control is stronger than in the cities. Anthropological analyses reveal that doubt in own worthiness is also a major defining aspect of this form, which may be interpreted as a symptom of the ‘elected versus rejected syndrome’ which still maintains power in rural, agricultural families. To be ‘elected’ refers to the privilege and status of the eldest son in the authoritarian, patriarchal family structure; the ‘rejected’ ones are all his siblings.

Is it a myth that working class families are more authoritarian than those from the middle and higher classes? In-depth studies employing participant observation have indicated that working class families articulated more direct, open discipline regulation, but more freedom was also given to the child since it was less use of indirect, hidden control mechanisms. Such mechanisms constitute an essential part of middle class socialisation practices. Accordingly, communication may be more restricted to ‘the here and now’, while socialising authority is more explicit in the working class compared to middle class values.

If codes of communication and authority differ in the social, hierarchical structure, it is also interesting to see these differences in relation to what is counting as valid codes in the school. It is assumed that exclusion/inclusion mechanisms can be a result of the contradiction between family practices in working class and rural families and the urban middle-class values that are dominating in formal education (e.g. individualism ands self-assertiveness in competitive learning environments). A collective cultural value orientation is stronger among the working class and the rural population, a value that is disfavoured in the dominant school practices. Children with collectivism as background, perform better when group goals – which make the individual anonymous – are prioritised. More privileged are urban middle-class children, who tend to perform better when their names are known and they work toward individual goals.

Behind the family facade there may be problems. It is estimated that
around ten per cent of Norwegian adults were victims of sexual abuse in
their family as children. Gullvåg Holter (1993) found for instance great
differences between parents’ expressed ideals on granting priority to chil-
dren’s well-being and development, and their capability to realise their
ideals. He suggests that increased individualism has meant disregard for
subjective and personalised integrity. Consequently, individualisation has
been reached by means of pedagogic practices that have a sharp focus on
individual personalities according to standardised criteria of what is ‘nor-
mal’ development (personalisation). If exaggerated, this may lead to a
disregard for human diversity, and inconsistency between what is real
and what is ideal may be one of the major problems of the Norwegian
family.

Spanish Family Patterns
How has the Roman Catholic, Spanish family developed compared to the
typical Norwegian family outlined above? The multi-cultural society and
the two traditional family structures in the Spanish national territory,
account for the fact that there does not exist any homogeneous ‘Spanish
family’. In what follows, some generalised features of the Roman
Catholic family as ideal type will be drawn, together with some main
findings from large-scale studies that provide data that are assumed to be
representative of the Spanish nation.11

Two basic family structures are distributed on the Iberian peninsula. The
authoritarian family structure has been prevailing in the Northern regions
of the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. These Northern regional
peripheries regions touch the centre of the political system and are more
industrialised and advanced economically than the remaining Spanish
peripheries. They have had considerable influence on cultural, religious
and political patterns and structures. The family structure underpins
excluding forces related to ‘ethnocentricity’, which is more outspoken in
the Northern than the Southern regions. Typical of patriarchal families,
the age of marriage is high, and there is strong support for Catholicism,
which is assumed to have an anxiety reducing function. In the south,
where an egalitarian family structure has been predominant, the age of
marriage is significantly lower.

The Roman Catholic ideology of the family is twofold. The family repre-
sents the smallest unit on which societal stability and the status quo may
be based. In order to reinforce the importance of the family, it is also des-
ignated as symbol of the holy community of the church. The exalted role

11 General features are based on Todd 1985; Gramsci 1971. Reference to data from repre-
sentative samples from European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) in Ashford and
Timms 1992. Spanish trends are here compared with overall Western European trends.
of female values and motherhood is symbolised through the position of the Saint over saints, as well as the holy mother Maria and her holy family. This may also relate to legacies inherited from ancient female Goddesses of the Mediterranean cultures. In respect to power, this ideology of high valuation of feminine collective attitudes attached to the family may, however, legitimate oppression of the female population in a claim for the status quo.

Some patterns and systematic differences exist in views on qualities desired in children among Western Europeans. The three highest valued qualities among Spanish respondents are:
- good manners
- tolerance and respect for other people
- responsibility

Spanish respondents score above average or average in these aspects. To become independent and self-determinative is in Spain markedly less emphasised than in Western Europe as a whole. In line with this, there is in Spain a higher emphasis on obedience.¹²

The issue where Spain most largely deviates from overall European trends is the high emphasis placed on the quality of imagination among Spanish respondents. To enhance in children and young people the capability to imagine what is not directly perceived may be associated with values favouring a rich mental life, where limitations associated with a one-sided rationality are avoided. That this quite paradoxically may enhance rationality as a second function may be anticipated because imagination necessarily relates to mental creativity where extended mental structures are favoured. These are basic qualities inherent in problem-solving and creative agency.

The emphasis on the value of imagination may counterbalance other Spanish and Catholic child-rearing ideals which are less internally-conducted, individualistic and self-assertive – and with markedly more emphasise on externally-conducted, collective values. There is an openly expressed emphasis on social control mechanisms as an essential part of

¹² Based on analyses by Ashford and Timms (1992) of data from EVSSG which have collected data at certain intervals of time. Scores: (i) good manners: average 75, Spain 82 per cent. (ii) tolerance and respect for other people: average 74, Spain 74 per cent. (iii) responsibility: average 74, Spain 80 per cent. Emphasise on obedience: average 38, Spain 44 per cent. (Extreme nations related to obedience are former West Germany with lowest external control belief in Western Europe, and France with the markedly highest). More recent data exist, and small changes are assumed to have taken place during the 1990s. However, such value studies show that value systems tend to be fairly consistent over time, and only subject to very slow changes.
the socialisation process. This may explain why Spaniards have less faith in own control potential (self-efficacy) than, for example, Scandinavian people. Their lower self-confidence in own control over both present and future situations may thus be realistic. With a basis in the previous treatment of the Norwegian cultural traits, it may be suggested that on the contrary, the corresponding high self-confidence in Norway may be somewhat unrealistic.

Related to the weaker belief in own control over own present and future lives and careers – and combined with greater open valuation of collective adaptation in Spain than in Norway – it might be anticipated that as regards educational and occupational choices, more conformist, less exploring choices would be found in Spain. This assumption would highly converge with the overall patterns that distinguish a cultural collectivist orientation from an individualist one; in collective societies sons follow the tradition of their fathers and families. From this it would also be likely to expect markedly more untraditional and unconventional educational and occupational choices among Norwegian adolescents. However, the opposite is the fact: Norwegian educational and occupational trajectories are among the most gender-conservative in Europe, meanwhile Spanish youngsters opt in manners that represent a radical breakaway from old gender stereotypes (to be elaborated later).

Transition from Family Traditionalism to Modernism
Increased demand for education as the dominant entry point to the labour market from the 1970s – combined with increased unemployment – has prolonged adolescence radically from the 1980s. Another change is that males and females no longer have segregated life trajectories. There seems to have been a liberation from social control of the primary, private sphere, which has occurred in parallel with increased standardisation of social control mediated by secondary institutions of socialisation.

Research on the family institution has shown that Spanish traditionalism and Scandinavian modernism in family life are commonly viewed as European extremes. The nuclear, bourgeois family separated from work has been more prevalent in Protestant regions of Europe. The more public, collective pre-industrial family form has been firmly established in Southern Europe. There are three family zones in Western Europe, which are related to the historical trends of development.13

---

13 Systematised and described by Hess 1995, also based on Vinken and Ester 1992; Ashford and Timms 1992. Demographic indicators of secular changes applied in Hess’ (1995) analysis were: fertility, family size, reproductive behaviour, household composition, extramarital birth rates, marital dissolution, single-parent families, remarriage/co-habitation, maternal employment and physical and sexual abuse.
• Southern Europe and Ireland: strongest traditional family roots.
• Majority of Western Europe: nuclear bourgeois family patterns as the prevailing form. This zone is made up of the European core countries, see Appendix 1.
• The Nordic countries, where the transformed modern family is now more prevalent than in the rest of Europe; diversification of family forms and dissolution of the two-parent nuclear family.

Southern European countries have started on a process of transformation and substantial change in family structure and function. Spain has had one of the most stable family forms, Norway one of the most transformed and radically changed ones. The family changes in Spain (and in Europe as a whole) move in the direction of the Nordic transformed and diversified families. The changes imply increased extra-marital births, divorces and single-parent households, and more mothers have entered the workforce (Therborn 1995; Stromquist 1997).

Power Distance at Institutional and Personal Levels

Power distance is manifested in social structures that shape and maintain social inequality as to status, position, and possibility to influence in private and public matters. Measurements show that there is a significantly greater tolerance to unequal power distribution in all the Western European countries that once belonged to the Roman empire in which there was one main power centre. In comparison, in the Nordic and Germanic cultures a markedly stronger intolerance to inequality of power distribution is manifested. These findings support the previous description of the dividing line in the development of democracy in Europe. There is also generally a connection between intolerance to unequal power relations and educational level as social class indicator: occupations with the lowest educational level relate to higher accept of unequal power and vice versa.

According to Hofstede (1993) power distance to some degree contradicts the centre-periphery dimension in the two countries. For instance, he found resistance to centralised power to be great in both countries. A corresponding tendency favouring regional and local autonomy for making local negotiations was even greater in Spain than in the more centralised Norwegian state, although in Norway, peoples’ attitudes do not fully correspond to the reality of a highly centralised and hierarchical organisation of power. Maybe this can be explained by the distinction between power in personal and institutional dimensions and between hidden versus open modes of exercising power.

A review of organisational theory after Boiset (1989) and applied to the
Spanish culture indicates that there seems to be an affirmation of the historical existence of an authoritarian tradition which has been deeply internalised in people, and that has made them, at least in organisational and institutional contexts, dependent on external direction and hierarchical power relations. This may be supported by the great mistrust in institutions in general that still seems to be the case in Spain, as Table 2 indicates.

Table 2 Institutional and interpersonal trust in Spain and Norway (percentage of total respondents).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in institutions</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>42,6</td>
<td>58,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>39,8</td>
<td>59,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>31,4</td>
<td>43,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>42,4</td>
<td>65,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal system</td>
<td>45,4</td>
<td>75,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>57,7</td>
<td>87,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>52,7</td>
<td>44,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General trust in persons*</td>
<td>65,1</td>
<td>36,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ester (1997)* General trust refers to a belief that “most people may be trusted”.

From the previous it may be assumed that Norwegians will tend to trust institutionalised, ‘neutral’ power exercise. In Spain, people will tend to trust power exerted in inter-personal relations where one may check the personal integrity of the power holder. Of the institutions examined, it was only one – the church – that was less trusted in Norway compared to Spain.

It should be noted that interpersonal trust is a prerequisite for political participation in a representative democracy, which is based on trust in one’s fellow-citizens. Interpersonal trust in this sense (not to be mixed with trust in intimate relationships) is not isolated from trust in democratic and authoritative institutions of the nation, as the two are linked. This relation has been essential in democracy theory (Almond and Verba 1965 in Hofstede 1991).

**Dependence – Independence**

This is a sub-dimension of power distribution. Research referred to above has shown that in countries with low power distance tolerance (e.g. Norway), there is in general a high and growing need for independence combined with weak collective norms and high individual exploration. What is of particular interest in this context is that in these countries the levels of parental education and occupational status play a relatively more deci-
sive role in shaping of attitudes than in countries with relatively high power distance (as in Spain). This implies that children of less privileged parental background in e.g. Norway are relatively more disadvantaged than those at similar levels in e.g. Spain, due to values of self-control and self-assertion that are required in education.

Individualism – Collectivism

This cultural dimension deals with the basis of identity formation, namely patterns of power and will of the individual versus the social group. Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose. Collectivism, as its opposite, pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups (Hofstede 1991, 1993).

Based on data from studies on European values (EVSS in Ashford and Timms 1992) it has been a cultural pattern that women, Roman Catholics, manual workers and young people are most likely to be negative to greater individual freedom. Individual freedom as value is most strongly supported by men, Protestants, older people and professional or managerial workers. The former groups are oriented towards collective responsibility for the welfare of all by the state, of greater equality in living conditions and by attitudes of solidarity. Political orientation in a right-left dimension is also systematically related to individualism/collectivism; those who are politically on the centre-left side are more likely to have sympathy with collective values of equality. On the centre-right side a prevailing orientation is associated with greater individual freedom and increased incentives for individual efforts, more competition and greater self-provisioning. There is a value gap between these different groups of people which runs across national borders and also across the North-South split in Europe.

There are in particular similar national views on individualism/collectivism related to economic issues and privatisation. Across Europe, in peripheries and core areas, the preferred strategy for fostering economic well-being is to encourage greater individual enterprise and reduce state involvement. A great majority of respondents in all countries praise the merits of competition. There is general agreement among people that pressure should be put on the unemployed to work and that success is a question of hard work. Spain is, compared to the average trend in Western Europe, less convinced that economic progress brings only benefits; indeed, there are accompanying costs likely to affect some groups more than others. Spaniards are definitely less positive than any other country to individual responsibility for their own social and economic security and welfare. They are also less convinced as to the benefits of increased
competition as stimulator of hard work (and they are less convinced that hard work in fact is the gateway to the ‘good life’). Concerning this item, Spain as a nation expresses values that correspond to those expressed by European women, Catholics, young people and manual workers.\textsuperscript{14}

The Scandinavian cultures are more individualistic than the southern European cultures. The national cultures are evaluated without considering deep-rooted or hidden aspects of dependence and power. In the examination of the welfare states that will be made in the next chapter, it will be distinguished between the Norwegian and Spanish welfare states:

- the social-democratic or institutionalised Norwegian ‘statism’
- the Spanish corporate Catholic work-merit welfare state

In the first case the individual is dependent on – and protected by the state. In the latter, social protection (above a minimum level provided directly by the state almost as a poor relief fund) is more closely linked to the family, mostly the male wage-earner; the father or husband.

The institutionalised form of dependency and loyalty is more easy to overlook because it is more invisible. When these different relations between individuals, social groups, and the state are taken into consideration, there seems to emerge a pattern with more nuances of individualism/collectivism in the two countries, which is related to the state and civil society. This is schematically displayed in Table 3.

\textit{Table 3 Individualism and collectivism in Norway and Spain.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Civil society, private &amp; public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Strong collectivism</td>
<td>Strong individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Weak collectivism</td>
<td>Strong collectivism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The egalitarian nuclear family structure prevalent in central and southern Spain favours individualisation of family members. Societies built on this structure develop flexible societies. At the other extreme, the authoritarian family structure commonly found in northern Spain and in Norway has tended to foster individuals who are more easily disciplined and disposed to collective social control (Todd 1985).

\textsuperscript{14} In these issues Spain follows close behind the Catholic countries, Portugal and Italy; but interestingly, the same is true of the Netherlands, a country that has been earlier and more strongly influenced by the Protestant Work Ethic than most others. They all share a doubt in regard to the unlimited value of increased incentives for individual effort, the effects of individual competition, and of a unilateral stress on the output of hard work (EVSS in Ashford and Timms 1992).
The Norwegian society is probably one of the most egalitarian societies in the Western world, with relatively small class differences or political polarity between right and left groups. The Norwegian preference for individualism may be a reaction against the levelling of incomes that exists in Norway. It is a general feature that those groups who most strongly support collectivism in welfare responsibility are women, low-educated workers, public sector employees, older and unemployed people.

Trust has been taken as an aspect of collectivism. Research seems to confirm the trend that those who most strongly favour collective social welfare systems are those who feel most dependent on it, and those with the lowest trust in own capability to have any political influence. Attitudes of trust also seem to vary between the genders. It was found that female respondents were significantly less apt to express institutional trust than male ones. Based on Svallfors’ study (1997), this may be interpreted as a symptom of the fact that women have lower perceived (and real) power to have influence on political decisions. Asford and Timms (1992) found that low perceived power is correlated with a high level of mistrust in social institutions. From this it may be argued that trust in own power to exert influence is related to trust in political decisions, which again is a condition of liberal ideas of individualist responsibility and freedom. It may be provisionally assumed that those who most strongly support collectivism are those who have the lowest perceived power to have influence on political decisions, and consequently they tend to feel more dependent on collective systems to secure their safety, welfare and justice. Given the validity of this supposition, it may be assumed that the ongoing economic individualisation and privatisation in Western welfare states proceed according to the political will of the most powerful and influential segment of the population, and consequently threatening the feelings of security and self-efficacy of other groups. Additionally, all value studies seem to support the hypothesis that the gender variable is the most powerful in explaining collectivist (feminine?) and individualist (masculine?) attitudes.

A vital question is then; ‘who may be trusted?’ European value studies (EVS in Vinken and Ester 1992) revealed a general trend whereby collective trust drops drastically when social relations are not personal. The cultural split following religious borders on the North-South axis seems to be – together with the gender variable – the most divisive criteria relating to the dimension of individualism and collectivism. There seems to be a general trend in Western Europe whereby those who support individualism are most likely to be Protestants, males, middle-aged/elderly, professionally trained or well educated. Collectivists tend to be Roman Catholics, female citizens, young people, nonprofessional or unskilled workers with low levels of education.
Feminism – Masculinity in Socialisation Practices

Sex and gender relates significantly to educational outcome, work and public positions, and may be said to have a function similar to that of social class. Gender refers to the socially constructed symbolic differences between men and women. ‘Gendered habitus’\(^{15}\) appears as natural, and is based on a masculine order, which is mostly implicit and appears as neutral, and needs no justification in the form of explicit formulations. Supported by ethnological research on shame and guilt and on psychoanalytical interpretations of Greek antiquity, Bourdieu (2000) concludes that the entire European cultural field shares an androcentric cosmology of the Mediterranean tradition (manifested in a dominating, masculine order), which is to this day historically reproduced by the social institutions of the state, the family, the church, the law and formal education. This order is embodied in unconscious schemes for perception and evaluation. Contrasts exist between a high (masculine, superior) sphere, which has the unspoken legitimacy to dominate a low (feminine, emotional, mystic) sphere that must be cultivated and tamed. Masculine domination is implicit in economic and political factors and cultural, symbolic power relations. To reveal such fundamental social division would require social analyses that deconstruct and reveal such ‘androcentric unconsciousness’ in research, language and cultural classification structures. This has never been an aim of this study. Power mechanisms related to gender are only superficially treated.

In both the Norwegian and the Spanish family structures the transmission of cultural values and norms went primarily through the female line. Some main differences in open versus hidden acceptance of this female authority (mandated from the masculine authority), and how these differences relate to socialisation practices, will now be outlined.

Due to the hierarchical structure there is transmission of strong norms of behaviour within the authoritarian family. Individuals are “shaped and moulded rather through education than by blows”. This is a symptom of the feminine cultural transmission based on masculine premises. The patriarchal family has overtly been defined by the father-son relationship, but in practical life the mother has had a key position in the socialisation of the children (Todd 1985:64).\(^{16}\)

\(^{15}\) The theory on gendered habitus is derived from Bourdieu’s (2000) viewpoint that the masculine order is dominating the feminine one in the whole European civilisation.

\(^{16}\) It is interesting to note that both in Norway and in the Basque country the female role is now publicly strengthened by allowing inheritance to follow the female line by juridical acceptance of primogeniture regardless of gender. The fact that Norway was a pioneer in banning physical punishment of children is an indication that authority no longer had

Continued on the next page
The following paradox seems to be the case: masculine authority has been formal and open, often involving physical violence, but of minor significance to the continuous cultural transmission. Feminine authority has been unofficial, but has served as a pillar in cultural reproduction, whereby basically hidden and indirect, symbolic means have been applied. Where other cultures have applied direct power to achieve individual adaptation to collective norms, the Norwegians (together with other countries within the authoritarian structure, largely converging with Protestant areas) have used feminine transmission based on masculine premises in formal and informal education. The impact of Prussian ideals of authority via self-repressive processes has been strong on Norwegian education (Todd 1985).

Taking as point of departure the distinction between traditional, open violence and symbolic, hidden violence (treated by Weber 1988; Bourdieu and Passeron 1994; Bourdieu 1996c) it may be asserted that the former no longer has legitimacy within the ideological setting of individualistic egalitarianism. This category is viewed as outdated and alien – but are people unaffected by the inheritance of this disciplining pattern? According to Webster (1995) there is in Europe a cultural pattern known as conditional inclusion underlying hidden forms of repression, and which is related to guilt and debt. The theories on Protestant and ascetic ethics indicate that this problem is greater among Protestant cultures. This assumption is confirmed by the European value studies (Ashford and Timms 1992; Ester 1997), which show that the legitimacy of traditional discipline and child-rearing has weak support among the population within Protestant countries. Correspondingly, various value studies have documented greater traditionalism in Southern Europe compared to the more post-traditionalist Northern Europe (EVS: Vinken and Ester 1992; Ester 1997. EVSSG: Ashford and Timms 1992. WVS: Therborn 1995).

The distinction between personal and institutional legitimacy of authority may be related to this difference. The lowest trust in authority executed by institutions is found in Southern Europe (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). Based on the previous, it may be assumed that it is personalised and open execution of authority that has strongest legitimacy in Latin cultures. This assumption seems to be supported by anthropological and organisational studies (Archetti 1984; Boiset 1989; Cohen 1993). In educational systems inspired by the Prussian school, in middle-class and bourgeois cultures;
and in societies with democratic, egalitarian ideologies, the regime of open authority has little legitimacy (Webster 1995).

Transmission of cultural patterns has been largely a task for the female sphere in the two cultural contexts, formally defined in one and informally in the other. In-depth studies (Archetti 1984) in Norwegian culture have indicated that the legitimate exercise of power in Norway is predominantly cognitively expressed argumentation, and emotional engagement is viewed as manipulative. In the Catholic and Latin context there is rather the strength of emotional engagement that may convince others. Taken together with the analysis of the masculine-feminine spheres in nationalisation processes it may be suggested that the Norwegian ideology is closer related to masculine rationality, the latter to feminine emotionality. Given the validity of this assumption, it can be presumed that there are stronger inconsistencies or tensions between masculine-feminine authority in Norway than in Spain, with stronger convergence between feminine vales and feminine transmission in Spain. This stands in contrast to Hofstede’s (1991, 1993) conclusion that Spanish culture is more masculine than Norwegian. Norwegian and Spanish cultures may alternatively be viewed as androgynous cultures – with diverging profiles of the masculine-feminine interwoven complexity.

Anxiety versus Tolerance towards Conflicts and Uncertainty

All cultures seem to construct some mechanisms to hinder and reduce arousal of anxiety when confronted with what is intolerably unpredictable, uncertain and ambiguous, however with different symbolic manifestations and of different levels of intensity. The most common institutions having an anxiety reducing function are religion, the legal apparatus and technology (Hofstede 1991) besides bureaucratic state paternalism and authoritarian-oriented political parties/movements (Todd 1985). The quests for intensified and greater progress and for exclusion of what is conceived as ‘differentness’ are also regarded as anxiety reduction means (Webster 1995; Zoja 1995). Hofstede (1991) makes a distinction between diffuse uncertainty and more specific risk situations related to the probability that possible negative events that are associated with them will actually happen. This may be captured by his statement that “uncertainty relates to risk as anxiety does to fear”. Uncertainty avoidance, as defined by Hofstede (1991:113), is a cultural phenomenon related to situations, and it refers to the extent members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. In what follows, this phenomenon will also be related to mental/social processes, since to confront the unknown is an essential aspect of educational and occupational creativity, problem-solving and decision-making.
The Mediterranean/Catholic cultures score high on uncertainty avoidance while the Nordic/Protestant score medium to low. This is the cultural dimension in which Hofstede (1991, 1993) found the greatest variance when measured along the South-North axis of Europe. He related emotional expressiveness, collective values of security and belonging, and masculine dominance (all claimed to be prevalent in Spain) to high uncertainty avoidance. Correspondingly, he linked high achievement motivation, high level of self-esteem, high individual internalisation, strong femininity and limited expressiveness of the Norwegian culture to low anxiety/uncertainty avoidance.

The production of anxiety/uncertainty avoidance will first be related to family structures in Spain and Norway. The authoritarian family structure is pathogenic by its consciously exalting the power of the father and unconsciously elevating respect for the mother, combining discipline with individualism. It creates weakness in defining the status of women; and as such the authoritarian family is an anxiety producing institution. It enhances discipline and intolerance, respect for the vertical power tensions through the father, and rejection of the horizontal structure, the brother. Women have a strong position in transferring female values via socialisation, but they are not respected since they are regarded as a threat to the masculine structure. This exposes the family to instability and gives women as well as offspring a double communicative message on the evaluation and legitimacy of female values. Children become susceptible to neurotic problems when there is discrepancy between the authority of the father and the mother: between the defined and formal, often ineffective power of the father – or the informal and undefined, but effective power of the mother. Through hidden, indirect communicative patterns, that may personalise the guilt and responsibility of the tension between mother and father, each individual becomes vulnerable. This family system coincides with high suicide rates (Adorno 1950; Laing 1970; Todd 1985).

Tolerance toward difference is the next issue to be considered. This deals with inclusive versus exclusive attitudes towards what is conceived as deviant. Comparison of Europeans’ attitudes towards e.g. racial and immigrant problems, political extremism, emotional instability have shown that Spanish respondents expressed higher willingness for social inclusion and tolerance than all the other Western European nations (EVSSG in Ashford and Timms 1992). This trend is confirmed by the features attached to individualistic family pattern prevailing in the Latin cultures and which, according to Todd (1985), have fostered people who are not predisposed to asymmetry in the social space. They meet what is different with an attitude of equality of worth between people. This has the effect that people do not forcibly try to reduce ‘differentness’ and to seek homogeneity. The great tolerance in Spain to what is diverse, makes cultural assimilation less required in Spain than in Norway. Spain has
welcomed minorities not welcomed elsewhere and serves as an example through its apparently peaceful cultural and ethnic heterogeneity. The shady side of this tolerance to social differences is that great social inequalities e.g. access to education, has also been tolerated.

Anthropological studies on Norwegian cultural codes have found that it is only when people and situations are conceived as equal that people feel free to be direct towards each others. Social symbols which show who ‘who belongs/does not belong to us’, is important in order to indicate to people whether they may – or may not – be direct in social situations. Cohen (1993) has stated that conflicts, because they are not easily controlled, are also handled by Norwegians in indirect manners of avoidance. Discussions should be focused on facts related to a pre-defined topic, and uncertainty linked to aspects that may be underlying or preceding a topic is regarded as irrelevant and illegitimate. What is clear, controllable and real is accepted. Disagreements and ambiguity are repressed, and common consensus of what is above the surface is expected. This results in less open oppression of others, but also in adaptation, resignation and reduction of creativity, as well as a virtual absence of deep-rooted solutions (Archetti 1984).

Final Remarks on Cultural Patterns

Cultural value patterns are difficult to analyse, due to a fact that has been demonstrated in this chapter: the various dimensions highly overlap each other both as analytical tools and in real life. The dimension of authority and power in various nuances is interwoven in almost all aspects of cultural creation and reproduction.

Authoritarian power exertion seems to have a dual function. First, it creates anxiety; secondly it is sought by those who have become most vulnerable to anxiety as an anxiety reducing strategy. To seek and support authoritarianism as open (but unconscious) defence strategy is in the Norwegian culture primarily levelled against institutional, modern authority. Open, personal authority and conflict is daunting in the Norwegian culture. However, personal power exists, but is hidden.

In the Spanish case, power has been more traditional and personal, directly executed as open confrontations. There has not been the same need to neutralise the socialisation authority in forms of self-censoring, due to an open and accepted definition of authority and greater acceptance of collective social control and dependency. Spanish young people conceive of themselves – probably realistically – as more externally controlled than Norwegian young people. On the other hand, it may be assumed that Norwegian young people perceive themselves as more inter-
nally controlled and self-reliant than what they in fact are, because institutional control over their life courses may be more difficult to identify from a personal perspective. This will be elaborated in the chapter on systematisation of education.

In Table 4 power is related to other cultural dimensions that have been treated in this chapter, and two ideal types of authority are deduced:

- traditional, personal, direct authority
- modern, institutional and indirect authority

**Table 4 Aspects of authority and socialisation in the different cultural and religious contexts.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional, personal, direct authority</th>
<th>Modern, institutional, indirect authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• diffused in: Catholic cultures (Spain)</td>
<td>• diffused in: Protestant cultures (Norway)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• main value: collectivism</td>
<td>• main value: individualism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• main aims: conformity to social control, collective responsibility</td>
<td>• main aims: independence, self-disciplining; self-assertiveness and competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• dominant communication form: verbal, not restricted to verbal, but rich in non-verbal forms, direct codes</td>
<td>• dominant communication: mostly verbal, often indirect codes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• officially defined feminine status and power in socialisation</td>
<td>• unofficial, undefined feminine power in socialisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• open sanctioning: collective and shame-centred versus negative agency, combined with unconditional affection</td>
<td>• hidden sanctioning: individual and guilt-centred versus negative agency, combined with conditional affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• legitimate authority: traditional, personal</td>
<td>• legitimate authority: modern, institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• executed in primary ‘human relations’</td>
<td>• executed in secondary ‘social relations’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• held in rural and working class cultures</td>
<td>• held in urban, middle class cultures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Family patterns have changed in Western Europe; and in all industrialised countries. The family group has generally become smaller and more diversified. It has moved towards the prevailing family pattern in the Protestant world, and more specifically the Northern European family, an area with greatest changes. In the Nordic countries the increased individualisation of sexuality, parenthood as well as childhood, has been combined with a decreased family collectivism. Taken the Nordic family changes and the modern authority regimes that are reigning there as a whole; it is likely to assume that the traditional, expressive and explicit authority that has been prevailing in Spain will change in direction of modern and implicit, power in step with the weakening role of the family as arena for socialisation, and the correspondingly increasing role of the formal school as arena for care, cultural transmission and learning.
Spain and Norway as Welfare States

*Human societies gain their quality by their ability to offer more people more life chances.*

D. Dahrendorf

Religion, culture and society are not separated entities. Variation in cultural and religious dimensions form different relations to the state, economically and politically. Mediterranean, Latin, Catholic Spain and Nordic Protestant Norway represent extremes along the North-South axis. Cultural and religious institutions and values were in the previous chapter found to be contrasting in many respects. Within the framework of economic and geo-political dimensions of Europe provided within political science by Rokkan and Urwin (1983), these two cases are also anticipated to maximise political variation in organisation of welfare states. Four basic institutions produce and deliver welfare:

- the state
- the family
- the civil society (encompassing the Catholic Church and voluntary organisations)
- the market

The different manners in which culture and religion relate to economic and political spheres in the Northern and Southern peripheries have formed essentially different qualities of the relationship between citizens and the state, and different degrees of systematisation between economic/political and cultural spheres. These differences have had great impact on distribution of welfare. The Norwegian and Spanish welfare states may be said to be European counterpoints. In Norway (as in Scandinavia) the state is a very strong actor; meanwhile in Spain (as in the Mediterranean countries) welfare is delivered mainly by the family (treated in the previous chapter) and by the civil society. The Catholic Church is a strong institution regarding welfare as health and education (Kuhnle 1999). This chapter focuses on how economy and politics relate to distribution of welfare equally and unequally in the two different social formations.
Spain and Norway as Economic/Political Peripheries

Berend and Ranki (1982) characterised both Spain and Norway as backward peripheries of Europe in the era of nation building and modernisation. In the period of the European education reforms and social changes that followed new industrialised production forms and class structures around the turn of the 19th century, Norway and Spain developed in different directions. Some social and economical aspects that are assumed to have caused these different national trajectories are focused upon in the following subsections.

Economy and Central Institution Building

During the period of industrialisation in Europe, foreign capital investment of the rich core in the peripheries – mainly to build communications and industry – was particularly extensive in the last third of the 19th century. In Norway the most extensive investment was made in the period when the national economy was being developed and the country was entering a self-sustained growth. This investment played an essential role in the opening of mines, building of electric power plants and in the chemical and aluminium industries. Domestic and international factors contributed to growth and international economic co-operation, in particular via foreign trade. From 1910 projectionist laws were passed in Parliament, which prevented further foreign investment.

Geographic proximity and availability of raw materials attracted France and Britain in investing in the Iberian peninsula, by granting state loans, building infrastructure and extracting and exporting minerals, particularly iron from the area of Viscaya. In Spain, differently than in Norway, these investments stopped before the country entered a consolidated national economy. In Norway, the relatively egalitarian distribution of land and income made it possible to create an internal market of mass commodities despite the small size of the nation. If there is just a small elite who can afford considerable consumer habits, few but luxury goods may easily be imported, as was the case in Spain. Thus the economy in Norway became relatively autonomous, more easily and quickly than in Spain.

The Spanish state tried to obtain a regulated economic policy, and it would have been necessary, like in other backward peripheries, to build a national economy through active state intervention. In Spain the features of the feudal structures of land-ownership from medieval times still caused tension between a strong landed aristocracy and a relatively weak

17 The following subsections are based on Behrend and Ranki 1982; Archer 1979; Rokkan 1987; Todd 1985; Østerrud 1986; Aubert 1989a,b; Rust 1989; Senghaas, Mentzel in Mjøset 1989; Pane in Gunther et al. 1988; Djurfeldt 1993, and Therborn 1995.
urban bourgeoisie. The latter insisted on an economic policy that was totally consistent with the liberal principle of free trade. The bourgeoisie in its long and successful struggle against the old feudal ruling class was inspired by the English case and wanted primarily to abolish old restrictions and rules and to promote liberalism. In Andalucia and Galicia the small farms \textit{(minifundis)} combined with absent landowners of the manors \textit{(latifundis)} inhibited efficient farming and economic growth; and thereby also an internal market with spending power. Across the nation, there was then a struggle between the feudal and middle class values, and between conservative traditionalism and liberalism. There existed enclaves in the Northern regions with a more advanced economy than the national territory as a whole. This resulted in internal regional protectionism.

Pane (1988:24 in Gunther et al. 1988) has claimed: “(...) on the basis of civic culture, literacy rates and economic development, it might be hypothesised that by 1930 Spain was at the level of England in the 1840s or 50s, or France in the 1860s or 70s.” This lag was reduced if not totally eliminated by the 70s, by which time Spain had become a major industrial power and its gross national product per capita had risen to a level comparable to that of other Western European countries. This shift was accompanied by a considerable urbanisation.

Norway is still a territorial and cultural periphery in Europe, but has turned out to be a small actor of the open world economy during the 20th century. Mjøset (1992) has analysed Norway’s position in the modern world economy from a centre-periphery perspective and concludes that there is a paradox that Norway moved from an economic periphery into the centre in spite of its typical patterns of dependency trade (just like in Spain); raw materials and primary products were exported with low levels of breeding and refining. Mjøset (1992) suggests that the specific apparatus of public administration became an important factor in the transition from underdevelopment to development. Nationalism and the economy were combined through a common resistance against foreign influence despite strong internal tensions. The homogenous Norwegian culture early gave legitimacy to a systematisation of the state apparatus.

Due to strong regional resistance to state centralisation in the north, and to the strength of cities that possessed traditions of trade and communication from the Mediterranean Roman trade belt in the south, it was difficult for Spain to establish a centre or core area. There was discrepancy between the politics of Madrid and the economy of the Northern regions, Catalonia and the Basque country. Andalucia and Extremadura were lagging behind, hampered by the \textit{latifundis} or big manor estates.

The Norwegian society was building up central state institutions that were shaped and controlled by a small ruling official class with its origins in
foreign nobility. This group of civil servants and clerks was supported by an aspiring burgher and entrepreneurial middle class. Due to the lack of a feudal aristocracy, the middle and upper classes had easy access to power. In Norway the political and cultural/economic elite was largely constituted by the same groups of people. This implied that the central institutions were controlled by one small elite who also had economic interests. State intervention and co-ordinating policies were resisted by the liberals of the peripheries, but from around the 1920s systematisation and centralisation were accelerated by means of economic restrictive strategies. In Spain liberalism was a reaction against the oppression from the feudal system. The powerful Catholic church tended to support the old elite power structures rather than a new entrepreneurial middle class. In Norway the religious streams of pietism tended to support and go hand-in-hand with the state, and with an ascetic work ethics with strong impetus to popular and secular enlightenment ideas, rationality, and entrepreneurial style in Protestantism/pietism/low church movements. “The road to salvation” combined the worldly and spiritual spheres and helped systematisation.

Solidarity and Welfare in Local Communities

Sociologists have claimed that fellowship and solidarity between equals (Gemeinschaft, which may mean fellowship or spirit of community) was a Germanic, Northern European phenomenon. On the contrary, hierarchical and segmented social systems (Herrschaft), was related to the structure of the Roman empire. However, after the fall of the West-Roman empire, the urban feudalism was weakened due to the break-down of the transport and trade city belt, and societal power was moved to rural areas. The Roman manors (latifundus) had been maintained by slaves. After the emancipation of the slaves, rural districts largely came to be constituted by peasant proprietors that were ‘equals’ and that might share solidarity and care for each other. In South-European villages there has been a spirit of community (in the sense of Gemeinschaft) with duration until recent structural changes in society. The rural village communities have had collective socialising and care functions in a manner that may remind of collective family systems in other parts of the world. One essential implication of this collective public space is that identity and satisfaction of needs have not been constructed in dyadic and closed relationships as in the urban bourgeois family system. Identity formation and care has been less individualised, and also ‘work’ has not been attached with the same high evaluation and individualisation as in Northern Europe.

An urban bourgeois culture and family system have also had weak influence in Norway. Norway has existed as a rural society with strong local spirit of solidarity until recently. In particular are the firmly established bonds related to both social sub-groups of the local community and to the
family. Forces favouring local solidarity have acted as peripheral resistance to centralisation and as counterculture towards the ideology of autonomy and individualism. Tensions have been between local solidarity and claims of individual welfare as a social responsibility reached through central political decisions (Lafferty 1981; Østerud 1986; Brøgger 1994).

Social Structure

Norway has been a class society like all other European countries, consisting of upper and middle classes of civil servants, merchants and entrepreneurs and a lower class of peasants and workers. Practically all farmers owned their own land, but fragmentation of the farmland had been prevented due to the ancient allodial privileges, which gave the firstborn son odal possession of the freehold land. Civil servants constituted a nuclear ruling class. The Parliament functioned as a democratic arena where the struggle between the rural interests and the urban bourgeoisie could be handled within a representative ‘democratic’ way that kept tensions low, preserving peaceful co-operation. Also, the rule of the law and the corps of lawyers had a peacekeeping function. The ideological structure has been built on an authoritarian foundation, the opposing liberal forces have been weak and expressed by less resourceful groups than in Spain. The church and the state have mutually supported each other. Finally, there is virtually no autonomous elite group. The elite in Norway has largely consisted of administrative bureaucrats and civil servants that would have no elite function independent of state power. The power centres have consequently been symbiotic. Norway is also more ethnically homogeneous and with less vertical hierarchy due to lack of feudal aristocracy.

In Spain the situation was opposite. As in Southern Europe in general, social and economic cleavages were common. The social structure created a social climate of ‘in-groups’ that were standing against other ‘in-groups’. In sociological terms this is particularism; to treat members of ‘out-groups’ differently than members of the ‘in-group’, as solidarity, trust and care is primarily linked to people who are personally known (Todd 1985).

Centres and Peripheries within the Nations

In particular, Catalonia has developed great economic and cultural strength to compensate for political power that had been lost to Castile by the end of the 15th century. In the history of Spain as national state the three major regional languages; Catalán, Galician, and Euskera or the Basque language, have received minimal level of recognition compared to
the Castilian language, but this has been countered by the great demographic imbalance in the country. There are strong cultural tensions among the regions, and at least four indigenous standards. From the 20th century onwards, Spain may be characterised as a seaward nation-state and a retrenched empire with strong city networks and autonomous regions. The linguistic structure is four official languages.

Catalonia, with its earlier history of centre-building, has consolidated its autonomous position in post-war times due to growing industry around Barcelona, which has caused great immigration from Castile to Catalonia. The Basque country is in a double frontier position between Spain and France, also having great linguistic differences in relation to the dominant culture, and is, just like Catalonia registered as a victorious periphery, high in cultural and economic relative strength, and with strong autonomous traditions (Rokkan 1987). The semi-industrialised Galicia occupies a medium position in terms of both culture and economy. Of all the regions, except those in the north of Spain, Andalucia is the most autonomous. Powerful centres and autonomous elite groups have existed independently of a state apparatus. Ideologically there has been a continuous struggle between liberal and authoritarian ideologies, while, as mentioned previously, traditionalism has been supported by the church. Centralisation of social institutions has been resisted by large groups, who view concentration of state power as potentially authoritarian. Boiset (1989) has concluded that in Spain there have been strong anti-monopoly and anti-centralising ideologies and low levels of concentration in managerial policies in business and industry. Production and markets have largely been regional.

Until 1800 Norway was a seaward periphery with a weak, but relatively autonomous, coastal city network and an independent agricultural structure. Norway has developed from a structure with strong city centres in the various regions into a nation with increasing centralisation and concentration of economic, cultural and political resources in the capital. The linguistic structure is officially defined as being composed of two official languages (the the ‘standard Norwegian’ riksmål and ‘new Norwegian language’ – nynorsk), in addition to the Sami language. The main peripheries are:

1) Central/Eastern region, which is inland areas with farming and forestry having more hierarchical social structures than the coastal regions, and the greatest agricultural properties. The region contains an inland belt of towns following the old pilgrimage route from the capital (formerly called Christiania) to the religious centre of Trondheim.
2) Southern/Western regions, which are partly inland areas with farming and forestry, and partly coastal areas with fishing as the primary
industry. These regions developed a coastal chain of sub-centres resembling the European city centres. The coastal centres were linked to each other and to the rest of the world by sea routes. Liberal as well as orthodox counter-cultural forces have resisted the authority and control of the dominant culture of the centre expressed as:

- Lutheran orthodoxy and pietistic fundamentalism against urban radicalism and secularism
- temperance movement
- ‘new Norwegian language’ (nynorsk) mobilisation against the dominance of the ‘standard Norwegian’ (riksmål) and the urban bourgeois culture

3) The Arctic, Northern Norway, which is a coastal periphery mainly occupied with fishing. This region is the most class-polarised periphery; mobilisation has been stronger as socio-economic right-left class polarity than as centre-periphery struggle.

Until the Second World War the Norwegian peripheries were autonomous and self-developing having a relatively strong coastal city belt and generally characterised by their capability to establish and maintain their own linguistic standards, achieving great cultural and political independence. However, the post-war urbanisation and centralisation process has reduced regional autonomy. The Norwegian peripheries have become dependent on strong regional subsidisation from the centre to maintain production, employment and welfare (Rokkan and Urwin 1983; Rokkan 1987; Mjøset 1986).

The State, the Civil Society and the Market

The state is the political and legal public apparatus and its servants, who organise a country’s international activity and the internal protection of the citizens’ rights and control of their loyalty to the state (Ester 1997). The latter mandate of the state has been emphasised by Weber (1988), who defined the state as the institution that may exert legitimate monopoly of violence towards the population within a certain territory. Aubert (1989 a: 56) has distinguished between a narrow and wide concept of the state; the former is constituted by the formal state apparatus, organisation and personnel, while the latter also includes citizens in their specific state-related roles as citizens. These roles may cover a wide range from creative contributors to clients or passive ‘users’. In order to distinguish the state from the civil sphere, Nilsen and Østerberg (1998) emphasise the rigid and closed dimension of the public sphere (comparable to status at individual level). Civil society, unlike the public sphere, is constantly in an open process of change (as project at individual level). The authors treat the market as a separate sphere and oppose the idea that it functions as an open institution in the public sphere. On the contrary, the market is
a closed institution characterised by *secret strategies* of participation. They claim that the public, open sphere is reduced by increased market liberalism. Another reason why markets are not functioning democratically is that they pre-suppose equal possession or resources distributed between citizens who act on the market.

Emerging from the distinctions above, it is held by many scholars that market liberalism serves the most resourceful groups of the population (e.g. Therborn 1995; Lasch 1996; Nilsen and Østerberg 1998). Civil society consists of networks and organisations that may generate differing potentials to influence the politics of the public state institutions. They may be vertically and horizontally organised at an internal level. Aubert (1989a) found it impossible to always distinguish civil society clearly from the relations of the market, but he warned against simplified conclusions that large or small market sectors are equal to developed or underdeveloped civil sectors. Collective action of welfare distribution within the civil sphere may be made up of formally and informally organised associations, and as spontaneous ad hoc projects. What characterises patterns of collective actions in the civil spheres of Spain and Norway?

There are significant differences between the Germanic and the Latin worlds when formal versus spontaneous dimensions of collective action are considered. The Latin countries of the former European Community exhibited an average membership in *formal* organisations, which is consistently below that of the respective EC countries. Among the Latin countries, Spain occupied the absolute lowest position when per cent of the population belonging to a formal, voluntary organisation is considered (Therborn 1995:306 ff.). However, *informal* civil agency is considerably more intensive in Spain than in Norway due to the Catholic principle of social voluntarism and subsidiarity (*subsidiariedad*), which has encouraged initiative for welfare, care and education largely as voluntary activity.

The Nordic countries have a particularly high level of participation in a variety of organisations; as such, political activity flourishes. Political parties, labour- and employers’ organisations have special (sub)groups designed for training youth for political and corporate activity. Most of these organisations are centrally organised and conducted according to a top-down leadership style. Political capital (which is unevenly distributed) is the outcome; suitable in order to gain access to the formal style of negotiations and decision making of Norwegian society.

Another typical Norwegian feature is the paternalistic role of the social democratic welfare state in the post-war period, which has led to a general public intervention in civil society. Civil institutions have gradually become legally, economically and professionally controlled. According to the initial definition of civil society, this politicisation and central control
of this sphere has led to a weakened civil life in Norway. Voluntary organisations receive public economic support, thus they have their actions evaluated, censored, regulated and controlled by the public bureaucracy. The public sector has lost some degree of openness due to marketisation; civil society has become weakened by public interventionism.

As for Spain, the country has scored low regarding membership in such formal organisations, with less than five per cent of the population involved. Among the Spanish respondents, the most frequently expressed reason for doing voluntary work has been the motive to contribute to improved change of the society, which is a collective motivation (EVSSG in Ashford and Timms 1992).

There is in Spain an established tradition of forceful expressive means in collective action. This is reflected in the high tolerance to open social conflict. The urban workers (in the industrial zones of Catalonia, the Basque country, Asturias and Madrid) and the rural workers (particularly at the latifundus in Andalucia and Extremadura) have been represented by trade unions dominated by Marxist politics and anarcho-syndicalism (the latter was particularly the case at the latifundis in southern Catalonia); these organisations have rejected formal democracy and favoured violent strike actions.

In Norway and Scandinavia as a whole there is a tradition of more peaceful and consensus-oriented negotiations. Here, the highest density of union membership of the industrialised societies exist, with highly centralised and strong unions that participate in a tripartite pattern of corporatist bargaining over wages, economic and social policy among the government, the leading political party (which for most of the post-war years has been the social democratic labour party) and the unions.

Modern Welfare State Models\(^\text{18}\)

The primary function of the Western welfare states has been to protect and grant social security to people. The advanced democracies of the West have developed different models of welfare states. The two models to be considered here are:

- the social-democratic or institutional Scandinavian state interventionism
- the corporate Catholic and Christian Democratic work-merit welfare states of the European continent\(^\text{19}\)

---

\(^{18}\) This section is based on the following sources: Mjøset 1986; Esping-Andersen 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; European Community 1989; Eriksen 1993; Hagen and Hippe 1993; Hagen 1992; Bentolila and Dolado 1994, and Stephens 1996.

\(^{19}\) on the next page
These models are, in different manners, related to labour market entry, employment and exit, and to patterns of strength and weakness of the civil society.

**Norwegian Corporatist State Interventionism**
The Scandinavian or Nordic welfare states are founded on a tradition of social-democratic, institutionalised state interventionism, with four basic institutional parameters:

- **Broad and universal coverage of social services in the fields of health, education and care**
  Citizens’ rights and full employment, rather than market participation have been ideals. An overall ideology of macro-economic management by the state implies regulation of the market (based on Keynesian theory developed in the 1930s). In Norway the Labour Party (*Det Norske Arbeiderparti*) has been a major actor in the shaping of the Norwegian welfare state. The party has proclaimed an overall ideology of rational planning as an essential means to growth and equality. There has been a compromise or consensus between a mixed economy of private and public ownership of means of production, a balance between democratisation/humanisation and modernisation, and between employer and employee rights.

- **High social insurance benefits**
  Insurance of every citizen against major cases of income loss and sickness. Involuntary interruption of work should not result in decline in standards of living. All income groups are included in a unitary social insurance scheme. The provisions for maternal leave are liberal. Individual social rights to pensions and health-care do not derive from social status of work or family. There is no formal link between an individual’s contribution and his/her rights, thus stigmatising testing of needs is to some degree avoided.

- **Service provided by the state**
  Universal public health and education systems and relatively good public child care, which has made high female employment possible.

By the late 1960s the Nordic welfare states had largely achieved their aims for income maintenance programs. The welfare programs were more universalistic, generous and comprehensive than those on the continent. The Nordic model fully came into being in the 1970s and 1980s by active labour-market politics, social-security expansion and formal equality between male and female citizens. Social policy has complied with

---

19 The third type of Western welfare state is the liberal or residualist Anglo-American model (Esping-Andersen 1996 a,b,c). This wills not be treated here.
demands for equality and production-orientation. To attain sustained full employment, states had to rely on the public service sector.

**Spanish, Catholic Corporatist Pluralism**

The welfare state model that has developed in Spain belongs to the Corporate, Christian Democratic/Catholic model. The main difference between this and the Nordic model is that social entitlements derive from employment (‘work-fare’) rather than citizens’ rights. To be deprived from employment implies being deprived from social entitlements other than need-tested, scarce and stigmatising public transfer.

This welfare system has supported the family as corner-stone of the society and the dependency of family members on the male wage-earner. Thus, there is dual social protection, differentiated according to occupational status hierarchies. It is generous in cash transfer, but scarce in social services produced by the welfare state. Social services are largely financed and provisioned by voluntary and non-profitable organisations managed by the church and private organisations. The social insurance schemes are differentiated. In the organised labour market there is high job security, high wages and expensive pensions and social-security schemes. In the extensive informal (often ‘black’) labour market and for those who are self-employed, social protection is low. This duality has led to a trade-off between female work participation and fertility, since social services are not adapted to female work participation.

In Tables 5 and 6 some features of the Norwegian and Spanish welfare states are compared, as well as some main ideological pillars behind the phases of their development.

*Table 5 Main characteristics of Spanish and Norwegian welfare states.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Welfare state Category</th>
<th>Corporate Catholic/Christian democratic welfare state</th>
<th>Social-democratic welfare state, State-interventionist corporatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer-mode</td>
<td>Family (paternal) transfer and dependency</td>
<td>State (paternal) transfer and dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer of social services</td>
<td>Private (family and voluntary organisations) production of social services</td>
<td>Public state production of social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility for entitlements</td>
<td>Work merits – contractual rights (generous) and proven needs (scarce)</td>
<td>Universal individual citizens’ rights unconditional of family/work status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards of transfer</td>
<td>Unequal standards</td>
<td>Equal standard guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupational pension schemes</td>
<td>Income-related cash benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime of bargaining</td>
<td>Tripartite, decentralised: government, political parties and unions</td>
<td>Tripartite, centralised: government, political parties and unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance schemes</td>
<td>Dual and differentiated social insurance scheme</td>
<td>Unitary social insurance scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 Ideological pillars and developmental phases of the two welfare states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPAIN</th>
<th>NORWAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominating concept of equality = ‘collectivist equality’ related to the individual as member of the family and to the status of the male wage-earner. Legacy from the ‘continental welfare monarchy’ model which was authoritarian, étatist and corporate and had as its main objectives, to preserve the hierarchical social order by:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• social pacification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• moral discipline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Catholic-nationalist values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The democratic welfare state organised from the 70s is built on:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the family and work nexus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• a combination of Catholic social doctrines of ‘subsidiarity’ and democratic citizens’ rights.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is ‘transfer-heavy but service-lean’ and inflexible to change. The work pillar is conditioned on a ‘standardised’ life cycle and ‘standardised work career’ (=long and unbroken). There are record high social-transfer benefits. The family pillar: underdeveloped social care services; social care is the domain of the family household. Disfavour of female employment/fertility causing trade-off between economic independence and motherhood. Less influenced by neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s than the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon welfare states. Strategies and effects:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• social investment in education and training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• job reduction in organised labour market with effect of job growth in informal/self-employed sector deprived of social security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• marginalisation of young unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominating concept of equality: ‘individualistic equality’ related to the individual as citizen. Overall ideology of macro-economic management by state interventionism implying a regulation of the market (based on Keynesian theory)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phases and policies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I (from post-war time)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• state paternal responsibility for all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• full employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• public education and health systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II (from late 1960s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income proportional schemes. Late 1970s a shift from social contract to organisational society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III (early 1980s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public production of all major social services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV (from 1980s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• anti-state sentiments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• pro-market participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• deregulation/restructuring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• increased productivity / consumerism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase V (1990s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• social welfare stagnation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• increased privatisation of care and insurance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• marginalisation of elderly and unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• social investment in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– education and training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– job retraining programmes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– job creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Welfare States in Transition

The unleashing of free-market mechanisms more loosely regulated by the state was the result of decline in economic growth in the industrial countries from the late 1970s and 80s. The Western, high-cost welfare states became less competitive in labour-intensive production. Countries came under pressure to privatise state-run activity and to be open to less centralised top-down management. Economic and fiscal policies at national levels became constrained. These trends, together with the technological infrastructure, which made production and transport more flexible, are viewed as essential in the globalisation of finances, production and mar-

---

20 The characterisation is Esping-Andersen’s (1996b).
kets. Increased trans-national and global competitiveness has led to a
global division of labour. The new relations between single states and
regions are classified within a hierarchical totality of the world system.
This implies that the whole region of European Union (former Commu-
nity) membership states and states that are economically associated, such
as Norway, have been affected by standardisation forces of the European
region as a whole. In this region the requirement of technical skills and
competencies has become universal, which is clearly manifested in the
enormous focus on education in this region. For both developed and
developing countries education and training are key responses to
increased global competitiveness. In line with this, human capital is
increasingly prioritised by states and organisations in the struggle for
regional and global competitiveness.

Welfare states have been challenged because their schemes were designed
to ensure the welfare of a homogenous working class existing within the
social order of industrialised society. In this perspective the growing dis-
junction between the existing, universal welfare schemes in social-demo-
cratic states and the evolving risks and needs of the new modes of pro-
duction is essential to understanding the current tensions. Parallel to the
upsurge of more pluralistic programs, there are also forces seeking con-
vergence in welfare politics due to the increasingly vulnerable national
economies. Avoiding growing inequalities of distribution of welfare
related to individual work merits and maintaining social-democratic wel-
fare politics, will become more difficult for individual countries (This
section has been based on Adick 1992; Esping-Andersen 1996 a,b,c;

Responses to De-industrialisation in Spain and Norway
Some general features of challenges to the Western welfare states have
been indicated in the previous. In what follows, the Norwegian and Span-
ish cases are viewed from Esping-Andersen’s (1996 a,b,c) model of the
different welfare states’ responses to these challenges, where the main
emphasis is on effects of de-industrialisation.

Neo-liberal route
Anglo-American countries have largely met the crisis with neo-liberal
remedies such as wage flexibility and de-regulation in the economic and
labour sector. The result has been growing income disparities and
inequality of social protection. This had led to a re-emergence of an
underprivileged class and of high pressures on families with young chil-
dren. In particular, unskilled workers and single-parent families have
been vulnerable. The Norwegian welfare state has partly followed this
route. Nilsen and Østerberg (1998) show how a combination of conserva-
tive politics and neo-liberalism of the rightist variety (Høyre) was taken
over and carried further by the Labour Party in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Citizens have been increasingly referred to as ‘users’ and ‘clients’, also in education policy documents. This has led to economic deregulation and increased adaptation to the market. In education, there has been economic managerial decentralisation combined with new public management (‘management by objectives’) with emphases on effectiveness, competition and ‘local/individual freedom of choice’. Income disparity has increased and private occupational and commercial welfare has been renewed. Social services are increasingly being linked to employment. This implies increased inequality of distribution of welfare arrangements, by some characterised as a trend away from welfare towards ‘work-fare’. In the period from 1970 to 1990 the proportion of employees who were covered by an occupational pension scheme doubled, from 30 per cent to 60 per cent (Hagen and Hippe 1993). There is decreased trust in the future potential of the National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygden). Preservation of high employment has legitimated acceptance of greater inequality. Norway has avoided large-scale unemployment partly due to oil revenues.

Social investment route
This response to the challenges tends to favour investment in young people by means of education and training programmes. To give priority to young people over elderly people, which is a strategy applied in Scandinavia, is unique in Europe. Norway has partly followed this route. This implies great investment in education, a focus on broad skills and competencies for job flexibility, mobility and life-long learning programmes. This strategy aims at preventing special strata from becoming excluded from work. Job retraining programs and job creation are employed in combination with a trimming of social benefits. Norway has avoided large-scale privatisation of social services and education and has taken a tighter (authoritarian) control over education. Social investment has also been given priority in Spain, as most other Western countries; investment in human resources through education and training are key strategies. How this strategy has been adapted to the particular national education profile in the two countries will be treated in a later chapter, which describes and compares the educational reforms of the 1990s.

Labour reduction approach
This is the strategy adopted by continental Europe and by Spain. It has implied mass retirement and mass unemployment. Due to a great surplus of an unskilled labour force there has been pressure to shrink the labour market and workers’ exits have been subsidised. This has led to an ‘insider-outsider’ dichotomy where the first group is mainly constituted by organised male breadwinners who are protected by strong labour unions. ‘Outsiders’ tend to be either long-term unemployed, those employed in the informal sector as flexible temporaries without social protection, or the self-employed who have included themselves in work, but who are excluded from job- and social security. Newcomers’ entry
into the regulated work market is strongly disfavoured. Outsiders tend to be young people.

Growth and Development

The following discussion is based on Human Development Reports (UNDP 1996, 1997 and 2002). Both Spain and Norway have in common the social investment route as an answer to de-industrialisation. Some contemporary trends of social investment relative to the general economic situation will be described in the present section.

The more equally economic growth is distributed among people, the more likely it is that growth will be translated into improved human well-being and development. During the last three decades, there has been a two-fold increase in the overall global trend in the disparity between the richest and the poorest. Economic growth has been increasingly unevenly distributed, and has primarily enriched those who are already rich. At global and world regional levels, as well as at within-country levels, there are increasing polarisation and marginalisation and a corresponding concentration of wealth. The poorest countries have stagnated, and many of the rich countries have had considerable growth. The world’s richest one per cent of people earn as much as the poorest 57 per cent.

The OECD countries have experienced a steady economic growth, albeit at a slower pace from the 1980s. Norway ranks among the richest of the industrialised, high human development countries. Spain was previously among the poorest third of the industrialised countries, but has had a higher relative growth than Norway, and also compared to the European Union.

The ‘human development index’ (HDI) measures and compares the variables of (a) life expectancy; (b) educational attainment; and (c) income. The aim is to link degree of economic growth to distribution of life chances and human development. The gender-related index of human development (GDI), which measures differences in life expectancy, educational attainment and standards of living between the genders, shows that the Nordic countries are among the most gender-equal in the world. Norway occupies a second position only preceded by Canada in 2000, and as number one in 2002. Spain was ranked as number eleven in 1996, and has lost ground and slipping to numbers 21 in 2002.

From the previous it may be concluded that Spain has great relative difference between general human development (HDI, measured by an index of life expectancy, educational attainment and income) and gender-related human development (measuring differences of HDI between the
genders). This signifies that the female share of the considerably high human development potentials that are distributed in Spain is far lower than the male share. In Norway, this inequality is only minor compared to Spain. However, when gender-related income disparity is considered isolated, Norway has a great inequality, which is surprising given the high educational level of the Norwegian female population.

Does economic growth relate to increased democratic participation, and what are people’s possibilities of influencing public and political decision-making on how to distribute the economic growth? These questions were studied and published in the Human Development Reports in 1996 and 1997. One outstanding key indicator accounting for inequality was found: the gender variable. A ‘gender empowerment measure’ (GEM) estimates gender inequalities in core areas of economic and political participation and decision-making. In Western Europe, Norway was ranked at the top concerning gender empowerment and Spain occupied a bottom position in 1996. According to Human Development Report of 2002, Norway has consolidated its positions, and Spain is improving every year (from position 25 in 1996 to 15 in 2002).

Table 7 Women and political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>15.0 (17.6)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>40.9 (42.1)</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic countries</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including elected heads of state and governors of central banks. B: Figures not available.

Final Remarks on Norwegian and Spanish Welfare Systems

Features of the two national profiles have again been confirmed in this chapter. As the historical development of welfare indicates, the Norwegian case was primarily marked by:
- formal socialisation and care in compulsive mass schooling
- formal political decisions and formal participation
- centralisation and systematisation of national welfare institutions
- direct relationship between the individual and the state as welfare and care guarantee.
The Spanish case was correspondingly marked by:

- informal codes of socialisation and community based welfare institutions
- informal political decision-making
- resistance towards centralisation/systematisation/unification of welfare institutions
- no direct control over socialisation, welfare and care of individuals by the state

Recent studies on the civil spheres in the two countries confirm a continuation of the deep historical differences. In Spain there is more informal participation in the civil sphere; greater tolerance to open negotiations, extreme values and conflicts than in Norway. In the latter there is more frequent participation in formal, semi-public civil organisations where compromises and consensus are favoured. Much of the Norwegian civil sphere is publicly regulated and leaves small room for spontaneous, voluntary action.

The responsive strategies to de-industrialisation and increased global competition of the two nations have been overlapping in the strategy of social investment through education. However, this strategy that had the intention of including young people in working life may have been somewhat neutralised or cancelled out by the other strategies that were also chosen, respectively neo-liberalism in Norway and labour reduction in Spain. How these combinations affect educational, work and welfare inequalities of young people will be discussed in a later chapter.
Systematisation of Education in Spain and Norway

The language of education is the language of culture creating, not of knowledge consuming or knowledge acquisition alone.

J. Bruner

All social and cultural life that has been discussed in the previous chapters is somehow related to transmission of what is conceived as valid identity and knowledge in given contexts. Education in this broad sense has been a two-edged social phenomenon; as social tool of conformity and new orientation. This chapter focuses on how education as cultural institution and national system has been developed and systematised in Spain and Norway, and how social and pedagogic authority is legitimated in these different contexts.

Education as Institution and System

Socialisation is usually applied about practices of upbringing within the family as primary socialisation arena. It involves social learning of knowledge, skills and dispositions that are found to be necessary to function in society. Socialisation is the broadest concept of teaching/learning, and it may imply both non-formal/informal transmission and formal schooling. Social learning takes place in spontaneous interaction between persons and their environment, in language and cultural habits etc. Socialisation may be distinguished from acculturation by encompassing attributes that all humans share in communicative processes across cultures. Acculturation indicates transmission of particular forms and contents of life-styles, which vary from one social context to another. In this study education as social institution primarily refers to formal schooling or professional teaching in the most specialised of teaching environments; the schools. Within formal education in schools, non-formal socialisation and acculturation takes place continuously; both as intended and non-intended activity. The school is regarded as a secondary socialisation arena.

When educational institutions are inter-linked as various levels in a hierarchical structure, and when educational options are standardised within

---

21 Based on conceptual definitions applied by Rust 1977; Ringer 1979; Müller 1987, and Hamilton 1990.
national territories, the state has taken a firm grip of cultural formation and social control of citizens. An educational system will then be taken to mean national systematisation of education. Educational systems may be characterised as inclusive and progressive, or they may be exclusive and segmented. Enrolment in secondary and tertiary education of the population, or of the relevant age group, is frequently used as measures of inclusiveness. Educational systems are generally characterised as inclusive and progressive when large proportions of students who attend higher education come from lower, middle and working classes.

Studies of educational systems are recommended to encompass some historical analyses in order to overcome simple descriptions. Organisation and content of education may be structurally and formally changed; but, underlying historic values may remain due to their deeper often unconscious meaning, which is not easily changed (Ringer 1979; Hofstede 1993; Ester 1997). Gundem (1993) has specifically drawn the attention towards the lack of consistency between educational intentions, implementation and results. She claims that in order to understand such inconsistency, it is essential to identify factors related to historical continuity of the social and political context and the cultural values behind educational decision-making. In accordance with these viewpoints, a brief historical outline of the extreme variation in the two national systems will form the basis of a comparison of the present restructuring and considerable rapprochement.

Historic epochs in European systematisation of education may be divided into some overall phases:

- **Phase one** covers the origin of education as a general European institution and its common inheritance from antiquity and from the Catholic schools.
- **Phase two** covers the break-up in different national courses in the early nineteenth century and through the development of modern education. An emphasis is on the great European modernisation at the turn of the nineteenth century which was promoted by the new middle class and which followed new production and capital structures. This phase describes the societal modernisation until the Second World War.
- **Phase three** covers the post-war time to the turn of the twentieth century.

**Joint Origin of Spanish and Norwegian Education**

Before education in Europe became systematised within national territo-

---

ries, it existed as *networks* of institutions that had taken monopoly on the development of certain skills and qualifications. As such, Spain and Norway have a common educational heritage from phase one above. Within the European civilisation education has been based on common hierarchical social structures. It is interesting to observe that the two geographical extremes of Spain and Norway developed almost identical schools in their early histories of formal schooling, the ‘Latin schools’. (A difference being that Norway was eight hundred years after Spain in establishing the first Latin school). In both countries, early formal education was organised as direct integration between the schools and the Catholic church. The schools had two main goals:

- *liberal formation* by means of classical, scholastic Roman and Greek traditions, and by the (seven) disciplines of *artes liberales*
- *professional training* of church and monastery staff

These schools exclusively recruited male students, and mainly from the religious elite. In the modern mass education, Spain and Norway also have a shared origin, the Prussian education model. Spain has been more indirectly inspired by this model than Norway, and the link has mainly between through an imitation of the French elitist system. Unlike in secularised France, there has been a strong, mutual support between the church and the elite in educational policy-making in Spain.

According to some trends in control and ownership that are general to the development of all national systems, both countries developed hierarchical systems where primary education was for the masses and secondary education was for selected elite minorities. In neither of the countries did education for the masses have any strong legitimating force as a means to social change, as was the case in most other European countries. In Norway the social structure was already supposed to be fairly egalitarian, and in Spain tolerance to social inequality was enduring.

**From European Elite- to Mass Education**\(^{23}\)

Compulsory mass schooling was a symptom of modernised authority and was most efficiently introduced in countries with a patriarchal family structure. Pressure to change the European elite education came from the expanding industrial and entrepreneurial urban middle class following the industrialisation. First, the classical nature of the secondary education did not produce the right skills to serve the capitalist development. Secondly,

---

\(^{23}\) Based on Rust 1977,1989; Ringer 1979; Boli and Ramirez 1992; Bourdieu and Passeron 1994.
the religious content of primary education for the masses was inappropriate to the socialisation of the right values according to the new work-force demands. Education was brought into closer interrelationship with the occupational life, and ‘modern, technical and applied’ subjects were integrated into curricula. Classical elite institutions had mainly served to legitimate social positions that were based on old traditional patterns of accumulation of cultural and economic capital. In modern capitalist societies, the classical elite education became incongruent with the emerging capitalist class structure, and the industrialised, technological modes of production. Vocational and technical schools were set up to meet the needs of the growing industry, and ‘real schools’ (from the pattern of the German Realsschulen) were oriented towards the ‘real’, concrete modern world with subjects needed for the sons and daughters of the urban burghers. They were mostly private, and were set up as substitution strategy for the new middle class, who could afford alternative educational, provisional expenditure. Substitutes of former private alternatives which no longer were suitable to reproduce social privileges in the new social structure, is a major cause for the segmented, stratified school system that developed. In this process, the role of the state was dominant in all countries (the earliest industrialised were two decades before the others).

Yet, there were strong similarities across great cultural borders. The systematisation also produced increased need of differentiation; in other words it produced increased segregation within the system. In all countries the differentiation reinforced the class divisions, and there were great structural similarities in all nations, as the state took firmer social control by means of the systematisation. Unification and systematisation in Europe following industrialisation was superimposed on already existing specialised and differentiated parts of educational networks, in order to become a system that might be more easily unified and controlled. This new form of invisible, symbolic authority was exercised by the state and, therefore, conceived as legitimate.

Norwegian Systematisation and Unification of Education
During the reform cycle around the turn of the 19th century, the classical elite domination in education was challenged by the new aspiring, entrepreneurial middle class, and also by growing democratic consciousness. Access to legislative influence and provision of financial resources to set up educational facilities that were competitive were required. The policy of this period ensured the rights of education for physically and mentally handicapped persons (e.g deaf, blind, and ‘mentally weak’). The state became responsible for education of ‘abnormal persons’ in centralised, special schools. ‘School homes’ (skolehjem) for children and youth who came from families that were considered incapable of the socialising task were also established.
This was a period of strong peripheral identification, during which time the two official languages (Nynorsk and Riksmål) received equal formal status. According to Bondevik Tønnesen (1995), there has never been greater local democracy in education than during this period. People’s own experiences and local culture were essential substance to the pedagogical project. Educational reforms had been influenced by folk movements and was essentially a popular-identity formation project. The liberal party (Venstre) was main premise deliverer in educational policies (in fact until the Second World War). The peripheries were granted a considerable self-definition, and not enfeebled by state centralisation.

There was still a highly segregated enrolment in the public system and the broad spectrum of private institutions, and home tutoring was common for the urban privileged class. Formally and legally, the School Law of 1889 is considered as a milestone in the manifestation of a broad social and educational transformation towards one unified, common school offering basic education. The state thus had the task of integrating the children of the elite with the common people, which was implemented in the form of the progressive, five-year, compulsory primary school (Folkeskole). It was based upon the principle of free and open, basic education for all, irrespective of social class, gender or geographical location. Scandinavia pioneered the concept of the progressive elementary school.

Traditional secondary education was in form and content very similar to the European elitist institutions. Less than one percent of the population attended the upper secondary level (gymnasium). There existed an ideology for unification – but dualism was the reality. Unlike in Germany, Great Britain and France, a rich pool of vocational educational institutions were in Norway established outside the state system as private enterprises: seamen schools, handicraft- and technical schools, commercial schools, farm- and forest schools etc. These schools were initiated by the entrepreneurial, middle class, who demanded more practical and utilitarian knowledge than was offered in the classical, liberal education.

The next cycle is historically starting in a free nation by the time of the abolishment of the Swedish-Norwegian union (1814 to 1905). This period is marked by demands for a labour force with ‘new skills’ and higher competencies. It followed general European trends of the time, which moved away from general, liberal studies towards the prioritisation of utility and practical work training in education, and encouraging more rapid entrance to employment. For the unification forces to win over the dual system, they were contingent upon a public school that had qualitative ability to compete with the private secondary level (middelskole) as an academic, preparatory institution. The year 1920 constituted a distinguishing point in the unification process of the Norwegian educational system. Through a budgetary decision in the Parliament (Storting), it was
decided that state financial aid was only to be granted to private ‘middle schools’ that built upon the seven-year, unified Folk school. All the population was to attend the same common school for seven years, with no parallel schools. Norway was the first country in Europe to formulate such an aim, only closely followed by Sweden and Denmark.

The Norwegian way of systematisation within a fixed and closed structure, represents at least three trends in accordance with the then-contemporary European situation:

- the establishment of more realistic and utilitarian alternatives to the general parallel to the liberal studies in traditional secondary education
- such parallel alternatives were the result of a need to differentiate within a state-systematised, controlled system
- differentiation had the effect of segmentation within the state-governed system. Two types of post-compulsory education eventually attracted students from different social strata. The post-compulsory ‘continuation school’ was a practically oriented school which offered rather unclear qualifications for the workers’ sons and daughters, and with rather unclear status as to the qualifications obtained.

From 1935 until 1981 the social-democratic labour party held power (with two short interruptions). Only one year after they had seized power, two important changes were legally introduced; English was to be an obligatory subject, and a standard leaving examination was to be introduced. From a centre-periphery perspective, this stood in contradiction to the former liberal principle whereby the local community had direct influence on contents and assessment procedures. By means of a centrally managed examination, the peripheries were forced to submit to a central definition of curriculum. In connection with this, the first national curriculum for compulsory education was introduced (1939). This decision was based on scientific research; it was a progressive plan influenced by the ‘New Education Movement’ from continental Europe and USA. This education was to be self-directed activity in a ‘concrete and real’ learning environment, with manual work as a valuable aspect of the programme.

Knowledge on manual and vocational work was gaining terrain in the educational debate on objectives, curricular contents and pedagogical methodology. The New Education Movement had influence on the Norwegian educational debate, by its emphasis on what is concrete and real, and on self-regulation of activity. It may be assumed that these ideas were compatible with the Norwegian Protestant work ethics’ mentality (in which work was a calling, and self-regulation part of the salvation). The result was what Rust (1989: 61) called the dual function of the “vocationally oriented activity school” with two main purposes:
• development of students’ intellectual/cognitive and rational human capacities
• introduction to the world of work

The reform process of systematisation continued immediately after the war that ended in 1945, under the governance of the Labour Party. Slagstad (1998) asserts that the key ideology was technical/instrumental rationality. A main aim was to increase production in rational industry, agriculture, and fishing – by means of a labour force educated in a rational school. This reform technocracy introduced the demand of effectiveness in human relations and the cultural field as instruments for the technical/economic rationality. The social engineering project was modelled after natural science and introduced and monitored by means of detailed state regulation. According to Rust (1989: 203) the intention was to build a school system in accordance with the needs of a new society and the ‘changing times’, a declaration which precipitated a reform cycle which was ongoing to the end of the 1980s. During this reform cycle, the structural systematisation of the Norwegian primary and secondary educational system was completed, along with the structure of the post-compulsory educational system. The legal framework from this reform period was valid until the restructuring of the 1990s. This legislation introduced a unified upper secondary school, (videregående skole, consisting of the former gymnas and the vocational schools), with three main aims:
• to qualify for occupational life
• to prepare for social participation
• to prepare for personal leisure time

Administration at the county level had responsibility for co-ordination of the courses within acceptable geographical distances. The upper secondary schools offered nine branches of study. The main model of structure was: one or two foundation years, followed by two years of continuation courses, eventually two years of apprenticeship. The two-year foundation course combined general education and vocational education. Each branch was broken down into a large variety of specialisation courses.

The social-democratic policy of the Norwegian Labour Party was the main driving force in this epoch, having centralisation as its key platform. Education was seen as the socio-political means to obtain the planned, rational society. In this way, education was the great leveller of society – and would produce upward social and political mobility. Innovation was to be based on scientific reasoning following, for the most part, the behaviourist approach. Pedagogy was not to be based on ideas, but on experimental evidence collected by “co-ordinated research endeavour”.

A great challenge to obtain what Lauglo (1989) has labelled egalitarian collectivism has been how to break down status barriers between spiritual
and practical work. School reform has been based on the justification that the school should be changed according to the changing society. During the 1950s and 60s, emphasis was placed on standardised tests as achievement measures. Prevailing pedagogical views were based on technological methods of teaching (e.g. ‘teaching machines’). Success and failure were measured in quantitative, technical terms.

The 1970s was a decade when critical reactions were directed towards technocratic policies, emphasising instead, the freedom to search and create meaning within local contexts, if indeed the overall goal of self-reliant human beings was to be achieved. The curriculum designers of this time had taken the problems related to centralisation seriously, providing Norwegian schools with a flexible, guiding framework free of compulsory requirements, and thereby making it possible to differentiate according to cultural differences at local level. This was a logical consequence of the systematisation and centralisation, and was the basis for the restructuring that started in the late 1980s.

**From Spanish Status Quo to ‘Peaceful Revolution’**

The early traditions of formal schooling on the Iberian peninsula had their origin in classical, scholastic schooling in the Roman and Greek traditions of the liberal education in the disciplines of *artes liberales*. A considerable network of classical schools had been established all over the territory. During the Moorish occupation (711–1492) a fine-grained network of private schools at elementary level had been organised, so in the smallest villages literacy was quite common among the Iberian population. After the ‘Reconquista’ in 1492, the municipality system was strengthened in combination with a concentration of royal and legal power. From this time the early development of a dual school network started. Private schools were established and run by teachers who controlled teaching and administration. Until the nineteenth century, these private schools were set up by professionals and offered to persons who wanted alternatives to the church schools – and to the public ones. The church worked towards greater influence in the private schools as well.

A Spanish intellectual elite had been strongly influenced by the philosophies and science of the European Enlightenment movement. It had expressed critical analyses of what they conceived as a backward and iso-

---

24 The description of the early Spanish education history is based on Hole (1969) when no specific references are made.

25 ‘Reconquista’ (English: re-conquer) refers to the victory of the Catholic army in 1492 that ended the Islamic occupation that had lasted for around eight hundred years. During these centuries the Hispanic territory was a field of numerous wars between Christians and Muslims, but also the time period when Spanish law, cultures and languages were formed.
lated status of spiritual and cultural life in Spain, which was dominated by traditional supra-national exchange in the Roman Catholic network. The renewed idea to establish a public, general education was launched as a means to raise the intellectual and cultural level of the people. Conservative traditionalism and liberal currents were counter-forces in a politically unstable situation, which for long periods delayed the realisation of the idea of a national public school for the masses. There was also a problem with rapid increases in the population, a fact that claimed an enormous effort directed toward the building up of a sufficient body of schools, in combination with delayed nationalisation of economy.

In 1812 a liberal Constitution based on the French model of democracy was passed in Cortes of Cádiz (Andalucia). It equipped Spain with the necessary legal foundation to develop cultural institutions. In respect to education, the Constitution stipulated that it was to be egalitarian, public and free. From this time democratic educational plans were launched, but due to reactionary counter-forces, they remained as plans and were to be implemented at a much later point. The constant conflict between traditionalism and liberalism caused paralysed development of education for the masses. Traditionalist currents favoured a school based on Catholic values and combining religious formation with national identity formation. Liberal forces wanted a school based on European philosophies and politics, with special emphasis on the essential ideas of enlightenment: rationality and equality, fraternity and liberty. Much like in the educational and political debate in England, the core of the discussion revolved around whether the radicalism and broad-mindedness in the wake of the French Revolution was to be accepted or opposed.

The plans were very hesitantly addressed by the responsible authorities, and for the first time seriously addressed as late as during the ‘Second Republic’ (1931-36). However, it should be noted that a significant number of privately initiated progressive, experimental schools were set up in the early nineteenth century, and which later had great influence on pedagogy in public schools. Also, elite education for the upper classes had long-standing traditions. Education as elite project may be illustrated by the fact that as late as in 1930, illiteracy rates were around 34 per cent of the adult population, and the single-room house was still the most common in public schools. In the most crowded schools, up to 100 pupils between the age of 6 and 12 might be in the same classroom – with one single teacher.

26 The idea of a public, free elementary education for all – based on the experiences of the children – had been put forward around 1600 by the founder of the famous model school – Escuela Pías – San José de Calasanz.
The impact German philosophy had on Spanish liberal education ideologies was strong. Spanish students of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg had formed an intellectual circle in Spain, inspired in large part by the pantheism of the German philosopher Karl Christian Krause (1781–1832). His core viewpoints on education may be seen as emphasizing dialectical or non-dualistic thinking. Stress was placed on:

- context and personal experience and what is universal and independent of time and space
- dialectics between authority and liberty
- dialectics between ideas and actions

All students should be equally confronted with cultivation ideals; arts and ethics were essential components, irrespective of gender, age and social classes. One of the most prominent participants of this intellectual group became the founder of the school ‘Institution of liberal education’ (*Institución Libre de Enseñanza, ILE*), which came to have strong influence on the liberalisation and reformation of public education during the short period of democratic government in the ‘Second Republic’. There are three reasons why some features of Spanish ideological currents at the turn of the last century and ILE shall be presented here:

- They constituted a valuable legacy that added to a the self-reflective process of educational renewal after the dictatorship, and the experimental, private schools for the intellectual elite but also as charity schools for poor children.
- ILE became a profound influence on the Spanish pedagogical research discipline and helped in drawing a picture of Spanish educational ideals in a great restructuring period in most of Western Europe.
- They are representative of the counter-forces against the prevailing, traditional authoritarianism.

Francisco Giner de los Rios (1839–1915, from Andalucia) had taken a critical stance against cultural and religious domination in education, and he was convinced that formation of independently thinking and autonomous individuals and citizens (*personas cabales* = persons of ‘solid cast’) was the only way to transform the in-egalitarian social structure and abolish the oppressive authoritarian forces.

ILE was the first attempt at unifying and systematising schools in Spain, in creating the high school as a direct continuation of elementary level education. Together the two levels formed a curricular, cyclical entity. Facts, skills and competencies were not essential; rather, focus was on the development of living, perceiving and experiencing students who were fully integrated intellectually, emotionally, physically, academically and practically. ILE and other progressive schools were a reaction against the growing rationalism and utilitarianism in education prompted by the European reform process.
The social aspect of education was formed in the interrelationship among three key actors: students, parents and teachers. The ideal of the educated person was an inner motivated person who was not externally manipulated by punishment nor award, but who interacted with the social and learning environments in unconditional and non-instrumental, spontaneous ways. Reaching this state was viewed as the basis for social equality. ILE had a general impact on public education of the time, its pedagogy being practised at state-financed public experimental schools and independent schools. The impact of ILE philosophy was not limited to education but extended to cultural currents of the time.

Profound social tensions and political disagreements that had been the cause of social unrest during two centuries were primarily concentrated on matters at internal, national level: the need for land-ownership reforms, the power of the church and the military, and the region-centre dimension. Finally, there was severe dissatisfaction with the status of Spain as isolated nation practising protectionism. This was expressed by the liberals who wanted international co-operation and progress in economic and cultural spheres (Robinson 1970; Wilhelm 1998).

The politics of the Second Republic had only partly been implemented at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). When the Spanish society dissolved into the serious civil conflict, education was converted into an ideological instrument of war both by Nationalists and Republicans. All ILE schools were immediately closed and their libraries burnt. Some basic principles behind the intended social transformation to be brought about by education, which were held by the liberal government and Republicans, have already been outlined above. Educational policies of the rightist-fascist movement (Movimiento Nacional), were supported by an educated elite that proclaimed moderate national syndicalism, and whose prevailing mission was to take party control over the means of production by using the hierarchically organised trade unions. The educational policies were also supported by an economic upper class, which contained conservative, traditional, monarchist- and Catholic authoritarianism, and authoritarian fascists. However, the factions merged into one fascist movement in 1934. This was united through a common ideology that society is by its organic nature vertically and hierarchically ordered, just as the family, the army, the trade unions and the church, and with concentration of power at the top. The Nationalists aimed at transforming the educational system by using their ideology to consolidate power.

27 The Nationalists were a coalition of rightist groups led by General Francisco Franco Bahamonde (1892–1975) and opposed to the Government of the Second Republic. The Republicans were made up by a coalition of centrists to leftist groups that supported the Government.
Ingredients of the ideological inculcation were militarism, patriotism, Catholicism and national identification. Teachers had to prove their patriotic and religious attitudes on appointment tests, and students had to produce documents in support of their religious and patriotic conduct – signed by military, civilian or church authorities before matriculation (Based on Hole 1969; Soria 1984 and Wilhelm 1998).

General Franco intentionally supported religious and patriotic forces in education, and during his regime, the Catholic Church regained its former influence in education, equal to that of the eighteenth century. Through a papal document of 1929 the church had received two privileges, ordained by God, and to be protected by the state (and if necessary, by the military): the mission of teaching, and the supranational maternity of the Catholic Church. From both privileges it follows that a state-monopolised education would be wrong. Reinforced by the parents’ ‘natural’ right to choose between state and church schools, and to the extent that the state organises schools, they must be Catholic.

There were two main currents of the dictatorship period. The first lasted until the beginning of the 1960s and was characterised by authoritarianism, traditionalism, nationalism and religious dogma in order to create the Catholic Spanish identity. Religion was the superior and guiding principle of education and national identity formation, labelled ‘National Catholicism’. From the 1960s, modernisation and technocratic forces used to enhance economic growth resulted in policy-making greatly inspired by Human Capital Theory.

Up to the early 1970s, there were still more than a million children at primary school age who were not in school. The state was concentrating on areas that were too poor to be a potential market for the Church schools. The public-private dimension in Spanish education should be understood primarily from the perspective of religion, which contributed to the stratification of the educational system through the Catholic Church’s and its exclusion of the more vulnerable rural and urban working classes living in disfavoured areas. Since parents had to pay for secondary education, only those who had economic resources could start on the specialised track of general upper secondary education (bachillerato) at the age of ten, thus having a great advantage over those who had to continue in obligatory primary education. The latter might make the later transition to bachillerato at the age of twelve (from 1964 from the age of fourteen), within a dual structure that benefited the privileged social groups (Based on Boyd-Barrett 1991).

During the 1960s there was a rapid acceleration in Spanish industry and a corresponding massive migration from the rural areas to the cities. Industrialisation and new urban forms of life required basic skills among the
rising urban working class. The decade from 1960 to 1970 represented the greatest change in the occupational structure of the Spanish population during the post-war period. The primary sector of production declined drastically, and the secondary (industrial) sector and the tertiary (service) sector rose simultaneously. The illiteracy rate in 1960 was still 11 per cent. Motivation for literacy and numeracy came from all sides; industrial leaders and the ruling class needed a better skilled and socially controlled work force, and the workers saw it as necessary in order to enter work in the industries, contributing also to their children’s social mobility. Girls in particular were encouraged to enrol in post-compulsory education. The Franco-administration in this decade adopted technocratic and economic rationality, according to which increased investment in education was viewed as a key strategy in the modernisation of the Spanish economy. Social and intellectual modernisation reforms were methods of bringing Spain closer to international standards and to encourage economic co-operation (Ferrer 1992). A historical treatment of the pre-conditions to the reforms made by Artigas (1992), who was director of the Cabinet of statistical studies and planning in the Ministry of Education and Science, supports the previous statements:

- the educational reforms at the end of the Franco period, which laid the foundation for the contemporary reforms, were initiated according to motivation extrinsic to the field of education *per se*
- the reforms reveal the instrumental character associated with education. Aside from the need for systematisation of Spanish education into a unified – but flexible – system adapted to the regional diversity, plans and projects from the early 1960s directly justified change in education according to economic-social progress and economic co-operation with Europe. Adaptation to international, mainly European, structures and standards of education was viewed as inevitable (Artigas 1992: 300).


The 1970 education reform was actually initiated in the 1960s under the authoritarian regime still in existence. Education underwent considerable democratic changes in the 1980s; nevertheless, the 1970 reform still defines the main part of the current system’s structure. According to Ossenbach-Sauter (1996), this reform is commonly accepted as a milestone in Spanish education history. From 1975, full compulsory school attendance for children between the ages of 6 and 14 became a reality. During the 1970s and 80s around one third of students at post-compulsory level were in vocational training, and two thirds were enrolled in general education (*Bachillerato Unificado Poliavente*) (Enguita 1992).
The 1970 reform was a result of social change and need for economic growth and welfare. With the help of educational technocrats, the conservative forces were placated. The reform was implemented in an authoritarian, top-down manner. Prior to 1970, children entered school at the age of 6 years, and at the age of 10, they were given the option to attend secondary school; or continue in primary education until the age of 14 years. A great majority of students left school at that level or before, with only a small minority continuing to the higher levels (Garcia Pastor 1998).

With the 1970 act, primary, compulsory education was extended to the age of 14 years involving 8 years of comprehensive school. Secondary education from 1970 implied three-year programmes (Unified Baccalauréate). A new University Guided Course was from 1970 required for entry to universities and professional training colleges. Extension of academic education was required for many occupational careers, which implied completion of secondary education and entry to tertiary education. Vocational training was available for students who had left school before completion of secondary education. The Catholic social-political principle of subsidiarity (Subsidiariedad) between the state and church in education was, according to Boyd-Barrett (1991) and Ossenbach-Sauter (1996), the main target of change – irrespective of whether the ideology of the politicians was driven by technocratic or democratic forces.

An educational act of 1984 (LODE, which was based on legal frameworks that had been set in place in the Constitution of 1978) established a democratic political system with citizens’ rights and duties within a parliamentary monarchy with a political party system. The balance and coexistence of private and public schools in Spain is stated. Article 2 states that parents have the right to a moral and religiously based education for their children in accordance with their own convictions. By the mid-1980s, the state had become by far the most important source of funding for both public and private schools. The structure that was introduced by the 1970 act on general education established the structure that was maintained until the 1990s, when the new, progressive system was introduced.

Until 1990 about one-third of the students followed the vocational track. Despite the aim of promoting vocational education from the 1970s, general education continued to be more popular, stemming from the fact that students from particular social backgrounds were over-represented. According to Mora (1996) the great majority of students whose families could afford post-compulsory education were enrolled in university preparatory education. This situation of greater enrolment in general education has not changed in spite of the fact that upper secondary education is now more universal.
Final remarks on Educational Systematisation

Norway and Spain are extreme cases in Europe as to degree and time of systematisation and unification of education. Norway was one of the first nations to introduce universal participation in a systematised and centralised public system. Private education early became scarce due to economic, restrictive state regulations, and has received limited autonomy in a society with strong democratic and egalitarian ideas. In the early unified system of Norway the various assertive groups of the society have been educated in the same system. Consequently, the system has been forced to specialise from within, according to the strength of the pressure from these groups. In Spain, different assertive groups have set up new and independent institutions when the output of the existing institutions was not assessed to be serving their specific interests.

In the post-war time the “Norwegian Labour Party” has mandated political centralisation as a strong instrument and basis for a top-down implementation model of educational reforms that has enfeebled not only local initiative but also teacher professional authority and integrity. Education has gradually become subordinated to economic and technocratic rationality. The ideology of ‘sameness’ and ‘normality’ as is a basis of the Norwegian unified school (*enhetsskole*), has been present in all the reform epochs, but centralised control to ensure equality has been particularly effective in the post-war modernisation project.

Development and reformation of Norwegian education largely corresponded to significant European currents, but the Spanish education history fell out of step in the European synchronisation of educational reforms. Despite of the similar background, Spanish and Norwegian educational systems have undergone quite dissimilar forms of historical development. Under the direction of the Catholic Church, education networks developed and operated as ‘private’ institutions independently of central, political control. Spain has been among the latest nations in Europe to organise a nation-wide, state-organised public comprehensive education system. As a system Spanish education has had relatively great autonomy and the connection between education as cultural institution and the economic and production sector has been weak.

According to Bourdieu’s terms, education may be viewed as a ‘social field’ where people and social classes exchange different forms of ‘capital’ in relational processes that they interact in. These capital forms are divided into two main categories: economic and symbolic capital. Symbolic capital may take the forms of
• **cultural capital**: information, knowledge achieved mainly via institutionalised education, giving access to higher education and prestigious positions in society

• **social capital**: contacts and networks mostly related to families, which provide access to privileged positions in society

• **political capital**: membership in parties, organisations, trade unions etc. which support social capital, and is typical in socio-democratic societies (Bourdieu 1986, 1992, 1996c; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1993; Bourdieu and Passeron 1994; Broady and Palme 1989).

*Social capital* inherited through family networks, have been more efficient than *cultural capital* obtained by formal education as access to privileged positions in the Spanish society. The value of cultural capital obtained via education has been greater in Norway, and the value of *political capital* obtained by formal participation and training in political parties and organisations should not be underestimated here. In both countries, the autonomy of public educational institutions has been limited. In Spain the church was more efficient in control of education than in most other nations; and in Norway premises from work and production – channelled through the ‘patriarchal state’ – has been strong.

Social selection in education seems to be a trans-national phenomenon, but with some variation. According to Bourdieu (1986, 1993), the more egalitarian the social structure and the culture of a society are, the more effective are subtle, *symbolic* forms of exclusion. This reflection supports the assumption that mechanisms of symbolic exclusion or differentiation may be more hidden in egalitarian and Protestant Norway than in elitist, Catholic Spain. Comparative research referred to in the introductory chapter has documented:

• a strong relation between selection mechanisms and *economic capital* in countries with high levels of private schooling and financing of education, which is parallel to state-organised education (like in Spain)

• in egalitarian countries with a strong state and a powerful official class, the most privileged groups concerning recruitment to higher university education are children of the educated bourgeois and the higher service personnel (like in Norway).

It may be concluded that the significance of *cultural capital* is stronger in economically more egalitarian countries with strong traditions of official-dom, compared to the significance of *economic capital* in societies with dual private-public education. *Social mobility* is also closely related to the level of openness of social institutions and structures. Spain and Norway are expected to constitute extreme cases regarding the categories above. On this basis, the restructuring during the last decade and some of its consequences to equality and inequality will be the topic of the next chapter.
Restructured Education in Spain and Norway: Preparing for the Future

Policies are relatively easy to formulate and often easier to mandate. The problem is one of practice.

E. N. Eisner.

The previous chapter showed that development and reformation of national education systems in Spain and Norway have been non-synchronised, and both cases were ‘out of time’ with the European reformation period around the turn of the nineteenth century. In Norway, systematisation and unification was initiated remarkably early and effectively. In contrast, the same processes in Spain unfolded hesitantly and comparatively late. The main topic of this chapter is whether and how the restructuring process at the turn of the twentieth century has brought the two European extreme cases closer to each other. This chapter addresses the present structure and organisation from an overall perspective of educational equality, and examines some main questions:

• What is the ‘restructuring package’ in the two countries?
• How is the principle of equal opportunities implemented in the reforms?
• How has the restructuring attended to self-definition and self-determination of key actors in schools?
• How is outcome of education in schools and in society equally or inequally distributed?

Educational Equality: Fate or Social Justice?

According to Farrell (1992: 111,112), the concept of equality can be related to four goals concerning the probability that children from different social groups can:

• get into education: equality of access
• stay in the school system to some defined level: equality of survival
• learn the same things: equality of output
• live relatively similar lives subsequent to and as a result of schooling (income, access to work and social positions etc.): equality of outcome

In particular, the following inequalities have been documented in relation to the selection pressures operating at the stage of transfer from primary
to secondary education. The most striking trends have been related to access and retention in connection with the variables of socio-economic background and sex/gender:

- children from lower socio-economic groups in Europe more frequently than others tend to leave school without reaching or completing the last grades
- drop-out relates systematically to poor academic ability for males, but female drop-outs do not score lower in academic ability than those who complete education
- a marked tendency for children from higher socio-economic backgrounds to transfer to post-primary schools that lead to tertiary education
- children from lower socio-economic strata tend to go to vocational/technical schools

The fact that such educational inequalities exists, has been discussed from two main basic value aspects: the social realist attitude against the ideology of affirmative action. The first holds that educational inequalities will always exist due to genetic and social inheritance, and it is utopia to try to achieve equality of conditions in schools and outcomes of education in society. The egalitarian counter-perspective of affirmative action is a strategy that is basically addressing the aspect of opportunities. Equality of opportunities in education has meant that all children, irrespective of race, culture, sex, socio-economic status or place of residence, should have equal learning possibilities. Eventual barriers to this equality should be eliminated. The principle of equality of rights that are not contingent upon achievement has been viewed as a possible way that to some extent may counteract the effect of a possible uneven motivation and ability in different groups. A more radical view has focused on equality of real participation in the educational system. From this radical point of view it is necessary to practise affirmative action, also labelled positive discrimination or compensation, in order to overcome inequalities of real participation and opportunities (Gallagher and Mullern 1992; Bullivant 1992; Farrell 1992).

The concept of marginalisation is a concept increasingly used to describe disintegration or excluding mechanisms in society, particularly related to education and the labour market. It describes a dynamic process by which individuals and groups located within a public space or social field are drawn away from the centre of power towards the periphery by means of excluding mechanisms. The concept marginalisation is used to analyse social and cultural indicators of disintegrated positions in the society (mainly related to weak social welfare and unemployment). In this perspective it is assumed that education is playing an increasing role in the
process of marginalisation, due to its importance in the late modern ‘knowledge society’.

Special (needs’) education is differentiation and may be understood from the perspective of affirmative action. Equality of opportunities inevitably deals with the whole school as an organisation, as well as the whole educational system, and not only limited to isolated problems of individual students. The use of definitions for handicap categories in education legislation was discontinued after 1975 in Norway. The same is true for Spanish policy from 1985. Instead, policy documents have increasingly placed the focus on the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of schools, in line with the growing assumption that learning difficulties and exclusive forces are created in the school system itself. However, in practical life individual diagnosis is still necessary – and even more than before – in order to release necessary resources for special education.

There is a common division of the integration concept into two categories throughout the legislation that regulates special education, and from which some indicators of equality will be dealt with in this chapter:

- **pedagogic** integration – in regular schools and classes; more often referred to as inclusive learning environments
- **socio-economic** integration, which incorporates a wider perspective of integration in society, in adult status and work and leisure world (often referred to as **social** integration, and its counterpart **social exclusion**).

### Spanish Restructuring

The Spanish restructuring has been implemented during a ten-year reform period from 1991 to 2001 and concerns structure, organisation, pedagogy and curriculum. The reforms have placed Spain in a mid-range category of Western European countries, when unification of the system and differentiation from **within** the system is concerned. According to the new structure, the choice between vocational and general education has been postponed for two years to the age of 16, and streaming according to abilities has been eliminated. The reforms have introduced an open and flexible approach to curriculum, which largely seems to be differentiated by means of a gradual increase in elective subjects. In the last cycle electives cover up to 35 per cent of the intended teaching time. The adaptation of curriculum to individual level has been improved, also leaving room for

---

28 In the years 1990–95 the reforms were implemented in pre-schools and in the six grades of primary school. During the period from 1996/97 to 1999/00 the reform were implemented in secondary obligatory education, and in the period 1998/99 to 2000/01 implemented in post-compulsory secondary education and professional education/training.
changes to suit specific groups of students. This represents a trend towards differentiation at individual level.

During the implementation period, education has been regulated partly by the former education acts on general education of 1970 (LGE), the 1990 act reforming the organisation of the system (LOGSE), and an act passed in 1995, which more specifically regulates the educational activity in schools (LOPEG).

Restructuring according to the regulations provided by LOGSE (1990) has introduced a ten-year compulsory and comprehensive education for all young people between the age of 6 and 16 years, creating a new structure that consists of two parallel school arrangements from infancy to higher education:

- a **general educational system**
- a **special system** of art education: music, dancing, dramatic arts, studio arts, design, languages, sports

Before the age of six, children may be enrolled in non-obligatory, early years education (Educación Infantil) that consists of two phases, each consisting of three years. From the age of 6 to 12 children are enrolled in compulsory primary education (Educación Primaria), and continue in secondary obligatory education (Educación Secundaria Obligatoria), from 12 to 16 years. Non-obligatory secondary education from the age of 16 years consists of a two-year general education (Bachillerato) and professional education at intermediate level (Formación Profesional de grado medio). Above this level is professional education at superior level (Formación Profesional de grado superior) and university education (Educación Universitaria). LOGSE also regulates adult education and special affirmative education with the aim of compensating for educational inequalities and to meet specific educational needs. LOGSE takes over from the general law concerning education passed in 1970 (LGE), which established compulsory and comprehensive education for all in general basic education (Educación General Básica – EGB) from the age of 6 to 14 years. This consisted of eight years of compulsory education, which was oriented towards separate subject matter in the last cycle from grade six to eight. General secondary education consisted of three years (Bachillerato unificado y polivalente – BUP); a university preparatory course of 1 year (Curso de Orientación Universitaria COU) and professional education (Formación Profesional – FP) (Gil 1995; MEC/CIDE 1996).

**Success and Failure in an Extended and Unified System**

According to García Pastor (1998), the rapid expansion and extension of mass education after 1970 has not only had levelling and democratising effects. The following presentation illustrates compulsory education as a
‘double-edged sword’: to be excluded causes problems in society. To have formal access, but not real opportunity, may lead to exclusion from within. The negative effect of the virtually revolutionary educational transition has been that of creating ‘special educational needs’ among new groups of students. This is related to increased student-teacher ratio at all levels, which has created corresponding challenges and unresolved problems of maintaining the quality of teaching. Simultaneously, the number of students having received diagnoses related to learning disabilities has increased dramatically. Echeita (1998) warns that the enthusiasm in contemporary educational leadership and policy-making may overshadow the needs of deep-rooted qualitative improvements in special needs education.

The Spanish integration programme has involved opening mainstream schools to students who earlier were in special schools, and improving education in regular schools for the 15 to 20 per cent of the students who are experiencing learning difficulties (UNESCO 1994). Contemporary special education policy emphasises that the aim is to educate pupils with special educational needs in the least restrictive environment. This is to be sought within a framework of normalisation of social and educational services, integration in mainstream schools and individualised teaching. Special education shall be available to children and adolescents in the same age group as those in ordinary compulsory education, but it may be expanded beyond the compulsory years up to age 18. Categories of disabilities are not defined in the legal framework, but they may be used for administrative purposes, as in the case of allocation of resources. The policy of integration is mandated at all levels of compulsory education, as well as in pre-school. A 1993 resolution went further to expand integration also to upper secondary level vocational education.

Special education is the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Science (MEC), and is administered by the Sub-directorate of Special Education within the Directorate of Educational Reform. Administrative decisions are shared between MEC and the autonomous communities. The Royal Body for the Prevention and Care of People with Disabilities co-ordinates all activities, including education. Private institutions can freely be set up with or without, joint association with public authorities. Special boarding schools provide services in severe cases of emotional and behavioural disturbance, mental retardation, physical/motor disabilities, visual and hearing impairment. All these categories in less severe forms, and language disorders and learning disabilities, are provided for in the form of support teaching in regular classes and resource rooms within regular schools (UNESCO 1995).

The history of formalised and public ‘special needs education’ in Spain is young. The centralised bureaucracy of the Franco administration had not
been very responsive to the needs of this weak, heterogeneous group. ‘Weak’ here refers to lack of power to set up alternative strategies and conduct assertive negotiations directly with the schools, which would have been strategies applied by assertive elite groups when the regular schools did not serve their needs.

Institutions for children with sensory disorders and mentally ill were established in the nineteenth century. The first school for mentally disabled children was opened in 1925. During the Second Republic (1931-36), the Department of Education became aware of the need to build special schools. From the time of the civil war the whole public educational system was neglected and misruled, and the problems of students with disabilities were only approached through private initiative. In 1955 MEC proposed the development of a plan for special education; however, it was not finished until 1978. Until the 1960s the conditions of handicapped people were debased and poor, but during this decade several types of MEC-supported and private special institutions were established. Boarding schools for handicapped children who lived in deprived social environments were set up. Social services had priority and most of them lacked educational programs. Public financial support was linked to individual diagnosis. Students with minor disabilities attended regular schools. With the increased mass enrolment of the 1960s, spontaneous initiative was also taken within schools where special classes were lacking, in order to remedy what was felt by teachers to be an unsatisfactory situation. It is reported on a nation-wide form of personal initiative and solidarity of teachers who started to adapt the syllabus to individualised learning programs, in solidarity with the students. This has been called the ‘spontaneous integration’, which expressed an essentially different attitude than the regular pedagogical one: that of making plans according to what the students in fact would be able to do instead of focusing on shortcomings (García Pastor 1998: 47).

The 1970 General Act on Education (LGE) for the first time organised and formulated Special Education in Spain. A National Institute for Special Education was set up in 1975 as an implementation of LGE, with the mandate to formulate a National Plan for Special Education. There were two major needs to be met: first, those of children not yet enrolled in schools due to severe handicaps, and second, the increasing problems with moderately handicapped children within the schools. A segregated system was developed through the establishment of special schools dedicated primarily to the first group; special classes within schools were to serve the second category. Special education in this era was in practice a parallel system, but terms such as ‘integration’ and ‘normalisation’ were conceived as adequate to cover the special classes within regular schools.

The Constitution of 1978 states that “(...) all have the right to an educa-
tion. The liberty to an education is recognised” (*Carta Magna*, Article 27, in UNESCO 1996: 157). It is also determined that public authorities “(...) will bring into being a policy of prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and integration (...) of the disabled and take steps to ensure the fulfilment of these rights in practice” (Article 49). This legal framework provided the necessary opportunity to formalise and improve already existing efforts in the civil and voluntary sphere to improve life conditions for handicapped people. The autonomous regions where modern educational systems in general were most developed, started the planning of special education on the basis of this general framework. Integration was most progressive in these regions.

The Royal Decree of March 1985 stated prescriptive statutory regulations to be implemented in an eight-year program and to be operative statewide. It is therefore particularly after this time that educational plans and priorities concerning ‘special educational needs’ have spread most rapidly, with the autonomous communities having developed their own processes of implementation. This recent development and growth of special education should be viewed in relation to the considerable educational expansion in general, but also to societal changes in general, as described in previous chapters. An act on social integration of handicapped people (LISM) laid in 1982 a new foundation for a change of attitudes in the statement specifying that the concept of handicap is to be understood as a result of social and environmental factors, not as an individual problem of disability. The removal of barriers to occupational integration and participation in social security programmes were targets for change. From this basic point of view steps were taken towards co-ordination and unification of the different aspects of provision of services to handicapped persons. Education was one of the four target issues, together with assessment/identification, rehabilitation and professional training. An essential implication of this legal framework was that education must be organised according to the special characteristic of education as an integral, flexible and dynamic process.

The 1990 educational act (LOGSE) laid down the integration of special education within the mainstream system that is open to diversity, and introduced the concept of ‘special educational needs’. Both common and more severe problems were to be attended to within comprehensive education system.

The 1995 act (LOPEG) drew a distinction between two categories of ‘special educational needs’, between those who have physical, psychic or sensory disabilities and severe behavioural problems as opposed to those who are in socially or culturally unfavourable situations. Special education is for the first category, and the second is the target group of *compensatory education*. This distinction has been further outlined in the Organic
Act on the Quality of Education (LOCE) of 2002. According to this act, the principles of non-discrimination and normalisation are basic to achieve the integration of students in the first category above, and _compensatory education_ is to be given to students with _foreign cultural background and to specially gifted ones_, which is the other group of students having 'special educational needs' (Eurybase 2003).

The principle of integration is no longer viewed as being compatible with teaching in special segregated classes, and no longer exclusively attended to negative definitions of unfavourable life conditions. There have been three different teams supporting the integration process.

- multi-disciplinary teams for assessment
- teacher-support teams
- therapists in the fields of speech therapy, psychotherapy, physical and psycho-motoric therapy.

To establish formalised individual programmes has been an essential aspect of the integration policy.

**The Restructured Norwegian Educational System**

The Norwegian educational system has also been in a state of restructuring and change during the 1990s. Primary and secondary education had previously been regulated by three different educational acts in their respective areas: Basic Education (_Grunnskolen_) in 1969, Upper Secondary (_Videregående skole_) in 1974, and finally the Act on Vocational Training (_Fagopplæring i arbeidslivet_) passed in 1980. In addition, the 1976 Act on Adult Education contained regulations concerning primary and secondary education. From the autumn of 1999 all these acts were replaced by The Act on Training (_Opplæringslova_). Introduction to the act states that the law continues to build on the previous authorisation to _give binding curricular provisions on subject matters and instructional time, essential work methods and work contents and aims_ to be fulfilled in primary and secondary education (MESC 1998: 3. Italics added). Private education in state-subsidised schools will continue to be regulated by a separate act.

Until 1997, compulsory education covered 9 years of schooling from the age 7 to 16. In accordance with decisions made by Parliament, which extended compulsory education from 9 to 10 years, all children from the school year 1997/98 have started school at the age of 6 years. The “six-year reform” and the so-called “all-day school” (_heldagsskolen_, which permits children to stay at school after instructional time), have been given a high priority in the elementary school reform. Basic school consists of a
primary stage (barnetrinnet) from grades 1 to 7, and a lower secondary stage (ungdomsskolen) from grades 8 to 10. The ten-year compulsory school is completely comprehensive and co-educational. The revised curriculum guidelines for the compulsory basic school from 1987, has been replaced by an obligatory curriculum that was introduced in 1997. The reform in primary and lower secondary obligatory education – Reform 97 – has been characterised by the Ministry (1994: 21) as a fourfold reform:

• a family reform which provides a secure environment for children while their parents are at work
• a children’s reform which gives schools greater responsibilities for the developmental environment of children and wider scope of learning
• a school reform which extends compulsory education by one year and leads to reform of content, teaching and learning, and finally
• a cultural reform whereby a greater part of institutions in the local environment become integrated in the everyday life of schools

The principal aims of education are formulated in the Core Curriculum that was introduced in 1994, provides a common basis for Primary, Secondary and Adult Education.

The reform of upper secondary education that was introduced in the academic year 1994/95 – Reform 94 – encompassed major changes:

• educational expansion
• structural simplification
• new curricula and didactic approaches

There is a trend away from early specialisation to the formation of a common and broad, general knowledge base that extends the character of comprehension through the foundation course. The more than 100 previously existing foundation courses that were characterised by an early specialisation, have been replaced by 15 foundation courses in total, 12 are vocational courses.29 Specialisation is now postponed to the advanced courses. All students between the age 16 to 19 years have statutory right of 3 years of post-compulsory education (in upper secondary education, grades 10 to 12). Students have the right to be accepted at one of three alternatives set by themselves. Students who are neither in education nor at work are under formal responsibility of an advisory service body (Oppfølgingstjenesten), which has the mandate to get the young person either back to school or into work. Upper secondary education leads to a vocational certificate or study competence in higher education.30

29 Initially the foundation courses were reduced to 13, later to 9, and lately the number has bee increased to 15.
Norwegian Special Education during Restructuring

The aim of Norwegian policy for special education ahead of and during restructuring period was twofold: to ensure the highest possible quality of life for each child and young person, and to ensure education and training adapted to the needs of the individual. These aims were sought by individualised curriculum programmes, in which contents and specific objectives are decided on the basis of the specific learning abilities of each child. Special education has been provided in accordance with the basic ideologies of integration, participation and decentralisation. It should be added, that after the formal reform period was terminated, special education policy increasingly tends to draw on the framework on inclusive learning environments and schools according to international trends. Accordingly, barriers between mainstream and special education are being broken down in terms of organisation of teaching/learning and allocation of resources. This trend might lead to minimisation of often stigmatising individual diagnoses, but the fact that these are used to document needs of additional financial resources to the school budget as a whole, they are still of great significance.

The brief retrospection below is intended to illustrate that the Norwegian progressive view of educational equality also corresponds to social control and the power to exclude. The school law of 1889 had taken for granted that some segments of society would not participate in those ‘common school experiences’ that were intended to be the case for all the rest. The education policy of a free public school for all did not include disabled people, as it allowed the exclusion of ‘feeble-minded’, crippled, and even children who misbehaved. In 1848 and 1868 some steps had been taken within the legal framework to regulate or control the family and social environmental background that was thought to contribute to mal-adaptive behaviour. Children might be taken away from parents who were conceived of as indifferent and disorderly to a level that caused the neglect of children under 16 years in the countryside and 19 in the cities. Based on the 1881 law concerning instruction for the ‘abnormal’, some special ‘school homes’ (skolehjem) were established for neglected children and youth. These measures served as an effective social control of parents to fulfil the obligations that were reviewed by the schools.

In 1896, Norway decided to establish the first public childcare (Barnevern) in the world. Stang Dahl (1987, in Slagstad 1998) views this act and the child guidance institution as effective means to intervene in – and control the family, thereby protecting society as much as the child.

---

Stang Dahl found that public child guidance was rooted in the need of the schools to exclude those who were obstacles to fulfilling the political aims of the 1890s, designed to include and integrate the whole population in a democratic, unified education. The law on child guardianship (Vergelov) of 1896 was an instrument by which the school might exclude and segregate individual students to a necessary degree in order to have a high enough standard to include all social classes into one school. It also created an opportunity for standardising ordinary classes to reach acceptable achievement levels, and was according to the previously referred historical analyses, discussed as a necessary precondition in the preparatory works to the school law of 1889. According to Slagstad (1998), the decision to introduce this means to exclude low functioning, difficult and ‘infectious’ individuals was taken without any debate on its legitimacy. Special education and psychiatry became new sorting mechanisms to create the ‘healthy societal body’ by means of ‘normality reforms’ that made it legitimate to segregate those who did not fit into the normality concept. Slagstad asserts that a primary reason for this standardisation was associated with the general European industrialisation and urbanisation of the time.32

In the pre-war time, special classes within the regular schools and a limited number of local, special day schools had been established in the major cities. In 1951 a special school act was passed which formed the legal basis of the establishment of a nation-wide network of special schools under the governance of the state. From 1955 local authorities were mandated to take responsibility for special education students who could not follow regular teaching. In the 1960s the intentions of the 1951 act on special education became increasingly a subject of debates. The integration and normalisation debate resulted in 1975 in additional regulations to the law on basic schools of 1969, which became operative from 1976. The legal framework of special education was then incorporated into the basic-school law. As far as possible, students with ‘special educational needs’ were to be integrated in regular schools and taught according to their abilities and qualifications. A great number of special schools that were run by the state were transferred to the municipalities. Revisions of the legal framework regulating non-compulsory education were passed during the 1970s and all children were entitled to be educated according

---

32 Auxiliary instruction (hjelpeundervisning) was introduced in the same period – at the turn of the 19th century – also after model in continental Europe, more specifically from Berlin. In the capital Christiania the first work school (arbeidsskole) for crippled opened in 1892, where practical and occupational training and religious fostering were main activities. Many arrangements were also made in the private sector to teach disabled persons some productive skills.
to own needs, interests and capabilities, in primary as well as in secondary education (if necessary by means of positive discrimination or affirmative action). According to Vislie (1990: 258) around 10 per cent of compulsory school-aged students were offered some sort of special education within the regular schools. In 1967 an act had been passed in Parliament, stipulating that children with malfunctions were to be educated in their local environment and were only to be moved to central state schools or local special schools if absolutely necessary. The local community had become responsible for the fulfilment of the right to specially adapted education.

During the 1980s the great majority of the state centralised special schools were closed and the students transferred to local provision. The aim of the ministry was to convert the remaining state-run special schools to resource and service centres within a nation-wide network where the state and municipalities jointly might contribute to adapted special education in the local environment. During the 1980s there was an extensive investment of resources for the transference from special classes to small groups and individual teaching in ordinary schools. In 1982/83 approximately 27 per cent of the government grants for the primary and lower secondary education were allocated to serve the 12 per cent of pupils who were assessed to be in the need of special education. After the municipalities had increased the share of the expenditure, around 30 per cent of the total costs were spent on special education in regular schools (Vislie 1990). Since 1987, students with ‘special educational needs’ who apply for upper secondary education have been given priority.

In June 1991, based on two White Papers (St. meld. no. 54 of 1989–1990, and no. 35 of 1990–1991), a reorganisation of special education was adopted by the Parliament, and by which most of the special boarding schools were to be transformed into National Competence Centres with the mandate to offer services of assessment and expert consultation nationally and regionally. Statistics presented by OECD (1995) that was based on 75 per cent of the school-age population show that in 1995 0.6 per cent of students with special educational needs were taught in special schools or classes, and the remainder were educated in mainstream schools. The 1994 Reform concerning upper secondary education introduced statutory rights to three years of upper secondary education and vocational education. Those who have been assessed by an expert to be in need of special needs education have the right to be accepted into their first choice of foundation course, and their right of a school place was prolonged to 5 years. The Reform of 1997 states that the basic school shall be an including fellowship. Pupils with ‘special training needs’ shall participate in social, cultural and subject-related learning environments that are characterised by a spirit of community and equality (MCES 1996: 58. Principles and Guidelines. Translated from Norwegian).
Differentiation Practices in Spain and Norway

Do differentiation policies and ideologies of justice and equality in the various countries enhance relatively homogenous or pluralist learning environments? The two most common differentiation methods internationally are:

- ability-grouping within classes
- team teaching, whereby a teacher collaborates with one or more other teachers to arrange teaching so that students can work according to their own level of knowledge and have individualised instruction.

The second form has from the restructuring period been most frequent in Norway, where ability grouping between classes is legally prohibited. Table 8 compares Norwegian and Spanish differentiation practice. The most striking difference is that differentiation may in Norway most typically be within classes and linked to ‘interests’, meanwhile in Spain according to ability and across school classes.

Table 8 Percentage of students in primary schools in which differentiation practices are used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Differentiation across classes</th>
<th>Differentiation within classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allocation to class (ability)</td>
<td>Multi-grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source OECD Education Database. Data from 1996 (a: data are not applicable, A the category does not apply).

Students with learning disabilities is the most frequent category that describes students with ‘special educational needs’. According to the OECD terminology (1998a), the following sub-categories are synonymous: learning difficulties, -disadvantages and -disabilities. As an overall Western European trend these groups of students are increasingly integrated into mainstream schools and classes and additional resources are made available to provide extra support. The cross-national categories of ‘special educational needs’ which are most relevant in this context, are ‘disadvantages’ related to the socio-economic and cultural environment or linguistic factors, and a second category where no clear, identifiable cause is identified. Additional resources are viewed as positive discrimination

---

33 A third main category refers to learning disabilities largely caused by impairing conditions of the individual (and comprises substantial normative agreement on e.g. sensory defects and cerebral dysfunctions, etc.).
(in line with affirmative action described previously) in OECD terms, and understood in Spanish as ‘compensatory education’ (educación compensatoria) and in Norwegian, ‘special education’ (spesial-undervisning).

A Centre-Periphery Perspective to Educational Leadership

In what follows below is an examination of the differences in centre-periphery dimensions and hierarchical systems in the two countries with special focus on the educational sector. The Spanish centralised organisation of the educational system during the fascist dictatorship (1939–1975), has by Spanish researchers been viewed as an altogether exceptional state. It did not reflect the historically patterned distribution of power between traditionally strong regions, nor the relatively weak political centre of the Spanish nation-state, described in previous chapters. The dictatorship quite unilaterally reflected the authoritarian forces, and suppressed the liberal ones. For instance, during the regime of General Franco, ethnic groups and minorities were openly discriminated against, and only the Castilian language was allowed as the language of instruction in schools. This situation did not correspond with Spanish tradition for pluralism and strong identification at local level. Since 1975, however, there has been a constant reorientation characterised by redistribution of power to the regions and local levels. In particular, since 1986, when Spain became member of the European Common Market, educational policy-making has also been marked by an openness to European and OECD models of educational decision-making procedures.

During the restructuring process, the Spanish educational system has gradually become one of the most decentralised models existing in Europe. The Constitution of 1978 determines the distribution of responsibilities between the state and the 17 Autonomous Communities, which are administered by regional governments and parliaments. The Autonomous Communities may receive full autonomy when they take responsibility for regulatory and executive responsibilities. Autonomous Communities have fully decentralised rights and responsibilities in educational decisions. They are only centrally regulated by the basic laws and a minimum statutory directives from MEC. These autonomous communities may govern the education system by different legislative policies and local arrangements. The rest, and less autonomous communities with the least developed educational systems are under stronger governance of MEC, in order to fulfil statutory minimum requirements.

In Norway there has been an ongoing process of change in the educational centre-periphery dimension for the last two centuries. Over this long time-span, administrative structures have moved slowly from strong
local provision and administration in the nineteenth century, to a gradual state centralisation and state-systematised administrative structure that was fully completed by the education acts of the 1970s. As a pedagogical response to the organisational centralisation, there was during the 1970s an effort to counteract the cultural standardisation that this might lead to, by means of strong local self-definition in curricular matters. From the 1980s this trend has been reversed. Before the reform process that started at the end of the 1980s, Norway had accomplished a fully unified and systematised school structure both concerning the quantitative extension of the centre-periphery dimension, but also regarding equality in the sense ‘sameness’ in schooling. Education was centrally administered from the top in all significant areas. However, there was still some local autonomy concerning the curriculum, since the national curriculum was only a model plan with loose guiding frames, yet, examination procedures were centralised. All students irrespective of geographical location, social background, or gender would share a “common school experience” – with small local differences, and individual differentiation according to learning ability – for the nine years of compulsory schooling (Rust 1992: 405). The current reforms of the 1990s have abolished the model plan, and a national obligatory curriculum was introduced for all levels of primary and secondary education.

A major step towards decentralisation in financial matters was introduced in 1986 when earlier earmarked grants to primary and secondary education from central to municipality/county levels were replaced by a system where local and regional (county) authorities receive a lump sum that incorporates all central government subsidies for education, culture and health services (Ministry of Education 1994).

The following comparison of lower-secondary education in Norway and Spain illustrates contemporary decision-making processes in the two countries. It builds on an OECD research project on decision-making, which collected data in twenty-two OECD countries (OECD 1998 a). The study shows that around half of the educational decisions were made at local community or school levels, the rest were made at regional and state levels.

In Spain, the role of central decision-making was limited, but certain frameworks and standards were set by the central government. The

34 The survey covered information about 22 OECD countries. The questionnaire dealt with four categories of centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making: organisation of instruction, planning of instruction, personnel management, and resources. For more detailed information about data collection procedures, calculation of the indicators and other notes, see OECD (1998 a) Annex 3, Indicator E 5 p. 406–414.
regional centre of the *Communidades Autónomos* may be considered as equivalent to the national government level in Norway, as each centre constitutes the major locus of decision-making at regional state levels. Spain was ranged at an intermediary position concerning autonomy granted to the lowest level of decision-making, the school. Norway was among the countries leaving the lowest degree of autonomy to schools among all the countries considered. The Norwegian profile is built on a concentration of decision-making power at, respectively, central-state and governmental and local community levels. In contrast, in Spain decision-making power is concentrated at the regional and the school levels.

The OECD study was based on four categories of centralisation and decentralisation of decision-making (organisation of instruction, planning and instruction, personal management and resources). When the categories were related to a ‘didactic relational model’ (introduced by Bjørndal and Lieberg 1978), it was interesting to observe that the OECD study did not take into account the student and her/his dispositions to learn (see Appendix 2). Further, to see decisions in a didactic perspective brought evidence of a weakening of the school level’s influence on the very contents of the teaching/learning. Increased local decisions concerned frame factors such as the (limited) financial resources assigned to the school, and personnel staff management. From the perspective of sociology of work (Braverman 1977; Mintzberg 1983), this trend may be indicator of a general weakening of workers influence on their own work – a trend that may reduce intrinsic meaning and motivation attached to work.35

Data from the OECD study concerning the various aspects of decision-making indicate that in the Spanish case:

• all didactic aspects of teaching and learning are domains of school-based decision-making
• school-based decision-making deals more with contents of schooling than frame factors
• when school-based decisions are taken in full autonomy, the majority of these decisions tend to be dealing with the contents of the teaching/learning (the work).

The OECD study did not take into consideration the fact that approximately 30 per cent of the curriculum of the Norwegian lower secondary school was delegated from the Ministry (MCES 1996:86) in order to be defined at school level (as local subject matter, concretising of the centrally defined curriculum, and optional topics). Nevertheless, the overall trend concluded on in the OECD study seems to be valid in Norway, fully autonomous decisions to be taken at school were almost zero.

35 For a more thorough reasoning of this argument, see Smehaugen (2001: 192–196).
Again, the Norwegian and Spanish educational leadership reflect the deep-rooted differences in the welfare state organisation that were illustrated in previous chapters. The autonomy of social actors at schools in Norway has been reduced during the restructuring, and pedagogical decisions at school may be viewed as appropriate means to fulfil centrally (nationally) defined goals and curricula. In Spain, the principles of school autonomy (founded in LODE 1985) had been extended in the laws of LOGSE (1990) and LOPEG (1995). These laws affirmed the autonomy of schools in defining organisational and pedagogical models that are suitable to meet the specific needs of the students – and the specific characteristics of the schools and their environments (MEC/CIDE 1996: 22, italics added).

The previous discussion on decision-making has dealt with autonomy versus regulation from higher levels. Another dimension to compare is whether meetings and discussions between key actors of the school are formal versus informal. In the study referred to above, Norway was the most formal case in the total sample of 22 OECD countries, as almost nine out of ten Norwegian students attended schools where formal, weekly meetings involved all staff members. The corresponding frequency in Spain concerned only sixteen per cent of the student body. Informal meetings were almost equally frequent in the two countries (Spain 44 per cent, Norway 42 per cent) (OECD 1996). These differences may illustrate the previously held assumption that different power forms have different legitimacy in the two cultures: institutional, indirect power with pre-fixed agenda (dagsorden) is conceived as legitimate in Norway; in Spain personal, more direct negotiations and less prefixed agenda (orden del día). This may also touch the cultural differences in tolerance versus anxiety to what is uncertain and beneath direct control, and ultimately the question “who and what may be trusted in” (see Table 2). It may tentatively be concluded: when and if cultural and social domination takes place in the Norwegian school day, it tends to be hidden as unspoken claims of adaptation to institutional arrangements. In Spain, it tends to be more personally expressed, when actors loose or gain power in decision-making as open conflicts.

Another difference indicated by the OECD (1998 a) study, was that in total, Norwegian teachers are considerably more involved in all forms of meetings compared to Spanish. This trend may be related to time spent in direct teaching activity. As it is documented in the Table 9, teachers in Spain spend around one third more of their working time in direct teaching activity as compared to Norwegian teachers. In addition, Spanish students have considerably more instruction time than Norwegian ones.
Table 9 Learning environment and organisation of schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of teaching hours per year for teachers in public lower secondary education</th>
<th>Total intended instruction time in hours per year for students 13 years of age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD mean</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Educational Database (OECD1998a)

Education as ‘Monopolistic State Agency’ or Private Enterprise?

During the period of modernising education following industrialisation in Norway, around 8.5 per cent of the student population were in private schools preparing for higher education. Ever since 1920, when the decision on the comprehensive school was made, only a marginal proportion of children have attended private schools. In 1970, less than one per cent of the pupils at primary level and two per cent at secondary level were attending private schools (Rust 1984; Bondevik-Tønnesen 1995). The fact that there is a relatively heterogeneous culture and religion, as well as minor class differences, leaves little room for elite educational traditions. Private schools have mainly been religious and pedagogic alternatives rather than being established on the basis of socio-economic class (Rust 1989). Restrictive policies during the twentieth century aimed at a uniform school – based on a conceptualisation of equality as “sameness”. This “monopolistic agency of the state” (Rust 1992: 412) has been part of a nationalist ideology of forming a common Norwegian identity, based on an ideology of cultural integration and assimilation. Since the 1980s there has been a more generous private school policy. As a consequence, the number of private schools has increased during the last decade. A new act that regulates free schools was passed on October 1, 2003, which set aside the previous law that regulated grants provided to private schools. According to the new act it is no longer a premise for private schools that they must be based on either religious or alternative pedagogical reasoning. So far, the liberalisation of the framework for private initiative in schooling has not led to any significant increase of applications.

During the 1970s the need for educational expansion in Spain was partly met by state grants to the private sector in order to ease the economic pressure on the state. In 1983, private initiative provided for almost half of the intended instruction time for students 13 years of age.

36 The regulation of funding to private schools at upper secondary level is currently under revision.
of all pre-schools, one third of basic education and general secondary and half of technical secondary education. The socialist party (PSOE) in power from 1982 to 1988 increased state grants to private schools in combination with a reinforcement of public-school competitiveness. By the end of this period, 91 per cent of private schools were 100 per cent state financed – and in contrast to the previous situation – these schools now operate according to conditions set by the state. Only four per cent of children in compulsory education have continued to study in schools that are non-state grant-aided and controlled (Boyd-Barrett 1991).

Private funding in education has been increasing in OECD countries during the 1990s, on average it accounts for nine per cent of the initial educational funds (OECD 1997). In Western countries there is a general opening for private activity in education and public responsibility is increasingly seen as forming only one part of the educational total. There is an overall trend that public subsidies to the private sector (primarily by financial aid to students) have grown more rapidly than the growth in direct public expenditure to educational institutions (OECD 1998 b).

Educational Opportunities and Outcome in Spain and Norway

The number of years a five-year-old child can expect to stay in formal education rose during the short time span from 1990 to 1996 from 14 1/2 to 16 1/2 years in the OECD countries. This rapid expansion is above all rooted in demands for better skilled workers combined with higher competition on job markets where there are work-force surpluses. In this social context, completing formal education only up to the compulsory level is associated with the risk of economic and social marginalisation. How are educational opportunities in compulsory and post-compulsory education distributed in Spain and Norway, and does education “pay off” equally for the two genders?

Access and Survival in Primary and Lower Secondary Education

In Western Europe, universal enrolment in primary education normally starts at the age of six, as is the case in Spain and Norway. In Spain (and Belgium, France and the Netherlands) virtually all four year-olds are already enrolled in either pre-primary or primary programs. Compulsory schooling after the 1990-reforms ends in both Norway and Spain at the age of 16. Enrolment in a ten-year compulsory education is now universal in both Spain and Norway.

Number of years of expected duration of schooling for a 5-year-old child is under the current conditions in Norway 17.9 years, and in Spain 17.5. In both countries, educational trajectories are longer of duration for
women compared to men: in Norway 18.6 (men: 17.3), and in Spain 17.9 (men: 17.1). From 1990 to 1996, the expected duration for all levels of education rose more than one year in Norway, and in Spain more than two. The increase in Norway, as in most Western European countries, was related to increased enrolment in tertiary level, while in Spain the rising number of years mainly rose due to the expansion of compulsory schooling initiated in the 1990 reforms (OECD 1998 a, 2002).

**Completion of Non-compulsory Education**

The pattern of Norway and Spain as extreme cases in Western Europe concerning enrolment in upper secondary education is clear when the generation that was born immediately before and during the Second World War are compared. These people are now in the final phase of their active working age. In Norway around 60 per cent of the oldest in this age group have completed upper secondary education. In Spain the corresponding percentage is only around 10 (OECD 2002). As it is illustrated in Table 10, this gap between the nations is narrowing as we descend in the age groups, but is still not closed even when the youngest age group of the work-aged population is compared.

*Table 10 Percentage of the population that has completed upper secondary education*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>55–64</th>
<th>45–54</th>
<th>35–44</th>
<th>25–34</th>
<th>25–64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data for 2001 (OECD 2002)

It is necessary to move to the contemporary situation brought about by the reforms of the 1990s, when the most rapid approximation between the two countries is to be identified. In Table 11 patterns of enrolment rates linked to age show only minor variation between the countries. The percentage of a given age group of the population that was enrolled in education in the year 2000 was almost similar. The great majority of the population that has passed the ending age of compulsory education are still enrolled in education: around 85 per cent in Norway and 80 in Spain. The most evident difference is that Spanish children tend to start schooling earlier and also end education somewhat earlier than those in Norway.
Table 11 Enrolment rates by age in Norway and Spain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range at which over 90% of the population are enrolled</th>
<th>Students aged:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5–14 as a percentage of the population of 5 to 14-year-olds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway 6–17</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 4–16</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Educational Tracks and Destinations**

As it has been argued previously, educational reforms in Norway have to a larger extent been designed to match labour marked demands than in Spain, where the role of education as cultural formation for elite groups have been more outspoken. Correspondingly, training for practical vocations external to formal schooling has been more common in Spain. A question to be addressed is whether and how these differences between the relationship between education and work eventually are maintained. In Table 12 the percentage of the population that was in the typical age of completion of upper secondary education in the year 2000 is sorted according to graduation from respectively general and vocational education in the two countries. A common trend that derives from the data is that a larger proportion of the students graduate from general than from vocational education in both countries. Both countries are out of step with Western Europe in general, where vocational, technical and apprenticeship programs tend to attract the majority of upper secondary students. However, the relationship between formal education and practical vocational is closer in Norway than in Spain. Another striking variation concerns the gender difference in educational choices. In Norway female students graduating from general, academic programmes constitute a significant predominance compared to male students and also compared to females graduating from vocational programmes. In Spain, graduation rates from general programmes are more similar, and graduation rates from vocational education are almost identical for the two sexes.
Table 12 Upper secondary graduation rates at typical graduation age in Spain and Norway.
(Ratio of upper secondary graduates to total population (multiplied by 100) by programme and gender).37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General programmes</th>
<th>Pre-vocational/vocational programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males &amp; females</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A comparison of graduation rates in general between the two countries based on Table 12 should be done with caution, since in Spain the length of secondary programmes has recently been extended, a fact that may lead to an underestimation of Spanish rates. It should also be noted that typical graduation age for both programmes is in Norway 18 to 19 years. In Spain the typical age of completing upper secondary education is higher for general (17 years) than for vocational education (15–17 years) (OECD 2002).

It is typical that in both countries students who are older than usual enrolment age tend to be in vocational tracks. Choice of occupation may be postponed in Spain due to the opportunity to make second choices in further, upper secondary programmes. This also ensures the possibility for more students to have a more general basis before they make occupational choices. In Spain it is also possible to enter vocational courses directly as a first programme for those who find general, academic education non-motivating. To enrol in a second, upper secondary program after the completion of primary programs has not been unusual in Spain, (as it is also quite common in, for instance, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Ireland). In Norway after the Reform of 1994, this category no longer applies, due to the statutory right designating that study places be limited to the age of 16–19 years. What are organised and classified as further programmes at secondary level in Spain, are in Norway offered as educational programs classified at tertiary level. Re-enrolment in Spain is in almost 100 per cent of the cases in vocational school following a general secondary education, which was also more common in Norway before the Reform of 1994.

37 The upper secondary graduation rates in Table 12 are estimated as number of persons, regardless of age, who graduate for the first time from general and vocational programmes per 100 people at the age at which students typically complete upper secondary education. (see Table A1.1 and Annex 1, OECD 2002).
The national patterns between vocational and general education become more evident when enrolment, not graduation is considered, since dropout before completion of students at vocational programmes in Norway is high. Table 13 may indicate typical profiles of educational cultures following the deep-rooted differences between Protestant and Catholic work ethics. General education holds in Spain a markedly stronger position compared to vocational tracks both concerning enrolment of students and as further destination in tertiary education. Post-compulsory education at secondary level primarily has academic and advanced research programmes at University level as destiny. In Norway the picture is quite opposite, and here upper secondary education most typical aims at preparing for direct entry to the labour market.

Table 13 Upper secondary education enrolment patterns by type of programme and type of programme destination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Distribution of enrolment by type of programme</th>
<th>Distribution of enrolment by programme destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The more separated spheres of practical work and formal education that has traditionally existed in Spain is still identifiable, despite structural changes following de-industrialisation also here, leaving fewer work places for low-skill workers. To be a school leaver below the level of upper secondary level is in Norway almost identical to the risk of being excluded from entry to the work market. However, it should be added that this risk here affects a relatively small proportion of young people, since Norway is the country with the lowest proportion of young school leavers when 28 OECD countries were compared. Spain, on the other hand, belongs to the countries with the highest proportion of young people having only primary and lower secondary educational attainment (OECD 2002). However, a direct comparison of the estimated risk of being socially excluded from work and adult status should be avoided, due to the traditionally different entrance gates to work in Mediterranean countries compared to Nordic ones. In Spain the risk of being excluded from the labour marked is not significantly higher for people with only basic educational attainment. The labour market here still seems to absorb people with low formal qualifications to a remarkably higher degree than in e.g. in Norway. This indicates that the relative risk of being socially excluded for early school leavers in Norway affects more ruthless at individual level, parallel to increased social pressure on succeeding in extended and theoretically more demanding educational careers. Both
women and men without upper secondary education have considerably more direct access to work in Spain than in Norway. These patterns are deduced from Table 14.

*Table 14 Percentage of 20 to 24 year-olds not in education, by level of educational attainment, gender and work status. Total 20-24 year-olds: 100.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below upper secondary education</th>
<th>Below upper secondary education</th>
<th>In education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Not in the labour force</td>
<td>Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway Males</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m + f</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain Males</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m + f</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Students who are in work-study programmes are considered to be both in education and in work according to the guidelines provided by ILO. The gap between Norway and Spain concerning the proportion of young people continuing education in the age group 20-24 has been closed. Of ten 20 to 24 year-olds about four are still in education in both countries.

**A Gender Perspective to Outcome of Education and Work**

Within the regulated societies of the Western European welfare states, paid employment has been traditionally related to full social status as adults and social security benefits. Social exclusion has been identical to unemployment. Patterns of how educational attainment protects against unemployment in Spain and Norway indicates that females in Spain are considerably least protected against unemployment irrespective of educational attainment, but with educational level below upper secondary education female unemployment rates are high: 16 per cent of the feminine work aged population as a whole. Unemployment rate is highest for the least educated women between 30 and 44 years of age; around 18 (in 2001). It should be noted that even to have tertiary education at advanced level protects females less effective than males at all educational levels. The protection for females and males against unemployment by level of educational attainment in Norway is about the same for both sexes (OECD 2002).

It should not be overlooked that people may have entered the work force, but they may be in low-paid and under-paid jobs which characterise the
so-called ‘working poor’. As group they are deprived of the status as unemployed, but mostly working in alternative and informal sectors with poor outcome and low job security. Within the European Community there has been a rise in low-paid service-sector jobs and appointments which may turn out as only temporary or ‘dead-end’ jobs. The indicator of educational outcome to be examined here is wage level. This will be approached by the following question: How does educational attainment protect against inequality in earnings for women and men in the two countries?

Table 15 Average annual earnings of women as a percentage of men by level of educational attainment of 30 to 34 year-olds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below upper sec. 30–44</th>
<th>Upper secondary 30–44</th>
<th>Tertiary type B 30–44</th>
<th>Tertiary type A 30–44</th>
<th>All levels of ed. 30–44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As it appears from Table 15, differences in earnings between men and women affect at all levels of education in both countries, but considerably more severe in Norway than in Spain. In Norway women in all ages earn about 60 per cent of men – irrespective of their educational attainment. In Spain, it is educational attainment at upper secondary level that has the greatest levelling affect between men and women, with average annual earnings of about 80 per cent of male earnings at same educational level.

From Table 16 it appears that when combined gross enrolment rates at all levels of education in the two countries are compared, educational careers of the feminine population now exceed those of males in both countries. When it comes to estimated earned income, or outcome of education in society, females are discriminated in both countries.

Table 16 Educational enrolment rates and estimated income from future work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Combined enrolment ratio (primary, secondary, tertiary) 1999</th>
<th>Estimated earned income US $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2002).
Have all access to resources needed for a decent standard of living, irrespective of sex/gender? Both Norway and Spain are among the OECD countries that are ranked as high human development countries where indicators of education, health and standards of living are measured (Norway is ranked as number one, and Spain as number 21 out of the total 175 countries considered in Human Development Report (UNDP 2002).

Income disparity within the countries considered indicates greater relative difference in Spain compared to Norway, even if it should be noted that inequality also has been rising in Norway during the last decade. In Norway 6.5 per cent of the population is living below income poverty line, in Spain this affects 10.1 per cent (defined as income below 50 per cent of median income). See also Table 17. When gender income disparity above is discussed (see Table 16), it is evident that in Norway, which was the first country in the world to introduce legal and formal gender/sex equality, has a gender difference in earning disparity which is high and persistent across all educational levels: women earn as an average only around 60 percentage of what men do (UNDP 2002). This inequality of educational outcome which strongly devaluates females ‘investment’ in education, may partly be explained by the tendency that feminine work force tend to end in service sector, with relatively low economic outcome. 80 to 90 per cent of female employment in both countries is within service (Table 18).

Table 17 Share of income (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poorest 10 %</th>
<th>Richest 10 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 18 provides an overview of four selected indicators of gender equality. As it is evident from these and previously presented data, it may tentatively be concluded that despite of the higher educational attainment for women, and despite of the fact that their share of highly skilled and professional employment is around the half in both countries, the outcome of their education and their work is marked by devaluation. Their share of high leading positions, politically and professionally, is not in consistency with the formal competence and educational achievements.
Table 18 Four indicators of gender (in-)equality (percentage of total).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament held by women</th>
<th>Female legislators, senior officials and managers</th>
<th>Female professionals and technical workers</th>
<th>Female employment by economic activity: all ages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of total</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>88 2 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81 5 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD (2002).

**Final Remarks on Educational Restructuring and Equality**

The restructuring processes of the 1990s in the two countries have gone far in closing the great historical gap between two European extreme cases. Both countries now have introduced a ten-year compulsory and comprehensive educational system. Current school enrolment rates are almost equal in the two countries. Both countries have invested in education as part of the welfare states’ strategies to meet challenges from de-industrialisation, ‘the social investment route’. The statutory rights of all to a place in secondary non-obligatory education in Norway, has resulted in a virtual extension of compulsory education for additional three years. Not to take advantage of this right is synonymous with being unsuccessful. The ‘responsibility’ and pressure for educational success at individual level has been increased since formally, everybody now has equal access to post-compulsory education. In contrast, the Spanish system allows for greater diversity within compulsory education:

- parallel arrangements of general or cultural, artistic specialisation
- private institutions and networks existing parallel to the public system
- to be early school leaver is not automatically consistent with exclusion from work

From the comparison of educational decision-making in the two countries, two different profiles seem to emerge. In Norway we find a highly centralised educational decision-making model. The geo-political centre of Oslo is also the cultural centre that defines the symbolic contents of education. The eventuality of open resistance by the weakened peripheries is reduced due to the Norwegian institutionalisation of political power in a top-down model of decision-making.

In the Spanish educational system there is greater autonomy of peripheries concerning both contents and frames of education, which implies cultural reinforcement of the peripheries. Additionally, autonomy at school level is great compared to Norway. However, assertive groups may directly influence the definition of what is valuable knowledge, while
less influential groups may become enfeebled and negatively defined by their ‘need of compensatory education’.

These different leadership profiles may be viewed as continuations of the historical reform models that have been prevailing in the two countries, and which coincide with Archer’s (1979) model of main reform strategies: respectively restrictive versus substitutive reform models. However, a sign of an approximation is also visible in this respect, since restrictive strategies have been introduced by the Spanish state in order to increase control in private education. These are almost similar to the restrictive economic-political decisions introduced in Norway about a century ago.

The restructuring may also be viewed against a background of the cultural dimensions of authority, trust and the feminine/masculine spheres. It has been argued previously in this book that in the Spanish case, power has been more traditional and personally executed as open, direct confrontation. There has not been the same need to systematise and standardise the educational activity. Moreover, personalised trust has had priority over trust in institutionalised power. All these patterns seem to be reflected in contemporary different profiles of modes and domains of decision-making: more centralised/institutionalised power in Norway, more open negotiations and personal, professional leadership at school level in Spain.

It is a general assumption that the didactic category of individual students and the cognitive, emotional, social and cultural aspects of their learning pre-dispositions and needs is a category of shrinking significance in general pedagogical decision-making at macro level. This trend is viewed as a result of the increased national and international standardisation of the contents and cultural self-definition in education. Differentiation problems related to this systematisation become to an increasing degree transferred into individualised differentiation. Standardised education systems produces ‘special educational needs’, which is assumed to be an essential part of cultural and social reproduction via education. ‘Special needs education’ may therefore be understood from a dual perspective:

- as affirmative education to fulfil democratic, educational rights of all citizens in accordance with own learning potential
- as a specialisation or differentiation strategy, resulting directly from unification, systematisation and standardisation of educational contents.

A direct consequence of the second perspective may be a stigmatising of individuals who fail to compete in standardised and academically more ambitious learning environments.

Graduation rates no longer show significant gender differences. In Spain there has been a rapid increase in universal, female participation in post-
compulsory education. Female graduation rates from upper secondary education here exceed those for males by around 10 percentage points. Spain is also an outstanding example of a country which has traditionally had a division between elite education and low levels of education for the masses, but which now is efficiently catching up with attainment levels of post-industrialised countries. This rapid change may lead to knowledge gaps between the generations. In Spain the proportion of young adults with at least upper secondary educational attainment is about twice as high as that of their parents’ generation.

Completion of upper secondary education is becoming the norm in the Western European countries, and contemporary differences in outcome of education increasingly tend to be a related to the different careers provided by vocational and general education.

As a general feature in the Western European countries, female students now attain higher educational levels than males. This may be labelled as a silent, gender revolution. The reverse side is that feminine achievements and efforts seem to be undervalued in society. Qualifications achieved by women seem to be subject to twofold devaluation: both as entry to prestigious positions in organisations and society, and as share of material outcome of work.
Life chances are opportunities for individual growth, for the realisation of talents, wishes and hopes and these opportunities are provided by social conditions.

R. Dahrendorf

An aim of this final chapter is to draw some general features of power dimensions in cultural patterns and social hierarchies in Spain and Norway, and as primary objective discuss how educational systems may practice and legitimate power and authority as if they were non-apparent or neutral. Finally, the democratic and universal principle of equality of real opportunities to participate in education and society shall be reconsidered in an internationalisation and globalisation perspective.

Modernisation Histories in two European Nations

To what extent and how have cultural value patterns and social power structures contributed to hidden and open forms of equality and inequality in Spain and Norway?

The specific ways organisation and reformation of education in the two national cases have systematically related to prevailing cultural value patterns and to the existing (but changing) economic/political situations throughout the two educational histories.

The Norwegian case has combined a relatively egalitarian social structure with a dominating collective identity of being ‘equals’. However, forms of social control that are inconsistent with the ideologies of individual rights and egalitarianism may have been concealed in compulsory mass education, and legitimated by the prospect of social mobility. The Spanish case seems to have had a contrary profile. Great power and status dispersion between elite groups and the masses seems to have been legitimated by greater cultural tolerance to asymmetry or inequality in the social structure. Social control of masses has here predominantly been a task of the church and of the family in local communities rather than of state organised education.
Education, when viewed as a system that transmits and internalises cultural values and culturally selected knowledge, has functions of socialising individuals and providing them with significant life-styles that may vary from one cultural context to another. By Bourdieu and Passeron (1994), such acculturation is considered as the process through which the dominant culture is being reproduced. This takes place by means of training and information, which form attitudes and behaviour patterns that uphold the cultural and social order. In this sense, transmission of abstract and practical knowledge may take three main forms – which are not restricted to the European context:

- **diffuse education**: pedagogic action is exerted by all the educated members of a social formation or a group
- **family education**: pedagogic action is exerted by the family-group members to whom the culture of a group or class delegates this task
- **institutionalised education**: pedagogic action is exerted by a system of specialised agents who are explicitly mandated for this purpose by an institution (Bourdieu and Passeron 1994:5).

All the above mentioned forms of education may be active simultaneously, and all relate to cultural power and authority in one way or the other. Applied to the Spanish and Norwegian cases, it may be concluded that compulsory education for the masses was early systematised in order to open the access to post-compulsory education for a broader segment of society in the Norwegian case (an inclusive system). In Spain informal education in the family, work and religious contexts have historically been predominant for the masses. Here, schooling designed to have higher education as destination has mainly been reserved for elite groups (a segmented system).

Socialisation and knowledge transmission is unthinkable without communication of authority – but also of accept and care. When pedagogy primarily is exerted within family and ‘in-groups’, values transmitted through the communicative codes are largely in consistency with the values and codes that the learner is familiar with. When education becomes institutionalised and systematised, a standardisation takes place by which definition of communicative codes and what should be taught (curriculum) is taken by central authorities or elite groups irrespective of the social origin of the student. This is in Bourdieu’s (1986, 1992, 1996 c) theories on cultural reproduction in education a core problem: symbolic violence takes place in educational systems since dominant groups define the criteria for what should be approved of and evaluated as success or failure. The dominating codes favour implicit authority, self-control and abstract, extended conceptual communication. The problem is that the school presupposes that these codes are part of the primary socialisation of the student, and working classes have other communicative and knowledge codes less favoured in traditional schools: explicit authority and
more concrete and conceptually restricted communicative codes. Bourdieu and Passeron (1994) claims that the dominating codes in schools are those of the ruling classes. However, in order to have legitimacy, this cultural dominance is dependent upon the values the middle classes set on scholastic qualifications. Their willingness to ‘invest in education’ is assumed to be related to:

- cultural ‘ethos’ of individualism, institutionalised, indirect power, linear growth rationality, and consensus between religious, political and economic authorities
- values attached to labour inspired by ascetic, Protestant work ethics which highly estimates individual merits and mastery achieved by hard efforts.

These dimensions are in accordance with ideals of freedom conceived as individual self-care and independence, a contrast to collective care and social dependency. The previous comparison of internal versus external control beliefs between representative samples of the Norwegian and Spanish populations in the various value studies presented previously, fulfils the pictures of Norwegian ‘spirits’ of hard work and individual responsibility of the autonomous self, as reflected in internal control beliefs held in socialisation and care practices. This composition is a favourable basis for early and efficient systematisation of compulsory mass education. Correspondingly, the Spanish case demonstrates stronger tolerance to collective dependency in care and socialisation values, and less pride related to work merits and achievements. These values seem to coincide with the less needs of a society to institutionalise education of the masses as compulsory schooling.

In Table 19 the relationship between education and cultural and social dimensions in the historical modernisation processes are systematised. See next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Formal schooling as joint enterprise of the state and the church. Informal socialisation in the family, but individuals also socially controlled by the state through compulsory education.</td>
<td>Informal acculturation by the church and the family. Informal social control in local communities. Education as autonomous, private networks for elite cultural formation and access to privileges professions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and social structure</strong></td>
<td><strong>Relation between the individual and the state</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct social contract between individuals and the strong (paternal) state through education and welfare services.</td>
<td>No direct relationship between individuals and the (weak) state formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social class formations</strong></td>
<td>One ruling class legitimised by symbolic capital (obtained through education). Easy access for new entrepreneurial middle class to political influence through education. Agreement rather than resistance of the middle class: co-ordinated interests in education. Strong public, official sphere</td>
<td>Ruling classes legitimised by social inheritance, economic capital, and religious dogma. Small middle class with little impact on the ruling policies due to resistance against the authoritarianism of the ruling elite. Tension between upper and middle class: limited co-ordination of interests in education. Strong public, civil sphere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious work ethics</strong></td>
<td>‘National church supporting and sharing interests in educational control of individuals to form self-controlling and skilled work force. Protestant (ascetic) work ethics (work as road to salvation).</td>
<td>Trans-national orientation of the church, the principle of voluntary ‘subsidiarity’. Catholic work ethics (work was not an entrance to salvation). Social control of individuals/families by religious dogma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polarity</strong></td>
<td>Strong cultural and economic resistance in peripheries, however gradually overpowered by central authorities. Result: weakened peripheries largely held up by transfer and definition from the centre.</td>
<td>Strong and successful regional resistance towards central cultural definition and economic politics. Result: strong regions as ‘prosperous peripheries’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The idea of institutionalised education, where political power might be executed in order to obtain certain goals of citizenship and social change, dates in its origin back to the sixteenth century, when schools for the first time began to include children regardless of social status or sex (Rust and Kim 1997). During the twentieth century, education increasingly became viewed as a political instrument for democratisation of society, and with a gradual shift of focus from philosophy of education to politics in educational discourse. After the Second World War, organisation and contents of education have been more closely linked to the political aims of modernisation and economic growth, and to the structure of work and production life.

The ideals of the old middle class of the nineteenth century had been radical individualism based on unambiguous control values, which rested upon clear and visible hierarchies (explicit authority). The connection between education and economic life was weak. Education mainly served the functions of liberal formation and cultivation. It also prepared students for certain professions, which required typical scholastic skills. Increasingly, education served the needs of a growing bureaucracy. During the period of industrialisation, modern schools became oriented towards technology and business, and the classical curricula were challenged. This was the period in which the restructuring from traditional to modern schools took place, and with the increasing co-ordination and enrolment, the significance of education changed as well. However, the new schools never attained the prestige of the former elite schools (Ringer 1979).

Parallel to the changing organisation of work following industrialisation, the new middle class transformed the explicit and open authority and control in education into more diffuse control, which is implicit to the socio-psychological relations between individuals. Individual persons also increasingly took part in social control of themselves as self-censoring or self-control. Individualisation increasingly took the form of personalisation, which made more personal aspects of the learner and his/her self-understanding open to pedagogical change and evaluation (Bernstein 1977).

Why has Norway historically had a greater adaptability to such transnational, European changes in pedagogy and educational systems compared to Spain? Some reasons are suggested below.

- In the Norwegian culture power has predominantly been symbolic, hidden and individualised.
- Norwegians have trust in institutions and find power legitimate when conceived of as impersonal and exercised in systems.
- Norwegian culture is homogeneous and more easily subject to mainstreaming of cultural identity.
Norwegian ‘state paternalism’ has reinforced political and cultural centralisation forces.

Norwegian internal control-beliefs may give a false notion of self-definition which may hamper resistance to cultural mainstreaming.

Norway has a weaker civil sphere and more politically regulated cultural institutions (state interventionism).

Values linked to the Norwegian Protestant work ethics: individualism, rationalism and strong achievement motivation in education and culture (close to the middle class codes which are generally predominant in schools).

Basis of the modern welfare state: state responsibility for individual citizens’ right to education, combined with citizens’ responsibility to fulfil a state regulated social contract.

These attributes are assumed to be an advantage for Norwegian politics that work for further adaptation to European currents of harmonisation, which seem to be closer to a ‘Protestant ethos’ than a Catholic one.

Present Restructuring: ‘European Mainstreaming of Culture’?

The political and economical relationship between centres and peripheries has previously in this book been addressed by asking how distant, how different and how dependent are the peripheries compared to the centre? Having people’s possibility to influence on their own cultural identification and development as topic, and a symbolic power perspective should be added. Does a political and financial centre also act as a symbolic centre, with authority to define and control local self-understanding? In that case, a local community will tend to have a marginalised and devalued culture, and patterns of communication, life-styles, values related to socialisation, care and identity formation become pressured from cultural standardisation and ‘mainstreaming’. To be externally defined is supposed to shape sub-ordination and dependency which hampers self-definition and creativity. The centre is strengthened, but the periphery is enfeebled. How valid these centre-periphery dimensions are in times of accelerated globalisation will be discussed in the end.

From the historical perspective to modernisation in the two countries, a focus on differences between the two peripheries has been striking. Even if such differences still exist, a focus on common, standardising forces is gaining relevance in addressing the contemporary harmonisation processes. The accelerating approximation between the two extreme cases in restructuring of education is interesting. It may be interpreted as a continuation of the nationalisation that previously was implemented within national territories, but now to greater markets and territories. This com-
parison implies that the cultural sphere, notably education, is a supportive arena for political and economic unification processes at trans-national level. The harmonisation that took place within nations during nationalisation, now acts between nations. The ongoing integration process in Europe may, then, be conceived of as an extension of personal identification to symbolically imagine that one belongs to a still greater territory than the nation-state. Education is a significant means in the formation of a European, integrated identity. In both nations there is strong local identification and resistance to external definition among people.

The dimension of dependency may be applied to a discussion whether actors within education as cultural institution have autonomy or are dependent of premises laid in other sectors of society. In Table 20 some coarse features of contemporary autonomy versus dependency in the two cases are systematised.

**Table 20 Relative autonomy of restructured basic education in Spain and Norway**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups of Agents</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. ‘Shapers’ (premise deliverers to the definition and selection of what is regarded as valid knowledge to be diffused to the masses)</td>
<td>From late 80s and during the 90s increasing informal channeling of premises from economy and production life (extrinsic premises) and weakening of (intrinsic) premises from professionals/education scientists.</td>
<td>Increased state interventionism and somewhat restricting policies concerning private education. Stronger (extrinsic) impact of economic and production life on education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ‘Regulators’ (politicians) and ‘executors’ (bureaucrats/civil servants)</td>
<td>Central definition of curriculum, its contents and its structure.</td>
<td>Central/regional definition of frames of curriculum and its structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ‘Implementers’ (school leaders, teachers)</td>
<td>Re-definition of centralised curriculum to concrete teaching.</td>
<td>School definition of contents, methods, organisation of instruction according to wide frames.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ‘Repairers’ (specialists within special education, social/psychological services)</td>
<td>General aim: Integration in mainstream schools and classes. Great increase in ‘special educational needs’ (mostly defined as ‘learning disabilities’) in expanded mass education. Great increase in differentiation at individual level (specialist guidance, individualised curriculum and incomplete leaving certificates). In practice, additional resources mostly released due to individual diagnosis. (This form of ‘social stigma’ telling who are “we” who are “the others” has been increased in spite of the fact that categorisation of disabilities is omitted in the legal frameworks in both countries).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The categorisation in the left column is based on Bernstein’s (1977) categories of key agents in schools.
In both cases the function of education as a relatively autonomous cultural institution has become reduced. The recent restructuring has largely been motivated by economic/political strategies external to pedagogical driving forces, and with the aim to modernise and adapt production apparatus to international and global financial systems.

Apple (1996) has analysed education as cultural production and claims that through the change in the pedagogical labour process towards centralised definition and standardisation, professional agents in schools loose control of substantial parts of curriculum and pedagogy. Simultaneously, they gain decentralised control of less important decisions. This change corresponds to general features of devaluation of labour, which move in the direction that workers’ influence on the contents and substance of their work is increasingly reduced. Technical management and control procedures introduced to education as cultural institution has strengthened central, political control in identity formation at local level. These trends have been confirmed at school level in the Norwegian case (Smehaugen 2004).

In Norway the restructuring process implied decreased influence of professionals (teachers, educational researchers etc.) and lack of openness in policy formulation. Interest groups and organisations from labour- and business life had a more active, but hidden, role as premise deliverers. The motivation to develop the economic sector in Spain should not be overlooked as underlying motivation to invest in education and human capital, but here a stronger professional status of teachers and school leaders seems to have maintained a higher valuation of pedagogical autonomy.

Educational restructuring has been accompanied by a new mode of governance, which is assumed to give more autonomy to schools. However, from experiences at school level around the world, this autonomy is reduced by a large number of forces which the new type of governance allows to enter into the pedagogical decisions and outcomes (Daun 2004).

‘Old Habits die Hard’ – even in ‘Silent Revolutions’

The inequalities that are concluded on below are not assumed to be a result of consciously willed inequalities. They are rather signifying that structural reforms and new formal opportunities do not abolish deep-rooted cultural practices that result in unequal outcomes of equal educational attainment. When the educational reform of upper secondary education in Norway (Reform 1994) is compared to the modernisation of secondary education that followed industrialisation, some parallel lines may be indicated. For instance, both reforms led to increased enrolment combined with a channelling of students into academic and vocational studies according to socio-material background. Both reforms introduced more
detailed and challenging curricula, which resulted in more students with special educational ‘needs’.

When it comes to leadership, the two reforms introduced different management styles. The reform that was adapted to *industrialisation* introduced bureaucratic rationalisation and detailed rules for education. The reform following *de-industrialisation* has introduced systemic control procedures through which process *and* outcome may be monitored according to achievement of aims and objectives.

This shift from rules to goals has involved that the frames of the teaching/learning have become more flexible – which is not in itself a negative change – but they have also become more invisible. These changes, when combined with harsh competition, may be viewed as a sign of the ‘risk society’. When knowledge frames, structures and demands are not openly communicated, students with parents who master the knowledge and communicative codes demanded at tests and examinations become privileged. Those with lower educational background of the parents (less useful cultural capital to decode the uncertainty) have reduced opportunities to make optimal educational and occupational choices.

To conclude: making educational/occupational ‘choices’ in a context of weakened/hidden frames combined with increased competition, is assumed to make youth from less educated family background more vulnerable to uncertainty than others. Contrary to the political aims of social equality in education, the reinforced segmentation in vocational/technical and general/academic tracks according to socio-economic background may at least partly be explained by the fact that the school has become a ‘risk zone’ with great possibilities *and* deep pitfalls. One strategy to cope with risk and uncertainty may be to safeguard and opt according to traditional, social division.

A difference between the two countries that was expected, is the significantly higher recruitment to general education compared to vocational/technical in Spain than in Norway. This national difference is interpreted as a continuation of historical differences between Protestant and Catholic knowledge traditions and work ethics (documented by Weber 1958; Merton 1964). It is also more common to take general, liberal education before vocational training programmes in Spain.

Contrary to what might be expected, given the greater overall gender inequality in Spain, youth in Norway seem to make more ‘gender-traditional’ educational/occupational ‘choices’ than their Spanish counterparts. By making traditional choices, female students aspire for – and enter – a feminine sphere of the labour market. In this sphere, the socio-material outcome of work relative to educational attainment is significantly less in
Spain and Norway (and in WE in general) compared to a masculine sphere. Females are more affected by educational inflation and are more over-qualified related to income and work status than are males. They have, therefore, less influence on, and outcome from, production relative to their educational investment. In Spain females with high educational attainment seem to receive more outcome in society than those in Norway. A possible explanation may be related to the fact that there has been a weak relation between education and work in Spain. Prestigious positions have largely been recruiting males according to social capital conveyed by the family. It is possible that females at high educational levels tend to be recruited from upper classes, and they may possibly take advantage of the social capital of their family in addition to their educational advantages. They may be pioneers in linking symbolic capital obtained by education more closely to social status in a culture where social mobility in general has been weak.

These inequalities between the genders may also be related to the distinction between masculine labour and feminine production in the agrarian society introduced by Karl Marx (1818–1883), and referred to by Bourdieu (2000). Marx concluded that the masculine dispositions have historically occupied the most beneficial work conditions. In the agrarian society, masculine periods of work have been related to ploughing/sowing and harvesting. The feminine period of work has been the process of growth and care related to it. Bourdieu (2000) claims that the priority given to masculine work over feminine has its origin in the Mediterranean cultures, but they have receded into the social order and unconscious structures of all European cultures. The educational/occupational inequalities that we are witnessing seem to fit into these historical structures as follows. Leadership is still largely masculine work: to deliver premises and initiate processes (to plough and sow?). This masculine work is rewarded with the greatest socio-economic outcome (the harvest of the growth?). Females’ educational/occupational careers are largely designed to take care of what is ‘growing’. They mainly work with human beings and processes in subordinated positions and supportive functions, which is to their disfavour when earned income and status is distributed (are they ‘losers’ when the dividends on the growth are reaped?).

It may be concluded that when educational attainment is equal, females have less protection against unemployment; they have heavier responsibilities in work and family; they are most likely to be ‘the working poor’ in formal and informal work with the lowest earnings and social securities. Females in general need significantly higher educational attainment to obtain the same level of protection against social exclusion as compared to males. This inequality – which is remarkably equal in the two countries – may also be interpreted as a reminiscence of a deep-rooted dominance in cultivating and forming citizens. To be valuable and worthy
of citizenship was restricted to males. Feminine contribution to modernisation of society was privatised and made invisible.

**Worlds Systems and Globalisation**

This book has been based on the assumption that education can only be understood from the perspective of socio-cultural, economic and political development, according to recognised theories within the field (Fägerlind and Saha 1989). The impact of religious ideologies on educational organisation has also been emphasised in an explanation of the origins and expansion of mass education, in which three features of institutionalisation are emphasised:

- **Standardisation**: it is universalised, standardised and transmits knowledge as reason
- **Homogenisation**: it aspires to be homogeneous throughout the world
- **Individualisation**: it is chartered to socialise the individual or symbolically construct the citizen as the central social unit (Boli, Ramirez and Meyer 1992; Boli and Ramirez 1992).

In this perspective the modern conception of citizenship was the source of mass schooling, and it derived from a growing hegemony of the nation-state for the pursuit of progress. Carnoy (1992: 158, 159) has shown how theories on education systematically relate to various views of the state and has claimed that education is an integral element of the state’s relation to civil society. This relation is fundamental to the interpretation of educational structures and processes. Educational systems interact with the three basic arenas of society: the state, civil society and the production arenas. All these interactions take place in the form of communicative processes and structures and assumed to be founded on a platform of the world system. National systems should be understood from this basis (Daun 1995). According to this perspective, the world system has existed prior to national systems, and nations constantly adapt to this overall system. Consequently, comparison of national systems should be connected to analyses drawing on universal world system theory (Adick 1992; Ginsburg et al. 1990, cited in Daun 1995). This systemic perspective forms the basis for the further, concluding discussion. As it appears from this world-system and globalisation perspectives, a focus on distance to the center as power tension becomes less valid. This implies a shift of focus from centre – periphery to local – global tensions in the continuation.

**Cultural Adaptation or Resistance?**

This section addresses cultural adaptation versus resistance in a local and global perspective. Irrespective of which part of the world we turn to, all institutionalised education is marked by typical scholastic characteristics, such as: ‘ritualization’ of pedagogic action, and a specific teacher-student
distance. This ‘routinization’ has been present in all historical epochs, and even in societies with weak bureaucracies. Moreover, production of pedagogical instruments such as manuals, textbooks and other tools, which are specifically designed by and for the school are basic signs of institutionalisation. Bourdieu and Passeron (1994:189 ff.) argue that such institutionalisation of education secures a monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence. A final question to be discussed:

How is culture and identity formation related to such symbolic power dominance at global and local levels?

According to Wallersteins’ theory (1988, 1990), cultural phenomena may function as a justification and preservation of the inequalities of a given social system. With emphasis on patterns of power in cultural change, his theory contributes to the understanding of culture as a universal world-system that forms the framework for the human capacity to create cultural systems and identify with them. What is created (contents) and how (form), are dependent on mechanisms of power and domination in the local creation of culture. He argues that the two principal ideologies that have emerged in the history of the capitalist world-economy view are:

- universality on the one hand, and
- racism and sexism on the other.

Racism and sexism are world-system problems, and local efforts to eliminate these exclusion mechanisms are inefficient (Bowser 1995; Nkomo et al. 1995). This perspective may add to an understanding of the inequalities of educational outcome that was documented between males and females in egalitarian Norway, as well as in-egalitarian Spain. These extremely different cases maintain some shared gender inequalities. These are remarkable within the European context that is regarded to have developed the oldest democratic social systems in the world. The differences between genders that still exist may be explained as a manifestation of a global masculine domination.

The world-system perspective introduced above may also explain why educational policies at the level of the nation-state, are continuously pressured by global forces, basically economic ones. Small countries in particular (such as Norway), and financially less developed (such as Spain until recently) will have to adapt to universal trends in order to become competitive. One imagined outcome of this trans-national process is an increasing standardisation of education, which will tend towards a global unification of the contents of the teaching/learning processes.

Seen from another perspective, globalised definitions of meanings tend to provoke reactions from local meanings, which may result in a revitalisation of local culture. Local resistance against the global currents is likely
to be manifested in civil society (Daun 1996). According to this view on the global – local dimension, centralisation and decentralisation in education are forces that are dependent on each other. They are complex and interwoven and may be working simultaneously.

Processes of international exchange in the world-system are encouraged to increase in times of deregulation of the economic systems. Globalisation of production, markets and capital may freely be displayed. Five dimensions of global, cultural flows are essential:

- increased ethnic mobility
- technological machinery produced by multi-national agencies
- rapid flow of money across national borders
- flow of information and images via global mass media
- flow of ideology linked to the previous (Featherstone 1991)

The impact of globalisation on culture is a paradox: at the same time as cultural variety and diversity is reduced, individual liberty to make cultural choices increases (Cowen 2002).

From this perspective two parallel forces may be active: first, a diffusion of democratic principles of equal rights to political participation, education, health and welfare, which are universal. A second, less optimistic outcome of globalisation is related to an accelerated specialisation of work and production, which is acting at global level. Parallel to de-industrialisation in Europe (and USA), the need for skilled labour force in developing countries is increasing. Developing countries will tend to adopt plans, curricula, textbooks etc. from prosperous ‘model countries’. Such globalised influence on people’s identities and self-understanding via standardisation of mass educational systems is likely to cause a standardised educational framework which in the most gloomy scenario could become a ‘sorting and selecting’ tool in global division of work and welfare.

Returning to the point of departure – two peripheral nations in Europe – these globalisation forces do not only affect the two nations, but also the European region as a whole. The ongoing harmonisation and standardisation processes in welfare, culture and education within Europe, are taken to be signs of alliance building to cope with increased global competition.

Questions that remain unanswered and left to the reader…

- What can we learn from the history of the European civilisation, that may have relevance in the present restructuring and integration process in Europe?

- What can be learned by the cultural differences in Spain and Nor-
way with relevance to the mainstreaming of culture in Europe as a whole?

• Which of the cultural values treated in this book are supposed to promote democracy, and consequently should be made universal irrespective of cultural and social context?

• Which critical reflections should be made if we consider to export/import parts of one system into another?

• How may we meet a stranger as ‘cultural friend’ – not as ‘cultural enemy’?

• Which concepts and analytical tools may help self-reflection on ‘sexism’, racism and ‘Eurocentrism’ in a globalised world?
Adick, C. (1992)  

Adorno, T. (1950)  

Andersen, B. (1983)  


Archer, M. S. (1979)  


Artigas, J.T. (1992)  

Ashford, S. & N. Timms (1992)  
*What Europe thinks. A study of Western European values*. Aldershof, Brookfield USA, Hong Kong, Singapore & Sydney: Dartmouth.

Aubert, V. (1989a)  

Aubert, V. (1989b)  


Bondevik Tønnesen (1995)

*Norsk utdanningshistorie En innføring*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Bourdieu, P. (1986)


*Den kritiske ettertanke*. Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget.

Bourdieu, P. (1996a)

*The state nobility. Elite schools in the field of power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1996b)


Bourdieu, P. & P. Champagne (1996c)


*Den maskuline dominans*. Oslo: Pax Forlag.


Bowser, B.P. (1995)


Braverman, H. (1977 [1941])


Broady, D. & M. Palme (1989)

“Pierre Bourdieu’s kultursociologi”. In H. Thuen & S. Vaage (eds.) *Oppdragelse til det moderne*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Brøgger, J. (1994)

*Kulturfornståelse. En nøkkel til vår internasjonale samtid*. Oslo: N.W. Damm & Søn AS.

Bullivant, B.M. (1992)

Carnoy, M. (1992)  


Cummings, W.-K. (1997)  

D’Andrade, R.G. (1990[1984])  

Dahrendorf, R. (1979)  
Life chances. Approaches to social and political theory London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Daun, H. (1992)  


Methodology dilemmas in comparative education: between the local and the global. Paper for the NICE seminar, Oslo University; November 26–29, 1998.

Djurfeldt, G. (1993)  


Eisenstadt, S. N. (1977a)  

Eisenstadt, S. N. (1977b)  

Eisenstadt, S.N. (1987)  
*European civilisation in a comparative perspective.* Oslo: Norwegian University Press.

Enguita, M.F. (1992)  

“Norwegian social democracy and political governance”. In A Cohen Kiel (ed.) *Continuity and change. Aspects of contemporary Norway.* Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Distributed by Oxford University Press.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1996 a)  

Esping-Andersen, G. (1996 b)  

Esping-Andersen, G. (1996 c)  


Giddens, A. (1992)

Gramsci, A. (1971)
*Selections from a prison notebook.* London: Lawrence Wishart.

*Kultur og hverdagsliv.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Gullvåg Holter, Ø. (1993)

Gundem, B. B. (1993)


Hagen, K. (1992)


Hofstede, G. (1991)

Hofstede, G. (1993)
Hole, N. (1969)  


Inkeles, A. & D.J. Levinson (1969 [1954])  


Johansson, T. & F. Miegel (1996)  
*Kultursociologi (Sociology of Culture)* Lund: Studentlitteratur.


*Participation and democracy in Norway.* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

*The politics of the family.* London: Tavistock Publications.


Lauglo, J. (1989)  

“Confidence in political and private institutions”. In H.D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (eds.) *Citizens and the state.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luhman, N. (1993)  

Maravall, J.M. (1985)  
Merton, R. (1964 [1957])
London: Collier – Macmillan.


Ministry of Cultural and Scientific Affairs/Ministry of Church and Education (1987).


Ministry of Church, Education and Science (1996)
*Læreplanverket for den 10-årige skolen.*

*Læreplanverket for den 10-årige grunnskolen.*

Circular f-52–98.


Mjøset, L (1989)
“Via macro sociology back to micro sociology. On Wilhelm Aubert’s last research project.” In *Sosiologi i dag,* 1/89, pp. 81 – 113. Oslo: Novus.

Mjøset, L. (1992)


*The rise of the modern educational system.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
*Statskvinnen Gro Harlem Brundtland og nyliberalismen.* Oslo: Forum, Aschehoug.


OECD (1996)
*Education at a glance. OECD indicators 1996.* Paris: Centre for educational research and innovation.

OECD (1997)
*Education at a glance. OECD indicators 1997.* Paris: Centre for educational research and innovation.

OECD (1998a)
*Education at a glance. OECD indicators 1998.* Paris: Centre for educational research and innovation.

OECD (1998b)
*Education policy analysis 1998.* Paris: Centre for educational research and innovation.

OECD (2000)
Education at a glance. OECD indicators. Education and skills. Paris: Centre for educational research and innovation.

OECD (2002)
Education at a glance. OECD indicators. Paris: Centre for educational research and innovation.


Patton, M.Q. (1987)

Rafael, G, Herranz de (1998)


*De nasjonale strateger.* Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S.

*Kunnskapens hus. Fra Hansteen til Hanseid.* Oslo: Pax Forlag.


Smehaugen, A. (2001)
*Inclusion & Exclusion in Culture, Learning and Education. A European perspective: The cases of Spain and Norway.* Doctoral thesis. Institute of International and Comparative Education. Stockholm University.


Sopena

*Educación y cultural en la guerra civil.* Valencia: Imprinta Martin.

Stephens; J.D. (1996)

Stewart, F. (1996)


Svallfors, S. (1997)
*Political trust and attitudes towards redistribution: A comparison of Sweden and Norway.* Paper presented at the conference “Europe Researched”.

Todd, I. (1985)

United Nations’ Development Program (1996)

United Nations’ Development Program (1997)

United Nations’ Development Program (1999)


UNESCO/MEC (1994)

UNESCO (1995)

UNESCO (1996)

Vinken, H. & P. Ester (1992)

Vislie, L. (1990)
Desentraliserings og “integrering av funksjonshemmede” i norsk utdanning. In Granheim, M. NB SJEKK NAVN HER!!! (Eds.) *Utdanningskvalitet – styrbar eller ustyrlig?* Oslo: Tano.


Wallerstein, I. (1990)
_The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism._ New York: Charles Schribner’s sons.

_Makt og byråkrati._ Oslo: Gyldendal.

Webster, R. (1995)  

White Paper St.meld. nr. 54 (1989–90)  
_Om opplæring av barn, unge og voksne med særskilte behov._

White Paper St.meld. nr. 37 (1990–91)  
_Om organisering og styring av utdanningssektoren._

White Paper St.meld. nr. 33 (1991–92)  
_Kunnskap og kyndighet. Om visse sider ved videregående opplæring._

White Paper St.meld. nr. 40 (1992–93)  
“…vi smaa en alen lange”.


Williams, J.H. (1997)  


Østerud, Ø. (1984)  

Østerud, Ø. (1986)  
“Nasjonalstaten Norge. En karakteriserende skisse”. In L. Alldén et al. (eds.) _Det norske samfunn._ Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag.
Appendix 1

### Areas of educational decision-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Didactic category</th>
<th>OECD-INES Criteria</th>
<th>Sub-areas and examples from the OECD study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Method Evaluation | Organisation of instruction | • teaching methods  
• assessment methods of regular work  
• decisions on school-attendance and  
• school careers (promotion, repetition, groupings etc.)  
• textbooks  
• additional support and extra-curricular activities |
| Goals Contents Evaluation | Planning and instruction | • design and selection of programmes  
• subjects to be taught  
• definition of course curricula  
• setting of qualifying examinations for diploma or certificates  
• rules for awarding credentials |
| Frame factors | Personnel Management | • hiring or dismissal of staff  
• salary settings  
• conditions of work |
| Frame factors | Resources | • current expenditure  
• capital expenditure  
• allocation of resources  
• use of resources in the school |

Based on OECD study on decision-making in schools (OECD 1998) and Bjørndal and Lieberg (1978).